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General Introduction
The German labor market has been characterized by high unemployment rates for
many years. In West Germany the unemployment rates stood at around 9% during
most of the 1980s. In the 1990s they peaked at 11%. In East Germany the unem-
ployment rates are in general around twice as high as in West Germany since the
reunification. In the 1990s they rose to about 20%. Moreover, the unemployment
rates in Germany show large regional variation. In 1992, for instance, in the West
German federal states they ranged between 4.4% in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and 10.7%
in Bremen. These unemployment rate differentials are very persistent.
One response from the government to the high unemployment rates has been the
massive implementation of active labor market policy. Between 1990 and 1999 the
German Federal Employment Agency has spent 208 billion Euro on active labor
market policy. Training programs for the unemployed are the main element of
active labor market policy. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate the effectiveness of
such programs in raising the employment rates of their participants.
One response from individuals to large and persistent unemployment rate differen-
tials can be to move from high to low unemployment regions.
In this dissertation the above outlined topics are studied using the IAB employment
subsample (IABS). In chapter 1, long–run employment effects of training programs
for the unemployed in West Germany are analyzed. In chapter 2, long–run effects
under the considerably more difficult economic conditions in East Germany are
evaluated. The topic of chapter 3 is the sensitivity of regional migration to regional
unemployment rates in West Germany.
Chapter 4 concerns the data used. In empirical research data quality is a key factor
influencing the credibility of the results. The data employed in this thesis, the IABS,
is based on very reliable administrative data, the employment register of the German
social insurance system. However, one of its variables of great interest for research,
the education variable, suffers from quality deficiencies, namely missing values and
wrong values. In chapter 4, deductive imputation procedures are proposed in order
to improve the quality of the education variable in the IABS.
Each of the four chapters comprising this thesis has the format of a stand-alone
paper. A brief overview is given as follows.
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Chapter 1: Get Training or Wait? Long–Run Employment Effects of
Training Programs for the Unemployed in West Germany
and
Chapter 2: Long–Run Effects of Training Programs for the Unemployed
in East Germany
These two chapters are pooled and treated together for purposes of this introduction.
This offers the possibility, on the one hand to avoid overlap, for the methods used
are the same, and on the other hand to present in context the results obtained
separately for West and East Germany. Chapter 1 is based on joint work1 with
Bernd Fitzenberger and Aderonke Osikominu, chapter 2 on joint work2 with Bernd
Fitzenberger.
In West Germany training programs for the unemployed have been used quite fre-
quently compared to other countries. However, there has been considerable scepti-
cism whether such large scale programs can be successful in raising the employment
chances of their unemployed participants. In East Germany after reunification the
same training programs have been used even more frequently than in the West and
in a more challenging environment. The economy was in transition from a planned
economy to a market one. The unemployment rates were very high. The adminis-
tration was inexperienced with training programs resulting in very loosely targeted
participation. Chapters 1 and 2 evaluate the differential employment effects of three
typical training programs for the unemployed in West Germany and East Germany
respectively.
The focus is on long–run employment effects. It is well known that in the short
run training programs for the unemployed have negative employment effects, called
lock–in effects. They are explainable because the effects are measured from program
start onwards, and time in the programs counts as time out of employment. In the
medium run some studies find positive employment effects. For the assessment of
the programs it is crucial to know if any positive medium-run employment effects
are really sustainable and persist in the long run. The contribution of these two
chapters is to evaluate the effects for at least six years after program start.
1Fitzenberger, B., A. Osikominu and R. Vo¨lter (2008). “Get Training or Wait? Long–Run
Employment Effects of Training Programs for the Unemployed in West Germany.” Annales
d’Economie et de Statistique, forthcoming.
2Fitzenberger, B. and R. Vo¨lter (2007). “Long–Run Effects of Training Programs for the
Unemployed in East Germany.” Labour Economics 14(4), 730-755.
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The objective of this analysis is to estimate the causal effect of participation in a
training program on its participants. This effect is defined as the difference be-
tween the actual employment outcome of the participants and the counter-factual
employment outcome they would have in case they would not have participated
in the program. Since the counter-factual non-participation outcome of partici-
pants is unknown, one takes the known outcome of non-participants similar to the
participants and uses the difference in outcomes between participants and similar
non-participants as measure of the program effect.
To evaluate the programs two types of employment effects are analyzed. The first is
the average effect on the employment rate (the share of participants in employment)
in percentage points measured 4–6 years after program start. This employment rate
effect excludes the years immediately after program start to focus on the long–run
effects and to abstract from negative short–run lock–in effects. The second effect
is the effect on the total time in employment measured in months during six years
after program start. This total employment effect contrasts negative lock–in effects
and any later positive effects. A positive total effect means that time lost during
participation can be compensated by higher employment rates after participation.
The program effects are evaluated conditional on the unemployment duration before
program start. Three stratums are considered, namely program starts during months
1–6 (stratum 1), months 7–12 (stratum 2) and months 13–24 (stratum 3) of the un-
employment spell. Each stratum has its own control group of non-participants, who
do not participate in any program during the stratum of unemployment considered.
These non-participants can, however, include unemployed who participate in a pro-
gram after the stratum considered. Such a dynamic definition of non-participants
has the advantage that one evaluates the effect of the participation decision as it is
actually made at the employment agency. Each time an unemployed meets his case
worker the decision to be made is whether the unemployed starts a program at this
time or not. The alternative, not to participate at this time, leaves open the option
of participation at a later time in case the unemployed stays unemployed. The first
paper’s title “Get training or wait?” refers to such decision.
In a non-experimental evaluation, like the present one, the simple difference in out-
comes between participants and non-participants is a biased measure of program
effects. It reflects program effects as well as effects of differences in other char-
acteristics, for example age. Hence, using the actual group of non-participants, a
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synthetic group of non-participants is constructed with the same average characteris-
tics as the participants. These are the matched non-participants. Then the program
effect is measured by the outcome difference between participants and matched non-
participants. The method applied is local linear matching based on the propensity
score, relying on the conditional independence assumption. The covariates used
in the propensity score estimations include socio-economic characteristics, previous
employment history, beginning of unemployment and elapsed duration of unemploy-
ment. The standard errors of the estimated average treatment effects on the treated
are obtained from bootstrapping.
The three main training programs at that time are evaluated:
• SPST, provision of specific professional skills and techniques, is the most fre-
qent program. It is taken by more than 60% of program participants. SPST is
oriented towards theoretical skills imparted mainly in classroom courses, e.g.
computer courses. Its duration is about six months.
• PF, practice firms, provide mainly practical skills in simulated training firms
and workshops. The program PF also lasts about six months.
• RT, retraining, is a very comprehensive program and trains practical as well
as theoretical skills. It results in a vocational training degree. RT takes 12–18
months, which is much longer than SPST and PF.
The evaluation is carried out using four inflow samples from employment into un-
employment. These are in the respective inflow years: (1) West German women and
men pooled in 86/87, (2) West German women and men pooled in 93/94, (3) East
German women in 93/94 and (4) East German men in 93/94. The evaluations are al-
ways conducted separately for the three stratums of unemployment duration before
program start. The share of unemployed participating in a training program in the
western and eastern samples is around 10% and 20% respectivly. This demonstrates
the more extensive use of training programs in the East.
Regarding results for West Germany, an overview of the long–run employment effects
in the 93/94 cohort is given in table 1. The first outcome measure is the average
effect on the employment rate. The results indicate that SPST increases the long–
run employment rate of its participants by 13–16 percentage points. The long–run
employment rate effects of PF and RT often reach this magnitude but in some cases
are smaller. The second outcome measure is the effect on the total time spent in
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Table 1: Long–Run Employment Effects West Germany 93/94
SPST PF RT
Employment Rate Effects 13–16 0–16 7–18
Total Employment Effects 7–9 0–9 -3–4
Notes: Average effects on employment rate in percentage points during
years 4–6 after program start. Total effects on time in employment mea-
sured in months during 6 years after program start. The ranges cover
results for the three stratums. 0 denotes statistically insignificant effects.
employment in months during the six year period since program start. It is found
that participants in SPST have a total employment gain of 7–9 months. The total
employment effects of PF and RT only partly reach this magnitude. They are
mostly smaller and in one case even negative. The effects in the 86/87 cohort in
West Germany are in general comparable to the effects in the 93/94 cohort.
The conclusions are twofold. First, in general all three programs show sustainable
and persistently positive long–run employment rate effects for at least six years.
Second, based on rate and total effects, the most frequent program, SPST, delivers
the best results for its participants. RT is no more effective than SPST or PF,
despite providing 12–18 months of training instead of only about 6 months.
Given SPST is successful for its own participants, a natural further question is if par-
ticipants in PF or RT would have gained by participating in SPST instead. Hence,
in a multiple evaluation, pairwise comparisons between the effects of participation
in any two of the three programs are performed. In the long run, most differences in
employment effects between two programs prove to be insignificant due to large stan-
dard errors. So, little evidence is found that a reallocation of participants between
the programs would have been beneficial for the employment outcomes.
Regarding East Germany, long–run employment effects are shown in table 2a. SPST
is discussed first. In the East SPST shows positive long–run average effects on the
employment rate of 7–13 percentage points. It can be concluded that in East Ger-
many also SPST causes positive and persistent long–run employment rate effects.
However, under the difficult circumstances of high unemployment and little target-
ing its employment rate effects are about a third lower than in the West. The total
employment gains from participation in SPST lie between 0 and 4 months, consid-
erably lower than in West Germany. This is explained by longer program durations
and much stronger negative lock–in effects in the East.
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Table 2a: Long–Run Employment Effects East Germany 93/94
SPST PF RT
Woman/Men Woman/Men Women/Men
Employment Rate Effects 7–10/7–13 0-0/0 0–16/0–12
Total Employment Effects 0–3/0–4 0-0/0 0-0/-5–0
Table 2b: Long–Run Effects on Unemployment Benefit Recipiency
East Germany 93/94
SPST PF RT
Woman/Men Woman/Men Women/Men
Unempl. Ben. Rate Effects 0-0/0-0 0–12/0 0-0/0–13
Total Unempl. Ben. Effects 0–7/0–9 0–11/7 8–12/8–14
Notes: Average effects on 2a: employment rate (2b: unemployment benefit recipi-
ency rate) in percentage points during years 3–6 after program start. Total effects
on time in 2a: employment (2b: unemployment benefit recipiency) measured in
months during 6 years after program start. The ranges cover results for the three
stratums. 0 denotes statistically insignificant effects.
In contrast to SPST, the conclusions about long–run employment effects of PF and
RT in East Germany are rather negative. RT only occasionally increases the long–
run employment rate. It never increases the total time in employment. PF does not
show any positive employment effects.
Individuals can be in three labor market states: (i) employment, (ii) unemployment
or (iii) non-employment, i.e. having left the labor force. Higher employment rates
can be accounted for by lower unemployment rates or lower non-employment rates.
In order to differentiate between the two, the long–run average effects on the un-
employment benefit recipiency rate in East Germany are evaluated using the same
methodology as in evaluating employment effects. Table 2b shows that no program
results in a reduction in the rate of unemployment benefit recipients. Mostly this
rate is unchanged in the long run, sometimes the rate of unemployment benefit re-
cipients even increases. This suggests the conclusion that successful programs raise
the employment rate of their participants by preventing them from leaving the labor
force. Table 2b also shows that in East Germany program participation increases
the total time receiving unemployment benefits. The fact that participants receive
unemployment benefits while being in a program explains this mostly.
Finally, regarding gender differences, the long–run effects of participation in a train-
ing program in East Germany are found to be quite similar for women and men.
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Chapter 3: Regional Unemployment and Regional Mobility in West Ger-
many
The topic of chapter 3 is the link between the regional unemployment rate and
regional mobility. The large and persistent geographical unemployment rate differ-
entials in Germany raise the question if individuals respond by moving from high
to low unemployment regions. Such migration could help equalize unemployment
rate differentials. From a macroeconomic perspective this can be beneficial for the
economy by enhancing efficiency. Taking the microeconomic perspective, migration
to low unemployment regions can also be beneficial, for unemployed as well as for
employed individuals. It is an opportunity to increase medium– to long–run em-
ployment prospects, because it decreases the risk of becoming unemployed in the
future. This is true as long as unemployment rate differentials are persistent as in
Germany. For the unemployed migration to lower unemployment regions can also
be a way to get a job in the short run.
The investigation is based on an analysis of job changes. A sample of job changes
of males in West Germany between 1984 and 1997 is obtained using the IABS. The
measure of regional mobility is the share of job changes between regions among all
job changes. A job change between regions is defined as job change in which the
job changer leaves his region and takes a new job at least 100 km away. Measured
in this manner, mobility stands at around 9 percent in the sample considered.
The main question examined is how the share of regional mobility varies with the
regional unemployment rate. It is analyzed in a linear probability model controlling
for individual characteristics of the job changers. It is found that regional mobility is
sensitive to regional unemployment. A one percentage point higher regional unem-
ployment rate is linked to a 0.1–0.2 percentage points higher share of job changers,
which leave the region. However, a 0.1–0.2 percentage points increase per percentage
point increase in the regional unemployment rate is small compared to the average
share of regional mobility of around 9 percent. It is also small compared to the influ-
ence of individual factors like employment status or education. University graduates
exhibit an about 8 percentage points higher share of regional mobility than men with
a vocational training degree.
This chapter’s main finding is a statistically significant but economically very weak
positive relationship between the regional unemployment rate and regional mobility.
This result is consistent with the observed high persistence of regional unemployment
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rate differentials.
It is also investigated whether the relationship between the regional unemployment
rate and regional mobility is heterogeneous. Regarding age it is found, that only for
those up to the age of 40 regional mobility is sensitive to regional unemployment.
Differentiating the decades under investigation, the 80s and the 90s, the sensitivity
is only significant in the 80s.
An additional aspect is examined in this chapter. Looking at job changes between
regions, i.e. the 9% of all job changes covering distances of at least 100 km, the
average difference in the regional unemployment rates between origin and destination
regions is analyzed. It is found that in the destination regions the unemployment
rate is 0.3 percentage points lower in the 80s and 0.1 percentage points lower in the
90s respectively. This shows the tendency of the regionally mobile individuals, to
take new jobs in regions with lower unemployment rates.
Chapter 4: Imputation Rules to Improve the Education Variable in the
IAB Employment Subsample
Chapter 4 is based on joint work3 with Bernd Fitzenberger and Aderonke Osikominu.
This thesis is build on the IAB employment subsample (IABS) as data source. The
IABS is a one percent employment sample drawn from the employment register
data of the German social insurance system. The main advantages of the IABS
compared to survey data are its large size and the reliability of core information
like those on earnings. However, some information like the one on formal education
is less reliable. The likely reason is that this information is not necessary for the
original purpose of the data, the social insurance administration.
For many issues studied in labor economics a reliable measure of education is impor-
tant. Two leading examples are returns to education and skill biased technological
change. The education variable given in the IABS data shows two deficiencies. First,
there are missing values for about 10% of the spells. And second, there are incor-
rectly reported educational degrees resulting in misclassifications. This concerns
some spells of up to 20% of the individuals in the data set.
3Fitzenberger, B., A. Osikominu and R. Vo¨lter (2006). “Imputation Rules to Improve the
Education Variable in the IAB Employment Subsample.” Schmollers Jahrbuch (Journal of Applied
Social Science Studies 126, 405-436.
12
The technical chapter 4 addresses these deficiencies and proposes three deductive,
nonstochastic imputation procedures to improve the education variable in the IABS.
They are based on specific characteristics of formal education. Formal education is
mostly constant once an individual has entered working life. In case it changes it
can only increase, by attainment of an additional degree. It never decreases. Finally,
the employers have to report the highest degree an individual has attained. These
features in combination with the panel structure of the data make it possible to
improve the education variable by extrapolating degrees. Degrees deemed reliable
are extrapolated to spells with missing education and to spells which are deemed
unreliable. The critical decision is which degrees can serve as basis for extrapolation.
The proposed imputation procedures differ in the heuristic rules, which reports
are to extrapolate. The procedures are designed to bound the true education in
distribution from above and below. One imputation procedure extrapolates almost
every report, including likely overreports, and thus can be viewed as giving an
upper bound for the true education. Two other procedures are designed as more
conservative procedures, resulting in lower bounds for the true education level. The
second procedure does not extrapolate rarely reported degrees. The third procedure
does not extrapolate reports coming from employers with bad reporting quality.
The results of the imputation procedures are as follows. Imputation removes more
than two thirds of the missing values. Concerning the education distribution of
employment, the improved data show the educational attainment of the labor force
to be higher than the raw data suggest. All procedures display higher shares of
holders of vocational training, technical college and university degrees and lower
shares of individuals without any of these degrees. The resulting shares in general
do not differ essentially in size between the procedures. Regarding wage inequality,
improving the data affects especially some measures of wage inequality at lower
percentiles in the low and medium skilled groups. In Mincer-type wage regressions,
improving the data makes only a small difference. However, wages for individual
skill groups are typically lower at all degrees when using the imputed data.
It can be concluded that in order to ensure data quality, applying the easily imple-
mentable imputation procedures to improve the education variable in the IABS is a
relevant step in preparing the data for empirical research. It changes the results in
some typical applications. In this thesis the improved education variable is used in
chapters 1 and 2 in the matching procedures and in chapter 3 in the regressions.
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Chapter 1
Get Training or Wait? Long–Run
Employment Effects of Training
Programs for the Unemployed in
West Germany
15
1.1 Introduction
Public sector sponsored training has traditionally been a main part of active labor
market policy (ALMP) in many countries like Germany. During the last decade,
there were many pessimistic assessments regarding the usefulness of public sector
sponsored training programs in raising employment chances of the unemployed (see
the surveys in Fay (1996), Heckman et al. (1999), Martin and Grubb (2001), Kluve
and Schmidt (2002)). While the surveys emphasized that small scale training pro-
grams, which are well targeted to specific groups and which involve a strong on–
the–job component, can show positive employment effects, these studies doubt that
the large scale training programs in countries like Germany are successful in raising
on average the employment chances of adult workers who became unemployed and
who participate in such programs. Negative short–run effects of these programs are
attributed to the lock–in effect while being in the program.
Recently, OECD (2005) has emphasized that long–term labor market programs,
such as training, often have little or negative short–run effects on outcomes. Also,
it is clear that lock–in effects are worse for longer programs, because they keep the
unemployed away from the labor market for a longer time. However, it could be the
case that sizeable labor market effects are only to be expected from sufficiently long
training programs (Fay, 1996). Therefore, it is crucial to assess program impacts in
a longer term perspective in order to investigate whether the sizeable lock–in effects
in the short run are compensated by positive long–run effects. In fact, OECD (2005)
reports positive long–term results for some training programs. Our paper adds to
this literature by estimating the long–run employment effects of three different types
of training programs in Germany over at least six years since the beginning of the
treatment.
The vast majority of the evaluation studies summarized in the aforementioned sur-
veys used a static evaluation approach receiving treatment during a certain period
of time against the alternative of not receiving treatment during this period of time.
In a dynamic setting, the timing of events becomes important, see Abbring and van
den Berg (2003, 2005), Fredriksson and Johansson (2003, 2004), and Sianesi (2003,
2004). Static treatment evaluations implicitly condition on future outcomes leading
to possibly biased treatment effects. This is because the nontreated individuals in
the data might be observed as nontreated because their treatment starts after the
end of the observation period or because they exit unemployment before treatment
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starts (Fredriksson and Johansson 2003, 2004). This paper follows Sianesi (2003,
2004) and estimates the effects of treatment starting after some unemployment ex-
perience against the alternative of not starting treatment at this point of time and
waiting longer.
For Germany, appropriate data for a long–term evaluation of public sector sponsored
training were not available for a long time and there existed serious scepticism in the
German policy debate as to whether ALMP is actually effective (Hagen and Steiner,
2000). Until recently, basically all the evaluation studies1 made use of survey data.2
Although these data are rich with respect to informative covariates, the evaluation
studies using survey data suffer from severe shortcomings with respect to the quality
of the treatment information and the precision of the employment history before and
after treatment. The sample sizes in these studies are typically small. They do not
allow the researcher to evaluate the effects of any heterogeneous treatment or of
treatments targeted to specific groups of individuals.
Contributing to the debate on the effectiveness of ALMP, this paper analyzes the
employment effects of three types of public sector sponsored training programs in
West Germany. We use unique administrative data which have only recently become
available. Using data on employment, periods of transfer payments, and participa-
tion in training programs, we carefully identify three types of public sector sponsored
training programs for the unemployed. These programs are not associated with a
regular job. The largest program among the three is the Provision of Specific Pro-
fessional Skills and Techniques (SPST). SPST programs provide additional skills
and specific professional knowledge in courses with a median duration between 4
and 6 months. The two other training programs are working in a Practice Firm
(PF) and Retraining (RT). RT involves a long program, which lasts up to 2 years
and which provides complete vocational training in a new occupation. PF involves
training in a work environment simulating a real job and is of similar length as
SPST. This classification of treatments is developed in this paper and in the earlier
1See Speckesser (2004, chapter 1) and Wunsch (2006, section 6.5) as recent surveys for Germany.
Previous studies based on survey data gave inconclusive evidence. For instance, for East Germany,
Lechner (2000) found negative employment effects of training programs in the short run and
insignificant effects in the long run based on survey data. In contrast, Fitzenberger and Prey
(2000) found some positive employment effects of training programs in East Germany.
2Notable exceptions are the recent studies of Lechner et al. (2005a,b) and Fitzenberger and
Speckesser (2007), which are all based on the same data set as our study. In fact, the data set is
the outcome of a joint effort to merge administrative data for evaluation purposes, see Bender et
al. (2005).
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paper, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007). The three training programs considered
here differ both in length and content. PF has the strongest on–the–job compo-
nent, SPST involves typically off–the–job classroom training and RT involves both
on–the–job and off–the–job training for a specific occupation. Based on the afore-
mentioned evidence reported by Martin and Grubb (2001) and others, PF should
be the most effective program, at least in the short run. In contrast, Lechner et al.
(2005a) report quite favorable evidence for RT.
This paper takes advantage of unique administrative data which integrate register
data on employment as well as data on unemployment and participation in active
labor market programs generated by the Federal Employment Office (Bundesanstalt
fu¨r Arbeit, BA). Our data set merges register data with benefit data and with survey
data obtained from the local offices of the Federal Employment Office. This sur-
vey records all cases of participation in further training programs during the period
1980–1997 and offers rich information on heterogeneous courses. Our analysis evalu-
ates the effects of training for inflows into unemployment for the years 1986/87 and
1993/94 in West Germany. These two inflow samples faced very different labor mar-
ket prospects due to changing business cycle conditions and the impact of German
unification. It is of interest to investigate whether the effects of ALMP differ by the
state of the labor market. The 1986/87 sample faced a fairly favorable labor market
in the years to come culminating in the unification boom in West Germany. In
contrast, the 1993/94 sample entered unemployment during one of the most severe
recessions in West Germany resulting in a prolonged period with bad labor market
chances.
Since our analysis is based on administrative data, we have to use a non–
experimental evaluation approach. We build on the conditional independence
assumption which says that for treated and nontreated individuals the expected
potential employment outcome in case of not receiving the treatment of interest
(which is observed for the nontreated and counterfactual for the treated) is the
same conditional on a set of observable covariates. In our case, these covariates
involve socio–economic characteristics, previous employment history, beginning of
unemployment, and elapsed duration of unemployment. The analysis uses the
popular propensity score matching approach adjusted to a dynamic setting building
on the recent work by Fredriksson and Johansson (2003, 2004) and Sianesi (2003,
2004). In fact, when the timing of treatment is a random variable depending
upon elapsed duration of unemployment, a static evaluation approach does not
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seem appropriate. We evaluate the employment effects of three multiple exclusive
training programs both against the alternative of nonparticipation and in pairwise
comparisons building on Lechner (2001) and Imbens (2000). Our matching esti-
mator is implemented using local linear matching (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and
Todd 1998) based on the estimated propensity score. In fact, kernel matching has a
number of advantages compared to nearest neighbor matching (Heckman, Ichimura,
Smith and Todd (1998), Ichimura and Linton (2001), Abadie and Imbens (2006)),
which is widely used in the literature (e.g. Lechner et al. (2005a,b), Sianesi (2003,
2004)). We run separate analyses conditional on elapsed duration of unemployment
at the beginning of treatment. We distinguish between training programs starting
during quarters 1 to 2, 3 to 4, and 5 to 8 of unemployment.
Our analysis extends considerably upon the earlier work of Fitzenberger and
Speckesser (2007) in several dimensions. The earlier paper evaluates the employment
effects of SPST against the comprehensive alternative of nonparticipation in SPST
for 36 months after the beginning of the treatment. The analysis is performed only
for the 1993 inflow sample into unemployment, both for East and West Germany.
This study analyzes the effects of three exclusive training programs for inflow sam-
ples in 1986/87 and 1993/94 in West Germany. The three programs are analyzed in
a multiple treatment framework and we evaluate medium– and long–run treatment
effects up to 25–31 quarters after the beginning of the treatment depending on the
start date of the treatment.
Comparing our work to the study by Lechner et al. (2005a), who also estimate
multiple treatment effects based on the same data, there are the following notable
differences. First, Lechner et al. only consider a sample for the 1990s, while we also
consider an inflow sample from the 1980s. Second, their study uses a different ap-
proach regarding the construction of the sample and the choice of valid observations.
The definition of treatment types and the identification of treatments from the data
differ as well. Third, taking into account the dynamic assignment into programs our
paper also comprises an important methodological difference compared to Lechner
et al. (2005a) who apply a static approach. Nonetheless, as far as comparable, the
results are quite similar in most cases.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 gives a short de-
scription of the institutional regulation and participation figures for Active Labor
Market Policy. Section 1.3 focuses on the different options of further training, their
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target groups, and course contents. Section 1.4 describes the methodological ap-
proach to estimate the treatment effects. The empirical results are discussed in
section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes. The final appendix provides further information
on the data and detailed empirical results. An additional appendix includes further
details on the data and on the empirical results.
1.2 Basic Regulation of Further Training
1.2.1 Programs
For the period covered by our data, further training in Germany is regulated on
the basis of the Labor Promotion Act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz, AFG) and is offered
and coordinated by the German Federal Employment Office (formerly Bundesanstalt
fu¨r Arbeit, BA). Originally, further training was conceived to improve occupational
flexibility and career advancement and to prevent skill shortages. In response to
unemployment becoming an increasingly persistent phenomenon during the 1980s
and 1990s, further training changes its character from a rather preventive ALMP
towards an intervention policy predominantly targeted to unemployed and to those
at severe risk of becoming unemployed. With the increasing number of unemployed
entering training programs, skill–upgrading courses targeted to employed workers
lose importance in favor of courses in which individuals are taught new technologies
or are given the opportunity to enhance existing skills for the purpose of occupational
reintegration.
The German legislation distinguishes three main types of training: further voca-
tional training, retraining, and integration subsidy. In addition, there is short–term
training which only existed from 1979 to 1992 (§41a AFG). Although, during the
1980s and 1990s, there have been many changes concerning passive labor market
policy – i.e. changes in benefit levels and eligibility criteria – the regulation of the
traditional training schemes, further vocational training, retraining, and integration
subsidy, remained stable until the end of 1997 when the Labor Promotion Act was
replaced by the Social Code III. In the following, we give a short description of the
main programs:3
3The complete list with descriptions of the different training schemes that are regulated by the
Labor Promotion Act can be found in the additional appendix.
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• Further vocational training (Berufliche Fortbildung) includes the assess-
ment, maintenance and extension of skills, including technical development
and career advancement. The duration of the courses depends on the partic-
ipants’ individual predispositions, other co–financing institutions and on the
supply of adequate training courses by the training providers.
• Retraining (Umschulung) enables vocational re–orientation if a completed
vocational training does not lead to adequate employment. Retraining is
supported for a period up to 2 years and aims at providing a new certified
vocational education degree.
• The program integration subsidy (Einarbeitungszuschuss) offers financial
aid to employers who are willing to give employment to unemployed or to
workers directly threatened by unemployment. The subsidy (up to 50% of the
standard wage in the respective occupation) is paid for an adjustment period
until the supported person reaches full proficiency in the job.
• In 1979, short–term training was introduced under §41a AFG aiming at
“increasing prospects of integration”. With this program, skill assessment,
orientation and guidance should be offered to unemployed. The curricula
under this program are usually short–term, lasting from two weeks up to two
months and are intended to increase the placement rate of the unemployed.
This type of training was abolished in 1992.
1.2.2 Financial Incentives for Participation
Except for the integration subsidy which is a subsidy to a standard salary (according
to union wage contracts), participants in training programs are granted an income
maintenance (IM, Unterhaltsgeld) if they satisfy the conditions of entitlement. To
qualify, they must meet a minimum work requirement of being previously employed
during at least one year in a job subject to social insurance contributions or they
must be entitled to unemployment benefits or subsequent unemployment assistance.4
Starting 1986 until 1993, the income maintenance amounted to 73% of the relevant
previous net earnings for participants with at least one dependent child and 65%
4If a person does not fulfill the requirement of previous employment, but had received un-
employment assistance until the start of the program, an income maintenance may be paid as
well.
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otherwise. This was higher than the standard unemployment benefits (UB, Arbeit-
slosengeld) in this period which was at 68% and 63%, respectively. And IM was
considerably higher for those unemployed whose UB expired and who were receiv-
ing the lower, means tested unemployment assistance (UA, Arbeitslosenhilfe) which
amounted to 58% (with children) and 56% (without children).5 In 1994, income
maintenance and unemployment benefits were both cut back to a common level of
67% (with children) and 60% (without children), reducing the financial incentives to
join a training program. Unemployment assistance was also lowered to 57% (with
children) and 53% (without children).6
IM recipiency during a training program did not affect the entitlement period for
unemployment benefit payments. Effectively, this means that the unemployed could
defer the transition from unemployment benefits to unemployment assistance by tak-
ing part in a training program. Additionally, participants in training programs could
requalify for unemployment benefits providing additional incentives to participate.7
Summing up, for our time period under investigation, there are positive financial
incentives for the unemployed to join a program. The income maintenance is at least
as high or higher than unemployment benefits and it is always higher than unem-
ployment assistance. Furthermore, participation allows to postpone the transition
from unemployment benefits to the lower, means tested unemployment assistance
and sometimes even allows to requalify for unemployment benefits. In addition,
the BA bears all costs directly incurred through participation in a further training
scheme, especially course fees.
1.2.3 Participation
Participation in further training programs in West Germany is large, see table 1.2.
In 1980, 247,000 participants enter such programs. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
annual entries peak at almost 600,000 and then decline to 378,400 in 1996. Among
5In the relevant period the exhaustion of UB and transition from the higher UB to the lower
UA took place between the 6th and the 32nd month of unemployment, depending on age and
employment history (for details see Plassmann, 2002).
6For detailed descriptions of the changes in regulations over time see Bender et al. (2005) and
Steffen (2005).
7This is because, until 1997, periods of income maintenance payments were counted on the
minimum work requirement for receiving unemployment benefits, for details see Bender and Klose
(2000).
22
the three main types of training programs distinguished by German legislation, the
general further vocational training schemes traditionally are the most important in
West Germany with about 70–80% of the entries. Roughly 20% enter retraining.
The small remaining share are integration subsidies.
1.3 Data and Treatment Types
We use a database which integrates administrative individual data from three dif-
ferent sources (see Bender et al. (2005) for a detailed description). The data contain
spells on employment subject to social insurance contributions, on transfer payments
by the Federal Employment Office during unemployment, and on participation in
further training schemes.
The core data for this evaluation are taken from the IAB Employment Subsam-
ple (IAB Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe, IABS) of the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB), see Bender et al. (2000) and Bender et al. (2005, chapter 2.1). The IABS is a
1% random sample drawn from employment register data for all employees who are
covered by the social security system over the period 1975–97. Because sampling
is based on employment, we restrict the analysis to inflows from employment to
unemployment.8 For this study, we obtained additional information from the IAB
for 1998–2002, which we merged to the basic data.
The second important source is the Benefit Payment Register (Leistungsemp-
fa¨ngerdatei, LED) of the Federal Employment Office (BA), see Bender et al. (2005,
chapter 2.2). These data consist of spells on periods of transfer payments granted
to unemployed and program participants from the BA. Besides unemployment ben-
efit or assistance, these data also record very detailed information about income
maintenance payments related to the participation in further training schemes.
The third data source are the data on training participation (FuU-data). The em-
ployment agency collects these data for all participants in further training, retrain-
ing, and other training programs for internal monitoring and statistical purposes,
8Restricting the analysis to inflows from employment, we exclude program participants who have
not been employed before registering as unemployed. This restriction of the data only concerns a
small share of training participants. Statistics from the BA show that the share of those who have
never worked or have not worked within the last 6 years before they enter a program is between 4
and 8 percent. Because of the sample design, it would be impossible to construct an appropriate
control group for such participants.
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see Bender et al. (2005, chapter 2.3). For every participant, the FuU-data contains
detailed information about the program and about the participant.
The FuU–data were merged with the combined IABS–LED data by social insur-
ance number and additional covariates. Numerous corrections were implemented in
order to improve the quality of the data, see Bender et al. (2005, chapters 3–4)
and the additional appendix for details. The IABS provides information on per-
sonal characteristics and employment histories. The combination of the transfer
payment information and the participation information is used to identify the likely
participation status regarding the different types of training programs.
1.3.1 Evaluated Programs
We evaluate the three quantitatively important training programs targeted at the
unemployed. Further vocational training is a very broad legal category and consists
of quite heterogeneous programs. Hence we utilize a classification developed in
Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007) and evaluate two specific further vocational
training programs: Practice Firms (PF) and provision of specific professional skills
and techniques (SPST). We also evaluate Retraining (RT). We do not evaluate short–
term training, since this program only existed until 1992.9 We also do not evaluate
integration subsidies, because they condition on having found a job involving a
potentially difficult endogeneity issue.10 Next, we describe the evaluated programs.
Table B.24 gives an overview of the evaluated programs.
Practice Firms are simulated firms in which participants practice everyday working
activities. The areas of practice are whole fields of profession, not specific profes-
sions. Hence, practice firms mainly train general skills while the provision of new
professional skills is less important. Some of the practice firms are technically ori-
ented, the practice studios, whereas others are commercially oriented, the practice
enterprises. One of the practice firms’ goals is to evaluate the participant’s aptitude
for a field of profession. The programs usually last for six months and do not provide
official certificates.
9After 1992 comparable programs were offered, but they are not recorded in the data. In order
to analyze both inflow samples in a comparable way we ignored information about short–term
training in the eighties.
10A detailed description of how the different treatment types are identified from the data is given
in the additional appendix.
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Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques intends to improve
the starting position for finding a new job by providing additional skills and specific
professional knowledge in medium–term courses. It involves refreshing specific skills,
e.g. computer skills, or training on new operational practices. SPST mainly consists
of classroom training but an acquisition of professional knowledge through practical
work experience may also be provided. After successfully completing the course,
participants usually obtain a certificate indicating the contents of the course, i.e.
the refreshed or newly acquired skills and the amount of theory and practical work
experience. Such a certificate is supposed to serve as an additional signal to potential
employers and to increase the matching probability since the provision of up–to–date
skills and techniques is considered to be a strong signal in the search process. The
provision of specific professional skills and techniques aims at sustained reintegration
into the labor market by improving skills as well as providing signals.
Compared to retraining, which is a far more formal and thorough training on a range
of professional skills and which provides a complete vocational training degree, SPST
provides a smaller, specific addition to the occupational knowledge. However, this
addition certainly exceeds the level provided in short–term programs (not evaluated
here) that usually aim at improving job search techniques or general social skills.
Thus, SPST ranges in the middle between very formal (and very expensive) courses
and very informal and short courses (improving general human capital).
Retraining consists of the provision of a new and comprehensive vocational training
according to the regulation of the German apprenticeship system. It is targeted to
individuals who had already completed a vocational training degree and face severe
difficulties in finding a new job within their profession. It might however also be
offered to individuals without a first formal training degree if they fulfill additional
eligibility criteria.
Retraining provides widely accepted formal certificates. It comprises both, theoret-
ical training and practical work experience. The theoretical part of the formation
takes place in the public education system. The practical part is often carried out in
firms that provide work experience in a specific field to the participants, but some-
times also in interplant training establishments. This type of treatment leads to a
certified job qualification in order to improve the job match. Ideally, the training
occupation in retraining corresponds to qualifications which are in high demand in
the labor market.
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Table 1.1: Overview of Evaluated Programs
PF SPST RT
Name Practice Firm Provision of Specific
Skills and Techniques
Retraining
Description training on the job
in a simulated firm
classroom courses complete new voca-
tional training
Orientation practical theoretical practical and theo-
retical
Median duration
86/87 (93/94)
5 (6) months 4 (6) months 12 (16) months
1.3.2 Inflow Sample into Unemployment and Participation
by Type of Training
The goal of this study is to analyze the effect of training programs on employment
chances of unemployed individuals. Therefore, we base our empirical analysis on
inflow samples into unemployment. We use the inflows into unemployment in the
years 1986/87 and 1993/94 in West Germany, omitting Berlin and East Germany.
Effectively, we consider individuals who experience a transition from employment
to nonemployment and for whom a spell with transfer payments from the Federal
Employment Office starts within the first twelve months of nonemployment or for
whom the training data indicate a program participation before the unemployed
individual finds a new job.11 In the following, we denote the start of the nonemploy-
ment spell as the beginning of the unemployment spell. We condition on receipt
of unemployment compensation or program participation to exclude most of the
individuals who move out of labor force after exiting from their job. This con-
cerns especially individuals whose treatment status would be nonparticipation in
any training program during their nonemployment spell. A treatment is associated
with an unemployment spell, if the individual starts training before possibly exiting
to employment. In our monthly data, this means that the individual should still
be recorded as nonemployed in the month when treatment starts. Furthermore, we
restrict our samples to the 25 to 55 years old in order to rule out periods of formal
education or vocational training as well as early retirement.
We choose the years 93/94 and 86/87 to allow for a comparison between the 1980s
and the 1990s. Figure 1.1 depicts the unemployment rate in West Germany. The
11We allow the same individual to appear in the sample more than once if he or she exhibits
more than one transition from employment to unemployment during the relevant time period.
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dotted vertical lines mark the years 1986 and 1993, respectively. Whereas 86/87
mark the end of a sequence of years with relatively high unemployment, the cohort
93/94 enters during a period with increasing unemployment rates. Thus, the 86/87
cohort faced a fairly favorable labor market in the years to come culminating in the
unification boom in West Germany, while the 93/94 cohort entered unemployment
during one of the most severe recessions in West Germany resulting in a prolonged
period with bad labor market chances. Our data allow to follow individuals en-
tering unemployment in 86/87 until December 1996/97 and individuals entering
unemployment in 93/94 until the end of 2001/02.
Table 1.3 gives information about the size of the inflow samples and the incidence of
training. We focus on the three types of training programs which are most suitable
for unemployed individuals and which do not involve on–the–job training (training
while working in a regular job). These are (i) practice firm (PF), (ii) provision of
specific professional skills and techniques (SPST), and (iii) retraining (RT). The
total inflow sample comprises 20,902 spells for the 86/87 cohort and 25,051 spells
for the 93/94 cohort. There are 1,714 training spells for the eighties and 2,727
for the nineties. Thus, about 10% of all unemployed participate in one of the three
training programs considered. Among these, SPST represents by far the largest type
of training with 64% and 72% of the training spells, respectively in the two samples.
About one fifth of all training spells are RT, and PF represents the smallest group
in both samples. In absolute numbers, there are 246 (325) PF spells in the 86/87
(93/94) inflow sample, 1,093 (1,944) SPST spells and 375 (458) RT spells. Table 1.4
shows the frequency of training by time window of elapsed unemployment.
Table 1.5 provides descriptive statistics on the elapsed duration of unemployment
at the beginning of treatment. Our discussion focuses on quantiles because averages
can be biased due to outliers. The median entrant in PF has been unemployed for
10 months in the 86/87 sample and 9 months in the 93/94 sample. Late starts
(75%–quantile) of PF occur after 19 months in the 86/87 sample and much earlier
in the 93/94 sample. For RT, the quantiles in the samples are very similar. With
a median of 6 and 7 months, RT starts the earliest. For SPST, we find a reversed
trend in comparison to PF. While SPST participation starts almost as early as RT in
the 86/87 sample, the starting dates are noticeably later in 93/94, with the median
increasing from 6 to 11 months.
Table 1.6 provides descriptive information on the realized duration of training spells.
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The average duration of practice firm is similar in both samples with 5.1 months in
86/87 and 5.7 months in 93/94. SPST has an average duration of 4.9 months for the
86/87 sample and 6.3 months for 93/94. Retraining is by far the longest program.
It lasts on average for 13.1 months in the 86/87 sample and 14.9 months in the
93/94 sample. Note that some participants drop out of the programs early. So the
realized durations can be shorter than the planned durations. In our samples about
70% of the participants complete the programs, 10% drop out because they have
found a job and 20% drop out for other reasons. Our analysis does not condition on
program completion since program dropout is likely to be endogenous. So, strictly
speaking, the programs we evaluate are the starts of the respective programs, as is
common in most of the recent literature.
The final question about the samples which we want to discuss is the incidence of
other programs. Our basic approach is to ignore the (relatively rare) participation in
other programs and classify such spells as spells without program participation. For
86/87, 1.2% of the participants in evaluated programs participated in short–term
training before starting an evaluated program. Also 1.2% of the nonparticipants
took part in short–term training during their defining unemployment spell.12 For
93/94, there existed no short–term training. The share of nonparticipants in the
evaluated programs who took part in another, not evaluated further vocational
training program13 is 0.5% in the 86/87 sample and 0.3% in the 93/94 sample.
Integration subsidies are paid to 1.2% of the nonparticipants in the 86/87 sample.
Only 0.3% of the training participants in the 86/87 sample finish their unemployment
spell with a subsidized job. And in the 93/94 sample among both, the treated and
the controls, this share is 0.3% or lower. Concluding, we argue that participation
in other, not evaluated training programs is small enough to be neglected in our
analysis.
1.4 Evaluation Approach
Our goal is to analyze the effect of K = 3 different training programs on the quar-
terly employment rate at the individual level, which is measured as an average of
12As we do with the evaluated programs we look at program participation during the defining
unemployment spell and in the case of integration subsidies at payment of a subsidy for the first
job after the defining unemployment spell.
13These other programs are mainly career advancement programs targeted at the employed.
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three monthly employment dummy variables.14 In a situation where individuals
have multiple treatment options, we estimate the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT) of one training program against nonparticipation in any of the three
programs and of pairwise comparisons of two programs. Extending the static mul-
tiple treatment approach to a dynamic setting, we follow Sianesi (2003, 2004) and
apply the standard static treatment approach recursively depending on the elapsed
unemployment duration. The implementation builds upon the approach for binary
treatment in Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007). We first present our evaluation
approach and then compare it to recent alternative proposals in the literature.
1.4.1 Multiple Treatments in a Dynamic Context
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potential–outcome–approach to causality,
see Roy (1951), Rubin (1974), and the survey of Heckman et al. (1999). Lech-
ner (2001) and Imbens (2000) extend this framework to allow for multiple, mutu-
ally exclusive treatments. Let the 4 potential outcomes be {Y 0, Y 1, Y 2, Y 3}, where
Y k, k = 1, ..., 3, represents the outcome associated with training program k and Y 0
is the outcome when participating in none of the 3 training programs. For each
individual, only one of the K + 1 potential outcomes is observed and the remain-
ing K outcomes are counterfactual. We estimate the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) of participating in treatment k = 1, 2, 3 against nonparticipa-
tion k = 0 (treatment versus waiting) and the differential effects of the programs
(program k versus program l where k, l = 0), see Lechner (2001).
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003, 2004) argue that a static evaluation analysis,
which assigns unemployed individuals to a treatment group and a nontreatment
group based on the treatment information observed in the data, yields biased treat-
ment effects. This is because the definition of the control group conditions on future
outcomes or future treatment. For Sweden, Sianesi (2004) argues that all unem-
ployed individuals are potential future participants in active labor market programs,
a view which is particularly plausible for countries with comprehensive systems of
active labor market policies (like Germany). In former West Germany, active labor
market programs were implemented at a fairly large scale in international compari-
son. This discussion implies that a purely static evaluation of the different training
programs is not warranted. Following Sianesi (2003, 2004), we analyze the effects
14The quarterly employment rate can take the four values 0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1.
29
of the first participation in a training program during the unemployment spell con-
sidered conditional on the starting date of the treatment. We distinguish between
treatment starting during quarters 1 to 2 of the unemployment spell (stratum 1),
treatment starting during quarters 3 to 4 (stratum 2), and treatment starting during
quarters 5 to 8 (stratum 3).
We analyze treatment conditional upon the unemployment spell lasting at least until
the start of the treatment k and this being the first treatment during the unemploy-
ment spell considered. Therefore, the ATT parameter (comparing treatments k and
l) of interest is
θ(k, l;u, τ) = E(Y k(u, τ)|Tu = k, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0)(1.1)
−E(Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Tu = k, u ≤ u˜ ≤ u¯, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0) ,
where Tu is the treatment variable for treatment starting in quarter u of unemploy-
ment. Y k(u, τ), Y l(u, τ) are the potential treatment outcomes for treatments k and
l, respectively, in periods u+τ , where treatment starts in period u and τ = 0, 1, 2, ...,
counts the quarters since the beginning of treatment. When l = 0, we compare treat-
ment k versus waiting (nonparticipation in the stratum) and when l ≥ 1, we do a
pairwise comparison between treatment k and l. U is the duration of unemployment,
u˜ is the random quarter when alternative treatment l starts, and u¯ = 2, 4, 8 is the
last quarter in the stratum of elapsed unemployment considered. Then, τ − (u˜− u)
counts the quarters since start of treatment l yielding alignment of unemployment
experience, because u+ τ = u˜+(τ − (u˜−u)), and Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜−u)) is the outcome
of individuals who receive treatment l between period u and u¯. For starts of l later
than u, we have u˜ − u > 0 and therefore, before l starts, τ − (u˜ − u) < 0. Then,
these individuals are still unemployed, i.e. Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜ − u)) = 0 when the second
argument of Y l(., .) is negative. This way, we account for the fact that alternative
treatments, for which the individual receiving treatment k in period u is eligible,
might not start in the same quarter u.15
15Admittedly, the notation in equation (1.1) is cumbersome because we do not follow Sianesi
(2003) and allow the alternative treatment l to start only in the same quarter u as treatment
k. The problem is that one has to decide how to assign individuals who receive an alternative
treatment later in the stratum considered. We think that program participation l ∈ {1, 2, 3} in a
later quarter u˜ > u (with u˜ < u¯) should not be interpreted as no participation (treatment 0) but
rather we suggest to add such a case to the l–alternative for treatment k in quarter u. This is
reflected in the definition of the parameter of interest.
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The treatment parameter we actually estimate is the average within a stratum
θ(k, l; τ) =
∑
u
guθ(k, l;u, τ) ,
with respect to the distribution gu of starting dates u within the stratum.
Our estimated treatment parameter (1.1) mirrors the decision problem of the case
worker and the unemployed who recurrently during the unemployment spell decide
whether to start any of the programs now or to postpone participation to the future.
We evaluate the differential effects of multiple treatments assuming the following
dynamic version of the conditional mean independence assumption (DCIA)
E(Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Tu = k, u ≤ u˜ ≤ u¯, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0, X)(1.2)
= E(Y l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Tu˜ = l, u ≤ u˜ ≤ u¯, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0, X) ,
where X are time–invariant (during the unemployment spell) characteristics, Tu˜ = l
indicates treatment l between u and u¯ (u¯ is the end of the stratum of elapsed
unemployment considered), and τ ≥ 0, see equation (1.1) above and the analogous
discussion in Sianesi (2004, p. 137). We effectively assume that conditional on X,
conditional on being unemployed at least until period u−1, and conditional on not
receiving any treatment before u (both referring to treatment in period u) individuals
are comparable in their outcome for treatment l occurring between u and u¯.
Building on Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) result on the balancing property of the
propensity score in the case of a binary treatment, Lechner (2001) shows that the
conditional probability of treatment k, given that the individual receives treatment
k or treatment l, P k|kl(X), exhibits an analogous balancing property for the pairwise
estimation of the ATT’s of program k versus l. This allows to apply standard binary
propensity score matching based on the sample of individuals participating in either
program k or in program l. For this subsample, we simply estimate the probability
of treatment k and then apply a bivariate extension of standard propensity matching
techniques. Implicitly, we assume that the actual beginning of treatment within a
stratum is random conditional on X.
To account for the dynamic treatment assignment, we estimate the probability of
treatment k given that unemployment lasts long enough to make an individual ‘eligi-
ble’. For treatment during quarters 1 to 2, we take the total sample of unemployed,
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who participate in k or l during quarters 1 to 2 (stratum 1), and estimate a Pro-
bit model for participation in k. This group includes those unemployed who either
never participate in any program or who start some treatment after quarter 2. For
treatment during strata 2 and 3, the basic sample consists of those unemployed who
are still unemployed in the first month of the stratum.
We implement a stratified local linear matching approach by imposing that the
matching partners for an individual receiving treatment k are still unemployed in
the quarter before treatment k starts, i.e. we exactly align treated and nontreated
individuals by elapsed unemployment duration in quarters. The expected counter-
factual employment outcome for nonparticipation is obtained by means of a bivariate
local linear regression on the propensity score and the starting month of the unem-
ployment spell. We use a bivariate crossvalidation procedure to obtain the band-
widths in both dimensions (propensity score and beginning of unemployment spell)
minimizing the squared prediction error for the average of the l–outcome for the
nearest neighbors of the participants in program k.16 An estimate for the variance
of the estimated treatment effects is obtained through bootstrapping based on 200
resamples. This way, we take account of the sampling variability in the estimated
propensity score.
As a balancing test, we use the regression test suggested in Smith and Todd (2005) to
investigate whether the time–invariant (during the unemployment spell) covariates
are balanced sufficiently by matching on the estimated propensity score P k|kl(X)
using a flexible polynomial approximation. For each specification of the propen-
sity score, the additional appendix reports the number of covariates for which the
balancing test passes, i.e. the zero hypothesis is not rejected. Furthermore, we in-
vestigate whether treated and matched nontreated individuals differ significantly in
their outcomes before the beginning of unemployment, in addition to those variables
already used as arguments of the propensity score. We estimate these differences
in the same way as the treatment effects after the beginning of the program. By
construction, treated individuals and their matched counterparts exhibit the same
unemployment duration until the beginning of treatment.
Finally, we need to discuss the plausibility of the DCIA (1.2) for our application.
16This method is an extension of the crossvalidation procedure suggested in Bergemann et al.
(2004) and also used in Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007). A detailed description of the imple-
mentation of the two dimensional bandwidth search can be found in Fitzenberger, Osikominu and
Vo¨lter (2006).
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As Sianesi (2004), we argue that the participation probability depends upon the
variables determining re-employment prospects once unemployment began. Conse-
quently, all individuals are considered who have left employment in the same two
years (matching controls for beginning of unemployment) and who have experienced
the same unemployment duration before program participation. Furthermore, ob-
servable individual characteristics and information from the previous employment
spell have been included in the propensity score estimation. E.g., we consider skill
information, regional information, occupational status, and industry which should
be crucial for re-employment chances. Unfortunately, our data lack subjective assess-
ments of labor market chances of the unemployed (e.g. by case workers). We argue
that these are proxied sufficiently by the observed covariates in so far as they af-
fect selection into the program. This is particularly plausible, since participation
occurred at a fairly large scale, assignment was not very targeted and driven by
the supply of programs, and case workers had little guidance on ‘what works for
whom’. Supporting our point of view, Schneider et al. (2006) argue that until 2002
assignment to training was strongly driven by the supply of available courses.17
1.4.2 Comparison to Alternative Dynamic Approaches
Abbring and van den Berg (2003), Lechner and Miquel (2005) as well as Lechner
(2004), and Heckmann and Navarro (2007) propose three important alternative ap-
proaches to estimate treatment effects in a dynamic context. We now compare our
approach building on Sianesi (2004), as described in the previous section, to these
approaches. Under stronger assumptions than we are willing to make for our anal-
ysis, all three alternative approaches would allow to estimate more comprehensive
treatment effects than estimated in this paper.
The timing–of–events approach by Abbring and van den Berg (2003) uses a continu-
ous time duration model with unobserved heterogeneity, where time until treatment
start and unemployment duration constitute two competing risks. The goal is to
estimate the causal treatment effect on the hazard to leave unemployment. Identifi-
cation of the causal effect of entering a program relies on the conditional randomness
17For the evaluation of the employment effects of job creation schemes in 1999/2000 based on
administrative data for Germany, Caliendo et al. (2004) were able to use a survey asking about
the motivation of participants (such information is not available for our data). It turned out that
both using administrative data and controlling for these motivational variables did not result in
noticeably different estimated program effects compared to using administrative data only. This
evidence also supports our point of view.
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of program starts and a non–anticipation condition as well as functional form as-
sumptions involving e.g. a mixed proportional hazard model and a tight specification
of the joint dependence between duration until treatment and the outcome variable
unemployment duration. Our approach also considers the variation of starting dates
during the unemployment spell, but relying on a selection on observables strategy,
we estimate flexible discrete time hazards into the program where covariates are fully
interacted with the elapsed duration of unemployment. By conditioning on elapsed
unemployment duration by strata, we account for the endogenous selectivity of the
group of individuals eligible for treatment at different points of time. In contrast to
Abbring and van den Berg (2003), we allow for heterogeneity of treatment effects
and our outcome variable employment is static. The two approaches have in com-
mon that the estimated treatment parameter corresponds to the effect of starting a
program at a given point in time versus postponing it.
Our estimated treatment parameter (1.1) can be cast into the sequential treatment
framework proposed by Lechner and Miquel (2005) and Lechner (2004). These
studies consider the identification and estimation of dynamic treatment effects with
matching methods in a context where selection into and out of programs takes place
sequentially from one period or stage to the next. Lechner and Miquel distinguish
two versions of the conditional independence assumption: strong and weak dynamic
conditional independence. The strong version is inappropriate in our case, because
it effectively rules out to match on elapsed unemployment duration which is affected
by earlier treatments. Under the weak dynamic conditional independence assump-
tion, it is possible to identify and estimate the effect of joining versus waiting for
those who join at the period in question.18 This assumption allows to identify other
more comprehensive parameters as well. However, it involves common support re-
quirements which are infeasible in our case because treatment or exit to employment
at some point excludes later treatment.
Heckman and Navarro (2007) consider the semiparametric identification of dynamic
treatment effects in structural dynamic discrete choice models. Similar to Abbring
and van den Berg (2003), the treatment status is allowed to depend on unobserved
factors in the outcome equation. Heckman and Navarro require the existence of
instruments that affect choices but not outcomes for semiparametric identification
18For instance, the effect of training versus waiting in the second stratum for the group of
participants corresponds to the following dynamic average treatment effect on the treated in the
Lechner/Miquel framework: nonparticipation in period one and training in period two versus
nonparticipation in both periods for the population of those who participate in the second period.
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of causal effects. Matching methods, in contrast, rely on a rich set of conditioning
variables that affect both the selection into treatment as well as the outcome such
that any dependence between treatment assignment and outcome is netted out.19 In
a dynamic context, one needs instrumental variation at each stage of the sequential
selection process or variation in the impact of time–invariant instruments (see Heck-
man and Navarro, 2007, Theorem 1). This variation must not be fully anticipated
by the agents.20 Using the reduced form model of Heckman and Navarro (section 2
of their paper), it is possible to identify the counterfactual outcome of waiting until
a later period for those who join in an earlier period. Using the approach to identify
other more comprehensive parameters in our case, more stringent modelling assump-
tions are necessary than we are willing to make and the necessary data requirements
regarding instruments are not likely to hold. Unfortunately, we lack time–varying
exogenous variables which affect the assignment process into treatment (see section
1.3 above).
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Estimation of Propensity Scores
Our empirical analysis is performed separately for the two samples of inflows from
employment into unemployment, associated with transfer payment or program par-
ticipation. To estimate the propensity scores, we run Probit regressions for training
starting during the three time intervals for elapsed unemployment duration, i.e. 1–
2 quarters (stratum 1), 3–4 quarters (stratum 2), and 5–8 quarters (stratum 3).
Instead of estimating a multinomial choice model for entry in one of the three pro-
grams or no entry at all for each window of elapsed unemployment duration and
sample, we estimate a series of binary Probit regressions. The additional appendix
reports our preferred specifications for the 1986/87 and 1993/94 samples, which are
obtained after extensive specification search.
The covariates considered are all defined for the beginning of unemployment and are
19Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) compare matching to conventional selection models and
show how to exploit information on exclusion restrictions and additive separability of the outcome
equation for matching. See Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) for a comparison of matching,
instrumental variables and control function methods in a static context.
20Abbring and van den Berg (2003, 2005) argue that it is often difficult to maintain exclusion
restrictions in dynamic settings with forward-looking agents.
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thus time–invariant for an individual during the unemployment spell. Personal char-
acteristics considered are age (as dummies for five–year intervals), dummy variables
for gender, marital status, having kids, being a foreigner and formal education (no
vocational training degree, vocational training degree, tertiary education degree).
In addition, we use information about the last employer, namely industrial sector
and firm size dummies, and a number of characteristics of the previous job as em-
ployment status and information on earnings in the previous job. In particular, we
use three variables containing information on earnings. Due to reporting errors and
censoring, we do not know the exact earnings for all observations. Therefore, we
distinguish the following three cases. First, we use a dummy variable that is equal
to one if daily earnings are above 15 Euro (in 1995 Euros), roughly the minimum
level to be subject to social security taxation.21 Second, we have a dummy variable
that indicates whether daily earnings are topcoded at the social security taxation
threshold (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). Third, we have a variable that records log
daily earnings in the range between 15 Euro and the topcoding threshold and zero
otherwise.
Regarding the employment and program participation history, we consider the fol-
lowing covariates. We use dummies indicating employment status in month 6, 12,
and 24 before the beginning of unemployment. We also consider the number of
months in regular employment during five years before the beginning of unemploy-
ment. The previous program participation history of an individual is captured by
dummy variables that indicate participation in an ALMP program in year(s) 1, 2,
and 3–5 before the beginning of unemployment. Differences in regional labor market
conditions as well as supply of programs are the reason to include regional variables
in the specification. We use the federal state of last employment and the unemploy-
ment rate as well as the population density at the district level. Finally, we also
use the calendar month of the beginning of the unemployment period, either as a
variable counting elapsed months since a given reference date (e.g. January 1960)
or as dummies for the respective years and quarters.
Our specification search starts by using as many as possible of the covariates men-
21Monthly earnings below e.g. DEM 410 in 1986 and DEM 500 in 1992 in West Germany for
marginal part–time employees (geringfu¨gig Bescha¨ftigte) were not subject to social security taxation
and should therefore not be present in the data. In addition, it was possible to earn at most twice
as much in at most two months of the year without contributing to the social insurance. Probably
due to recording errors, the data shows a number of employment reports with zero or very low
earnings. Since this information is not reliable, we only use the information for daily earnings
reported above 15 Euro as a conservative cut–off point.
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tioned above without interactions. The specification search is mainly led by the
following two criteria: (i) single and joint significance, and (ii) balance of the covari-
ates according to the Smith–Todd (2005) test. As regards the qualitative variables,
like state, firm size and industry, which are split up into dummies for the different
categories in the regression, we usually test for joint significance. When insignifi-
cance is found, the covariates are dropped. Furthermore, we test for the significance
of interaction effects, in particular interactions with gender and age. In order to
achieve balance of covariates, we test different functional forms (e.g. the square of
a variable) and interaction effects. In a few cases, we keep insignificant covariates
or interactions if they help to achieve balance. As we find the balancing test to be
somewhat sensitive to small cell sizes we occasionally aggregate small groups that
have similar coefficients. One example is the aggregation of two federal states.
The results for the Probit estimates show that the final specifications vary consid-
erably over the inflow cohorts and the three time intervals even keeping the k/l–
comparison constant.22 On the one hand, this emphasizes the necessity to treat all
36 k/l–pairs separately. On the other hand, it makes it impossible to present and
discuss all the specifications in detail. In general, the number of covariates decreases
with elapsed unemployment duration. This is not surprising because many covari-
ates contain information about the previous job, which should characterize someone
in a better way who has only recently become unemployed compared to a long–term
unemployed. Furthermore, since the ‘better’ types leave unemployment earlier, the
long–term unemployed tend to be a more homogeneous subgroup.
Age effects are significant in most estimations. In particular, participants in re-
training are younger than individuals in other groups. This reflects the assignment
policy of the employment agency. The very comprehensive and expensive retrain-
ing schemes are preferably assigned to individuals who have a long time horizon of
working life. Gender effects are also relevant in most cases, but they do not follow
a common pattern. In cases where the foreign dummy is significant, it shows that
foreigners have a lower probability to participate in any program. The employment
history is important in most estimations. Previous participation in an ALMP pro-
gram is sometimes significant. If so, it increases the probability of another program
participation. The industrial sector of the previous job is sometimes significant and
the firm size only rarely. In most estimations regional effects and the calendar date
22The tables with the propensity score estimations, the balancing tests and the figures showing
the support of the propensity scores are displayed in the additional appendix.
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of unemployment entry (seasonal effects) are contained.
For the balancing test in almost all cases, using a cubic in the estimated propensity
score, we reject for at most one variable in the respective propensity score specifica-
tion. Only in two out of 36 cases the test rejects for two variables. Considering both
variants, i.e. the cubic and the quartic in the propensity score, the test does not
reject for more than one variable in the specification in 20 out of 36 specifications.
Overall, we are confident to have achieved a sufficient degree of balance between
treatment and control groups in order for matching on the propensity score to be
valid.
The graphical examination of the common support requirement for estimating the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for training versus waiting reveals
that lack of common support is a problem only in some cases. In these cases, it
occasionally happens, that for very small estimated participation probabilities there
are only nonparticipants, but no participating counterparts with such low estimated
participation probabilities. This poses no problem for estimating the treatment
effect on the treated for treatment versus waiting. Only in two of the treatment
versus waiting comparisons we excluded 1.3% and 1.8% of the treated observations,
respectively, from the estimation. Overall, we are also satisfied with the overlap
of support for treatment versus treatment (k/l–pairs with k, l ≥ 1). Though the
graphical inspection of common support seems to reveal slight differences in support
in a few cases, these differences mostly lie within the close neighborhood of the
respective treated observation determined by the bandwidth. Therefore, we proceed
without restricting the samples except for four cases where we drop about 2% to 4%
of the treated observations, respectively. Detailed results of the balancing tests and
common support graphics are shown in the additional appendix.
1.5.2 Estimated Treatment Effects
The outcome variable is the average of monthly employment dummies in a quar-
ter. We match participants in treatment k and participants in treatment l by their
similarity in the estimated propensity scores23 and the starting month of the un-
employment spell. For matching, we use only eligible participants in l who are still
unemployed in the quarter before treatment starts and we align them by the quar-
23We use the fitted index Xiβˆ from the Probit estimates.
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ter of elapsed unemployment duration. The ATT is then estimated separately for
quarters τ = 0, ..., τmax since the beginning of program k, where τmax = 31, 29, 25,
respectively, for stratum 1, 2, and 3. The expected counterfactual employment
outcome for l is obtained by means of a local linear regression on the propensity
score and the starting month of the unemployment spell among the eligible l–group.
We obtain an estimate for the variance of the estimated treatment effects through
bootstrapping the entire observation vector for a spell in our inflow sample. This
way, we take account of possible autocorrelation in the outcome variable. Inference
is based on 200 resamples. As a further test of the matching quality, we estimate
in the same way the differences between participants and matched nonparticipants
during quarters 1 to 8 before the beginning of unemployment. By construction, par-
ticipants in k and matched eligible members of the l–group are unemployed between
the beginning of their unemployment spell and the beginning of the treatment in
the k–group.
Figures 1.2–1.7 graphically represent the evaluation results. Each figure contains a
panel of three times three graphs, where each row represents one pairwise comparison
of two treatments and each column represents one of the three intervals of elapsed
duration of unemployment at the beginning of the treatment, i.e. 1–2 (stratum 1),
3–4 (stratum 2), or 5–8 (stratum 3) quarters since the start of the unemployment
spell. The graphs display the estimated average treatment effect for the treated
during quarters 0 to τmax since the beginning of the treatment and the differences
during 8 quarters before the beginning of the unemployment spell. We put pointwise
95%–confidence intervals around the estimated treatment effects. The vertical gap
at zero reflects the variable length of time between the start of the unemployment
spell and the start of the treatment.
In order to contrast the initial negative lock–in effects of the programs with the
later positive program effects, we calculate the cumulated effects of every program
8, 16, and 24 quarters after the beginning of the program. The cumulated effects
(≡ sum of quarter specific treatment effects) are calculated as the sum of the effects
depicted in figures 1.2–1.7 starting in quarter 0 and summing up over the first 8, 16,
and 24 quarters, respectively. Tables 1.7 and 1.9 provide the results. These effects
show the change in the total number of quarters in employment since the beginning
of treatment. When the cumulated effects become positive then a negative lock–in
effect is compensated by positive effects afterwards. The estimated standard errors
are based on the bootstrap covariance estimates for the quarter specific treatment
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effects. A potential drawback of considering cumulated effects is that many of
them are rather imprecisely estimated because they are summed over all quarters
such that negative short–run effects and positive medium– to long–run effects are
lumped together. Therefore, we also include a table (table 1.8) for training versus
waiting with average ATT’s, that are averages of the quarter specific treatment
effects during the first three years and from year four onwards after the beginning
of treatment. Table 1.8 allows to assess in a parsimonious way whether persistent
significantly positive effects exist after the end of the lock–in period.
Training versus Waiting
We first discuss the effects of the three training programs against the alternative of
waiting, i.e. no treatment during the time interval (stratum) of elapsed unemploy-
ment duration, displayed in figures 1.2 (cohort 86/87) and 1.5 (cohort 93/94).
We do not find significant pre–unemployment employment differences in any case.
Since all individuals become unemployed eventually, this test for matching quality
should focus on the differences during the earlier quarters. There is no evidence of
systematic differences in employment rates between treated and associated matched
individuals. This suggests that time–invariant unobserved heterogeneity does not
invalidate our matching approach.
The results for 86/87 in figure 1.2, show positive medium–run (1–3 years) and long–
run (4–6 years) post treatment effects of all three training programs after a negative
lock–in effect in the program right after the beginning of treatment. These effects are
typically of the magnitude 10 to 20 percentage points (ppoints) and prove significant.
They are smaller and not significant for PF in the second and third stratum. For
SPST and RT the medium–run effects lie even above 20 ppoints for strata 2 and
3 and are larger than the long–run effects. As expected, the lock–in periods are
shortest for PF (typically the shortest treatment), lasting at most 3 quarters, and
longest for RT, lasting up to two years. SPST lies in between for strata 1 and 2 with
a lock–in period of about 1 year and shows a very short lock–in period of 2 quarters
for stratum 3. The positive effects for SPST show similar patterns for the three
strata (similar to the results for SPST in Fitzenberger and Speckesser, 2007), with
the effects being slightly higher in strata 2 and 3. For RT the positive medium–run
effects are larger for strata 2 and 3 compared to stratum 1 and the long–run effects
are larger for stratum 2 compared to both strata 1 and 3.
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For the 93/94 cohort, figure 1.5 shows similar patterns for training versus waiting.
For PF, we find shorter lock–in periods for strata 2 and 3 and small positive but
insignificant treatment effects after the lock–in period in stratum 1. For strata 2
and 3, we now find significantly positive medium– and long–run treatment effects of
10 to 15 ppoints. Again, the lock–in period is longer for SPST and even longer for
RT. The significantly positive medium– and long–run effects for SPST lie between
10 and 20 ppoints and are more persistent than for the earlier cohort. The positive
medium– and long–run effects for RT in stratum 1 are below 10 ppoints and barely
significant. The effects are somewhat stronger for strata 2 and 3.
Next, we discuss the cumulated effects of the different programs against the alterna-
tive of waiting, which are reported in table 1.7. This allows for a simple comparison
of the ATT effects across programs, though it is important to recall that these ef-
fects for the treated cannot be compared because they are based on the separate
groups of participants in the different programs. It will be interesting to contrast
these effects to the results of the pairwise program comparisons reported in the next
subsection.
For the 86/87 cohort, the cumulated long–run effects after 24 quarters are signifi-
cantly positive at the 10%–level for all cases, except PF in stratum 3. Overall, SPST
shows the largest long–run effects with the highest value of 4.2 in stratum 3, i.e.
during the 24 quarters after the beginning of the treatment the treated individuals
are employed on average for about 4 quarters more than had they not been treated.
For SPST and RT, the long–run effects are higher in later strata, though one can
not put a causal interpretation to this because the selection of individuals in the
different strata changes. There are less cases with significantly positive cumulated
effects after 16 quarters. After 8 quarters, the cumulated effects are still negative
for RT due to the longer lock–in period, mostly positive for SPST and PF, and
significantly positive in strata 2 and 3 for SPST.
For the 93/94 cohort, the cumulated long–run effects after 24 quarters are signifi-
cantly positive in all strata for SPST, in strata 2 and 3 for PF, and in stratum 2
for RT. For SPST, the pattern is similar to the earlier cohort. For PF, the effect
is higher in strata 2 and 3 and much lower in stratum 1. Also for RT, the effects
are lower and even significantly negative in stratum 1. Early treatments for PF or
RT in stratum 1 show worse effects for 93/94 compared to 86/87. The effects at 8
and 16 quarters for RT show stronger lock–in effects for the later cohort. For PF in
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strata 2 and 3, there are stronger positive effects already at 8 and 16 quarters.
Table 1.8 shows the yearly averages of the ATT’s which are typically more precisely
estimated than the quarter specific treatment effects and the cumulated effects. For
SPST, all average ATT’s are significantly positive from year 2 onwards and slightly
smaller for the cohort 93/94. For RT, all effects from year 3 onwards are significantly
positive for the cohort 86/87 and only from year 4 onwards significantly positive for
the cohort 93/94. RT shows longer significantly negative lock–in effects for the
cohort 93/94 compared to 86/87. The pattern of the estimated effects for PF is less
clear cut. For the cohort 86/87, there are significantly positive effects for one or two
of the periods following year 1. For 93/94, PF shows significantly positive effects
for all periods following year 1 in strata 2 and 3 but no significantly positive effects
in stratum 1.
Summing up, our results on training versus waiting show that most training pro-
grams yield significantly positive and fairly persistent medium– and long–run treat-
ment effects. There are strong lock–in effects, with RT showing the longest lock–in
periods (up to 8 quarters). The cumulated effects and the average treatment effects
during years 2 to 4 are significantly positive for most programs. Overall, SPST
seems to show the best results for the treated individuals. The positive effects of
SPST deteriorate little for the later cohort. For RT, there is a noticeable increase
in the lock–in period and a noticeable decline in the treatment effects for the later
cohort and, for PF, the treatment effects deteriorate for stratum 1 and improve for
later program starts.24 The slight deterioration of the treatment effects for the later
cohort could be caused by the worse business cycle conditions in the 90s.
Pairwise Comparisons of Training Programs
Next, we estimate pairwise ATT’s both of the treatment k versus the alternative l for
the treated in k and the treatment l versus k for the treated in l. As mentioned above,
the first ATT does not necessarily coincide with the negative of the second ATT
because of effect heterogeneity and the different composition of the two treatment
groups (Lechner, 2001). The pairwise comparison allows to investigate whether the
different programs are well targeted on average. With individual heterogeneity of
24Following the suggestion of a referee, we also investigated whether there are heterogeneous
treatment effects by gender, age, and qualification. In the matched samples, we regressed outcome
differences on these covariates. However, based on bootstrapped standard errors we did not find
any significant differences. These results are available upon request.
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treatment effects, it could very well be the case that the participants in SPST fare
better on average through participating in SPST as compared to RT even though
the participants in RT also fare better on average through participating in RT as
compared to SPST. This example is used because we find some evidence for such
effects, though they often are not significant.
The quarterly treatment effects for the pairwise comparisons are displayed in figures
1.3, 1.4, 1.6, and 1.7. After a short description of these effects, our discussion focuses
on the cumulated effects in table 1.9. Note that for the pairwise comparisons, the
control groups used for local linear matching are considerably smaller compared to
evaluating one training program versus nonparticipation, see tables 1.3 and 1.4.
In the vast majority of cases, we do not find significant pre–unemployment employ-
ment differences. In a small number of cases, there are significant (but barely so)
employment differences for some quarters before the beginning of unemployment.25
Therefore, we conclude that there are no systematic differences in employment rates
left between treated and associated matched individuals.
We find significant short–run treatment effects in a number of cases reflecting the
different lock–in periods of the three training programs. RT performs worse than
the two other programs during the first two years and PF tends to perform better
during the first year. However, we do not find this for all cases. We do not find
persistent medium– and long–run effects. In a number of cases, the treatment effects
in the medium and long run are significant over a short time period and display quite
erratic movements.
The estimated cumulated effects in table 1.9 suggest that for the cohort 86/87 most
significant effects are caused by the differential lock–in periods. Comparing SPST
with RT for those treated in SPST (‘SPST vs RT’), we find strong significantly
positive effects after 8 quarters in stratum 1 and 3. Comparing RT with SPST and
RT with PF both for those treated in RT, we find no significantly positive effects and
the point estimates are even negative in a number of cases. For participants in SPST,
SPST seems to outperform RT at 16 quarters for strata 1 and 3, but the cumulated
effects are reduced at 24 quarters and not significant any more. For participants in
RT, SPST seems to outperform RT as well at 16 quarters for stratum 1 but again
the effect at 24 quarters is reduced and not significant any more. PF seems to
25These differences in employment history often become insignificant, if larger bandwidths are
used. Further details are available upon request.
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outperform SPST for participants in SPST in stratum 1 after 24 quarters, whereas
the cumulated long–run effects are insignificant for participants in PF. The long–run
cumulated effects for RT in comparison to PF for participants in RT are positive
and sizeable in stratum 2 and 3, but not significant. The long–run cumulated effects
of PF in comparison to RT are also positive in stratum 1 and 3 but not significant.
For the cohort 93/94, the cumulated effects at 8 quarters are qualitatively similar
reflecting again the different lock–in periods. Both PF, for stratum 1 and 3, and
SPST, for all strata, seem to outperform RT in the short and medium run for the
participants in PF and SPST, respectively. In the long run we only find signifi-
cant effects for participation in SPST compared to RT in stratum 1. RT is also
outperformed by SPST and PF even for participants in RT, though the effects are
only strongly significant at 8 and at 16 quarters (the effects are of similar size at
24 quarters). Comparing SPST and PF, the cumulated effects are not significant
but the point estimates suggest that SPST outperforms PF at least for the own
participants.
Summing up, our results on the pairwise comparisons are much weaker compared
to the comparison of training versus waiting, because the standard errors for the
pairwise comparisons are much higher. Nevertheless, we can draw some conclusions.
The significant cumulated effects after 8 quarters reflect the different lock–in periods
for the three training programs. Most medium– and long–run cumulated effects are
insignificant which suggests that in these cases, the employment outcome of the
treated individuals could not have been improved on average in the medium or long
run by reallocating them to a different training program. There is, however, some
evidence for SPST and PF outperforming RT in the medium and long run even for
the participants in RT, for the 93/94 cohort. The point estimates for SPST versus
PF suggest for stratum 1 in 86/87 that the cumulated employment effect would have
been better, if participants in SPST had instead participated in PF. For 93/94, the
point estimates suggest that SPST outperforms PF in the medium and the long run
even for participants in PF. However, none of these effects for 93/94 are significant.
1.6 Conclusions
Based on a unique administrative data set, which has only recently become avail-
able, we analyze the long–run employment effects of three types of public sector
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sponsored training in West Germany, which do not involve a job for the partici-
pants. The three types of training are Practice Firm (PF), Retraining (RT), and
the Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (SPST). Specifically, we
estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) against the alternative
of nonparticipation in any program as well as for pairwise comparisons among the
three programs. We take inflow samples into unemployment for West Germany
in 1986/87 and 1993/94. We use the approach for multiple treatment evaluation
suggested by Lechner (2001) and Imbens (2000) and apply it to a dynamic setup.
Slightly modifying the approach suggested by Sianesi (2003, 2004), we distinguish
three types of treatment depending upon the elapsed duration of unemployment
when treatment starts, i.e. treatment starts during the first two quarters (stratum
1), during the third or fourth quarter (stratum 2), and between the fifth and the
eighth quarter (stratum 3).
When comparing treatment against nonparticipation, the estimated treatment ef-
fects in almost all cases involve first a lock–in period with negative treatment effects
and significantly positive treatment effects in the medium and long run. The lock–in
period is shortest for PF (at most 2 quarters) and longest for RT (around 2 years).
SPST lies in between with a lock–in period of around 4 to 6 quarters. The treatment
effects deteriorate slightly from 1986/87 to 1993/94 in a number of cases, especially
for RT and especially for treatments starting in stratum 1. For RT, the length of
the lock-in period increases considerably for the later cohort. Both could reflect the
worse business cycle conditions in the 1990s. The cumulated effects are significantly
positive for most programs.
The pairwise comparisons of the three treatments, one against another, show first
the differences in the lock–in periods and in most cases insignificant treatment effects
in the medium and long run. There is, however, some evidence for SPST and PF
outperforming RT in the medium and long run for the 1993/94 cohort. For 1993/94,
SPST tends to outperform PF, but the effect is not significant.
Overall, SPST shows the best results for the treated individuals and the positive
treatment effects for SPST are almost at the same level for 1993/94 compared to
1986/87. Note that SPST is by far the largest program and its share is even higher
in 1993/94 compared to 1986/87. It is remarkable how little the effectiveness of
SPST differs between the two time periods despite the differences in business cycle
conditions and the apparent change in the timing and length of treatments.
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In comparison to the study by Lechner et al. (2005a) based on the same data source,
our general results for the 1993/94 cohort are quite similar in most cases, even
though the exact treatment definition, the choice of valid observations, and the
employed econometric methods differ substantially. Notable differences from the
results reported in Lechner et al. (2005a) are that we find significantly positive
effects for treatments relative to nonparticipation much earlier after the treatment
starts and that our results for RT in comparison to other training programs are
often negative.
Our study draws a somewhat more positive picture of large scale public sector spon-
sored training programs compared to the previous literature. However, an overall
assessment of the microeconomic effects is not possible since various necessary in-
formation for a comprehensive cost–benefit–analysis are lacking in our data. Since
the relative performance of SPST tends to improve over time and PF does not
seem to dominate the other two programs, our evidence is in contrast to some of
the conclusions in the surveys by Martin and Grubb (2001), Kluve and Schmidt
(2002), and OECD (2005) advocating a strong on–the–job component for public
sector sponsored training to show positive employment effects.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Descriptive Statistics and Description of Data
Table 1.2: Participation in Further Training in West Germany until 1997
Year Annual entries Annual average stocks
Total Further vocational Retraining Integration
training subsidy
1980 247.0 176.5 37.9 32.6 177.1
1985 409.3 336.5 45.1 27.7 245.8
1986 530.0 426.0 59.1 44.9 308.1
1987 596.3 482.6 64.5 49.2 346.1
1988 565.6 448.7 65.7 51.2 361.5
1989 489.9 388.4 61.0 40.8 357.9
1990 574.0 442.8 63.4 67.9 349.7
1991 593.9 474.5 70.5 48.9 364.5
1992 574.7 464.5 81.5 28.7 372.1
1993 348.1 266.0 72.2 9.9 348.4
1994 306.8 224.9 73.1 8.8 308.8
1995 401.6 309.7 81.8 10.0 304.3
1996 378.4 291.6 77.3 9.5 306.6
Remark: All numbers in thousands. Source: Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (1987, 1992,
1997).
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Figure 1.1: Unemployment Rate in West Germany
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Table 1.3: Participation in First Training Program for the Inflow Samples into
Unemployment
Training Program Frequency Percent of Percent among
inflow sample treated
Cohort 86/87
Practice Firm 246 1.2 14.4
SPST 1,093 5.2 63.8
Retraining 375 1.8 21.9
No training program above 19,188 91.8 –
Total inflow sample 20,902 100 100
Cohort 93/94
Practice Firm 325 1.3 11.9
SPST 1,944 7.8 71.3
Retraining 458 1.8 16.8
No training program above 22,324 89.1 –
Total inflow sample 25,051 100 100
Remark: Programs that start before a new job is found are considered. We exclude training
programs which start together with a job (like integration subsidies) or which involve a very
small number of participants since they are not targeted on inflows into unemployment (as
career advancement and German language courses). Furthermore, we do not consider the
very short programs according to §41a of the Labor Promotion Act, which are only offered
to the 1986/87 inflow sample as separate programs, but treat them as open unemployment.
This improves the comparability of the inflow samples since comparable very short–term
programs offered to the 1993/94 inflow sample are not recorded as programs but as open
unemployment in our data. Thus, a participation in retraining after a §41a program is
counted as the first program.
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Table 1.4: Number of Training Spells and Length of Unemployment before Program
Start
Practice Firm SPST Retraining
86/87 93/94 86/87 93/94 86/87 93/94
1–2 quarters 74 102 503 528 172 198
3–4 quarters 60 102 257 481 101 138
5–8 quarters 69 86 176 669 71 106
>8 quarters 43 35 157 266 31 16
Total 246 325 1,093 1,944 375 458
Remark: The time intervals indicate the quarter of program start relative to the beginning
of the unemployment spell.
Table 1.5: Elapsed Duration of Unemployment in Months at Beginning of Training
Spell
Practice Firm SPST Retraining
86/87 93/94 86/87 93/94 86/87 93/94
Average 15.8 11.4 13.3 12.9 10.2 8.1
25%–Quantile 5 5 3 5 3 3
Median 10 9 6 11 6 7
75%–Quantile 19 15 14 18 12 12
Table 1.6: Realized Duration of Training Spells in months
Practice Firm SPST Retraining
86/87 93/94 86/87 93/94 86/87 93/94
Average 5.1 5.7 4.9 6.3 13.1 14.9
25%–Quantile 2 3 2 3 5 6
Median 5 6 4 6 12 16
75%–Quantile 6 8 7 8 22 21
Remark: The duration of the training spell is defined as the number of months of uninter-
rupted training.
1.8.2 Estimated Employment Effects of Further Training
Programs
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Table 1.7: Cumulated differences in employment rates – sum of quarter specific
average treatment effects on the treated since beginning of treatment – Training
versus Waiting
Cumulated Treatment Effects
Cohort 86/87
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
PF vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -0.159 (0.382) 0.586 (0.706) 1.817 (1.018)∗
Stratum 2 0.164 (0.316) 1.150 (0.653)∗ 1.971 (1.009)∗
Stratum 3 0.276 (0.304) 0.748 (0.685) 1.280 (1.115)
SPST vs Waiting
Stratum 1 0.174 (0.118) 1.420 (0.241)∗∗∗ 2.524 (0.373)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 0.631 (0.173)∗∗∗ 1.920 (0.353)∗∗∗ 2.766 (0.536)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.702 (0.173)∗∗∗ 2.725 (0.406)∗∗∗ 4.221 (0.649)∗∗∗
RT vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -1.353 (0.169)∗∗∗ -0.150 (0.326) 0.921 (0.511)∗
Stratum 2 -0.678 (0.252)∗∗∗ 1.069 (0.501)∗∗ 2.842 (0.761)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.347 (0.216) 1.673 (0.533)∗∗∗ 3.017 (0.808)∗∗∗
Cohort 93/94
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
PF vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -0.001 (0.293) 0.317 (0.606) 0.876 (0.924)
Stratum 2 0.340 (0.235) 1.566 (0.499)∗∗∗ 2.862 (0.744)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.544 (0.276)∗∗ 1.590 (0.600)∗∗∗ 2.540 (0.899)∗∗∗
SPST vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -0.012 (0.113) 1.201 (0.235)∗∗∗ 2.375 (0.348)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 0.378 (0.130)∗∗∗ 1.745 (0.266)∗∗∗ 3.070 (0.421)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.439 (0.097)∗∗∗ 1.495 (0.217)∗∗∗ 2.544 (0.338)∗∗∗
RT vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -1.982 (0.149)∗∗∗ -1.552 (0.340)∗∗∗ -1.061 (0.535)∗∗
Stratum 2 -1.218 (0.192)∗∗∗ -0.059 (0.395) 1.352 (0.649)∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.878 (0.260)∗∗∗ -0.152 (0.563) 1.258 (0.904)
Remark: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%–, 5%–, and 1%–significance
level, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Averages of quarter specific average treatment effects on the treated
Average ATT
Cohort 86/87
1st year 2nd year 3rd year year 4 onwards
Average ATT, PF vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -0.086 (0.044)∗ 0.046 (0.061) 0.076 (0.057) 0.145 (0.048)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 -0.039 (0.031) 0.080 (0.054) 0.115 (0.056)∗∗ 0.103 (0.052)∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.041 (0.032) 0.110 (0.055)∗∗ 0.078 (0.059) 0.056 (0.059)
Average ATT, SPST vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -0.074 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.118 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.145 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.143 (0.019)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 -0.026 (0.018) 0.184 (0.030)∗∗∗ 0.179 (0.031)∗∗∗ 0.114 (0.027)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.003 (0.019) 0.178 (0.030)∗∗∗ 0.257 (0.034)∗∗∗ 0.198 (0.034)∗∗∗
Average ATT, RT vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -0.221 (0.020)∗∗∗ -0.117 (0.029)∗∗∗ 0.120 (0.029)∗∗∗ 0.143 (0.029)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 -0.167 (0.024)∗∗∗ -0.002 (0.046) 0.198 (0.043)∗∗∗ 0.229 (0.041)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.097 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.010 (0.043) 0.206 (0.053)∗∗∗ 0.199 (0.049)∗∗∗
Cohort 93/94
1st year 2nd year 3rd year year 4 onwards
Average ATT, PF vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -0.066 (0.032)∗∗ 0.066(0.047) 0.063 (0.047) 0.050 (0.044)
Stratum 2 -0.015 (0.026) 0.100 (0.044)∗∗ 0.148 (0.045)∗∗∗ 0.163 (0.040)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.016 (0.028) 0.120 (0.047)∗∗ 0.113 (0.048)∗∗ 0.131 (0.045)∗∗∗
Average ATT, SPST vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -0.104 (0.012)∗∗∗ 0.101 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.156 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.146 (0.017)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 -0.047 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.142 (0.022)∗∗∗ 0.177 (0.021)∗∗∗ 0.164 (0.022)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.015 (0.009) 0.124 (0.018)∗∗∗ 0.141 (0.019)∗∗∗ 0.127 (0.017)∗∗∗
Average ATT, RT vs Waiting
Stratum 1 -0.255 (0.014)∗∗∗ -0.241 (0.026)∗∗∗ 0.019 (0.033) 0.069 (0.030)∗∗
Stratum 2 -0.162 (0.017)∗∗∗ -0.143 (0.035)∗∗∗ 0.097 (0.036)∗∗∗ 0.179 (0.037)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.122 (0.031)∗∗∗ -0.097 (0.044)∗∗ 0.072 (0.052) 0.154 (0.050)∗∗∗
Remark: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%–, 5%–, and 1%–significance
level, respectively.
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Table 1.9: Cumulated differences in employment rates – sum of quarter specific
average treatment effects on the treated since beginning of treatment – Pairwise
comparisons of training programs
Cumulated Treatment Effects
Cohort 86/87
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
PF vs SPST
Stratum 1 0.028 (0.355) -0.199 (0.686) 0.023 (1.036)
Stratum 2 -0.159 (0.426) -0.014 (0.833) 0.431 (1.224)
Stratum 3 0.053 (0.331) -1.016 (0.866) -1.065 (1.455)
PF vs RT
Stratum 1 0.853 (0.395)∗∗ 0.348 (0.736) 0.259 (1.117)
Stratum 2 -0.650 (0.579) -1.896 (1.101)∗ -2.819 (1.726)
Stratum 3 1.237 (0.350)∗∗∗ 0.907 (0.836) 0.140 (1.402)
SPST vs PF
Stratum 1 -0.125 (0.339) -0.848 (0.714) -2.114 (1.041)∗∗
Stratum 2 0 (0.437) -0.380 (0.888) -1.275 (1.375)
Stratum 3 0.798 (0.406)∗∗ 1.837 (1.022)∗ 1.768 (1.601)
SPST vs RT
Stratum 1 1.246 (0.354)∗∗∗ 1.072 (0.599)∗ 0.199 (0.789)
Stratum 2 0.380 (0.394) -0.308 (0.761) -1.177 (1.147)
Stratum 3 1.310 (0.286)∗∗∗ 1.625 (0.771)∗∗ 1.575 (1.240)
RT vs PF
Stratum 1 -1.121 (0.509)∗∗ -0.309 (1.154) 0.523 (1.857)
Stratum 2 -0.496 (0.498) 0.413 (1.022) 1.252 (1.528)
Stratum 3 -0.133 (0.431) 1.498 (1.104) 1.632 (1.654)
RT vs SPST
Stratum 1 -1.173 (0.227)∗∗∗ -1.024 (0.440)∗∗ -0.774 (0.698)
Stratum 2 -0.868 (0.347)∗∗ -0.142 (0.824) 1.225 (1.326)
Stratum 3 -0.430 (0.269) -0.207 (0.691) -0.066 (1.098)
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Cumulated Treatment Effects – continued
Cohort 93/94
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
PF vs SPST
Stratum 1 0.209 (0.282) -0.498 (0.605) -1.054 (0.930)
Stratum 2 -0.085 (0.354) -0.324 (0.741) -0.300 (1.136)
Stratum 3 0.333 (0.376) 0.485 (0.782) 0.439 (1.165)
PF vs RT
8 quarters 16 quarters 24 quarters
Stratum 1 2.002 (0.376)∗∗∗ 1.723 (0.763)∗∗ 1.534 (1.234)
Stratum 2 0.274 (0.521) 0.295 (0.881) -0.166 (1.285)
Stratum 3 1.084 (0.327)∗∗∗ 1.119 (0.971) 0.707 (1.616)
SPST vs PF
Stratum 1 0.174 (0.391) 0.920 (0.824) 1.017 (1.240)
Stratum 2 0.210 (0.366) 0.620 (0.828) 1.306 (1.374)
Stratum 3 0.081 (0.370) 0.733 (0.898) 1.852 (1.378)
SPST vs RT
Stratum 1 1.554 (0.201)∗∗∗ 1.623 (0.531)∗∗∗ 1.552 (0.905)∗
Stratum 2 0.836 (0.339)∗∗ 0.126 (0.659) -0.805 (1.002)
Stratum 3 0.629 (0.221)∗∗∗ 0.323 (0.570) -0.337 (0.864)
RT vs PF
Stratum 1 -1.707 (0.374)∗∗∗ -1.477 (0.805)∗ -1.481 (1.164)
Stratum 2 -1.890 (0.445)∗∗∗ -2.453 (1.017)∗∗ -2.158 (1.678)
Stratum 3 -2.112 (0.743)∗∗∗ -2.988 (1.713)∗ -3.341 (2.694)
RT vs SPST
Stratum 1 -1.485 (0.257)∗∗∗ -1.698 (0.540)∗∗∗ -1.453 (0.848)∗
Stratum 2 -1.411 (0.250)∗∗∗ -1.661 (0.536)∗∗∗ -1.389 (0.869)
Stratum 3 -0.940 (0.201)∗∗∗ -1.372 (0.519)∗∗∗ -1.122 (0.825)
Remark: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%–, 5%–, and 1%–significance
level, respectively.
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Chapter 2
Long–Run Effects of Training
Programs for the Unemployed in
East Germany
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2.1 Introduction
Active labor market policy (ALMP) has been used at an unprecedently high scale
during the transition process in East Germany in the 1990s. Public sector sponsored
training has been a major part of ALMP with the goal to adjust the skills of the
East German workforce to the needs of a Western market economy. Annual entries
into training programs were around 250 thousand during the years 1993 to 1996
(Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit 1993, 1997, 2001). In comparison to public sector spon-
sored training in other countries, the East German experience shows the following
five specific aspects. First, participants had fairly high levels of formal education.
Second, access to treatment was easy since targeting was very low. Third, the mar-
ket for training provision had to be established and in the early 1990s case workers
had no practical experience on what works. Fourth, predictions about the catching
up process of East Germany and about future labor market trends proved to be
wrong. Fifth, the duration of training programs was fairly long.
During the last decade, there were a lot of pessimistic assessments regarding the use-
fulness of public sector sponsored training programs in raising employment chances
of the unemployed (see the surveys in Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin
and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002). These studies doubt that large scale
training programs, which are not well targeted, are successful in raising employ-
ment. However, evidence for Eastern European transition economies (other than
East Germany) has often shown positive effects (Kluve et al., 2004; Lubyova and
van Ours, 1999; Puhani, 1999). Recently, OECD (2005) has argued that long-term
labor market programs, such as training, often have little or negative short–run ef-
fects on outcomes, which can be attributed to lock–in effects. However, in some
cases, positive long–term effects exist for long training programs, for which lock–in
effects are worse than for short programs (see also Fay, 1996). Therefore, it is cru-
cial to assess program impacts in a longer term perspective in order to investigate
whether the sizeable lock–in effects in the short run are compensated by positive
long run effects.
For East Germany, appropriate data for a long term evaluation of public sector
sponsored training were not available for a long time and, until recently, the available
evidence has been quite mixed.1 Detailed administrative data have been used in
1See Bergemann et al. (2004), Fitzenberger and Prey (2000), Kraus et al. (1999), or Lechner
(2000) for exemplary studies based on survey data. Speckesser (2004, chapter 1) and Wunsch
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the recent studies of Lechner et al. (2005b) (≡LMW), Fitzenberger and Speckesser
(2007) (≡FS), and Hujer et al. (2006) (≡HTZ), where the first two studies are based
on the same data as this study, while the third uses administrative data since 2000.
HTZ find negative short–run effects which are probably driven by lock–in effects,
while their data do not allow to investigate long–run effects. LMW and FS find
positive medium– and long–run employment effects for some treatments considered
in this paper. LMW evaluate effects of three training programs (long training,
short training, retraining) on employment and benefit recipiency. They find strong
evidence that, on average, the training programs under investigation increase long–
term employment prospects and do not change benefit recipiency. As important
exceptions, long training and retraining show no positive employment effects for
males. FS estimate the employment effects of one major training program (Provision
of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques, SPST) against nonparticipation in
SPST for 36 months after the beginning of the treatment. The analysis is performed
only for the 1993 inflow sample into unemployment. The analysis finds positive
medium–run employment effects, but it does not distinguish between genders.
The vast majority of the existing evaluation studies for East Germany uses a static
evaluation approach, which contrasts receiving treatment during a certain period
of time against the alternative of not receiving treatment during this period of
time (FS and HTZ are recent exceptions). In a dynamic setting, the timing of
events becomes important, see Abbring and van den Berg (2003), Fredriksson and
Johansson (2003, 2004), and Sianesi (2003, 2004). Static treatment evaluations run
the risk of conditioning on future outcomes, leading to possibly biased treatment
effects. This paper follows Sianesi (2003, 2004) and estimates the effects of treatment
starting after some unemployment experience against the alternative of not starting
treatment at this point of time and waiting longer. The actual implementation
of the estimator builds and extends upon FS and Fitzenberger et al. (2006). The
estimated dynamic treatment effects mirror the decision problem of the case worker
and the unemployed who decide recurrently during the unemployment spell, whether
to begin any program now or to postpone participation to the future.
Using a dynamic multiple treatment framework, this study analyzes the effects of
three exclusive training programs (practice firms, SPST, retraining) for inflow sam-
ples into unemployment for the two years 1993/94. We evaluate medium– and
(2006, section 6.5) provide comprehensive surveys of this literature, which is not reviewed here for
the sake of brevity, and discuss critically the data used.
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long–run treatment effects both for employment and benefit recipiency up to 24–30
quarters after the beginning of the treatment depending on the starting date of the
treatment. The analysis is performed separately for males and females to reexamine
the evidence in LMW and the two studies differ substantially regarding the exact
treatment definition, the choice of valid observations, and the econometric methods
used. Our results confirm the positive employment effects for SPST reported in
FS after the initial negative lock–in effect to hold for a much longer time period
and to apply for both males and females. Our study finds no positive employment
effects for practice firms and in four out of six cases for retraining. We do not find
systematic gender differences and, similar to the study Fitzenberger et al. (2006) for
West Germany, our assessment of retraining is considerably worse than of SPST.
Furthermore, we do not find any of the three programs to reduce significantly the
benefit recipiency rate in the medium and long run. In the short run, all programs
show the lock–in effect with an increase in the benefit recipiency rate, thus providing
evidence for ’benefit churning’ as in Kluve et al. (2004).
Our analysis differs considerably from the recent work of LMW, FS, and HTZ. LMW
use a static multiple treatment evaluation approach. They find gender differences
for long training and retraining, which we can not replicate using our dynamic
evaluation approach. We explore potential reasons for the different results. LMW
analyze the effects of treatments starting during the years 93/94 for unemployed
whose unemployment spells start during the years 93/94. We also analyze the
inflows into unemployment for the years 93/94 but we analyze the effects of all
treatments taking place during the first two years of unemployment. We investigate
whether the estimated treatment effects differ for treatments during three different
time windows of elapsed unemployment durations. Furthermore, there are a number
of important differences in the definition of the treatments, the selection of samples,
and the implemented methods. FS use a dynamic treatment evaluation approach for
SPST only. We estimate the effects of three training programs for a much longer time
period after the beginning of the program, and our analysis distinguishes between
genders. In addition to the employment effects, we also analyze the effects on benefit
recipiency. Furthermore, we use a larger inflow sample than FS. In contrast to HTZ,
who estimate a duration model and focus on exits from unemployment, we estimate
medium– and long–run effects on both employment and benefit recipiency, which
we distinguish from lock–in effects. Estimating a duration model, it would be very
difficult to take account of the large number of exits into and out of employment
observed after the first exit from unemployment.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 gives a short de-
scription of the institutional regulation and participation figures for active labor
market policy. Section 2.3 focuses on the different options of further training, their
target groups, and course contents. Section 2.4 describes the methodological ap-
proach to estimate the treatment effects. The empirical results are discussed in
section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes. The final appendix provides further information
on the data and detailed empirical results. An additional appendix includes further
details on the data and the empirical results.
2.2 Basic Regulation and Programs
2.2.1 Basic Regulation
For the time period considered here, public sector sponsored training in Germany
is regulated by the Labor Promotion Act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz, AFG) and is
offered and coordinated by the German Federal Employment Office (formerly Bun-
desanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, BA). We consider the two main training programs: Further
training (Weiterbildung) includes the assessment, maintenance and extension of
skills, including technical development and career advancement. The duration of
the courses depends on individual predispositions and adequate courses provided by
the training suppliers. Retraining (Umschulung) enables vocational re–orientation
if a completed vocational training does not lead to adequate employment. Retrain-
ing is supported for a period up to 2 years and aims at providing a new certified
vocational education degree.
2.2.2 Evaluated Programs
Further training is a very broad legal category and consists of quite heterogeneous
programs. Hence we utilize a classification developed in FS and evaluate two specific
further training programs: Practice Firms (PF) and provision of specific professional
skills and techniques (SPST).
Practice Firms (PF) are simulated firms in which participants practice everyday
working activities. The areas of practice are whole fields of profession, not specific
professions. Hence, practice firms mainly train general skills while provision of new
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professional skills is of less importance. Some of the practice firms are technically
oriented, the practice studios, whereas others are commercially oriented, the practice
enterprises. One of the practice firm’s goals is to evaluate the participant’s aptitude
for a field of profession. The programs usually last for six months and do not provide
official certificates.
Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (SPST) intends to
improve the starting position for finding a new job by providing additional skills
and specific professional knowledge in medium–term courses. It involves refreshing
specific skills, e.g. computer skills, or training on new operational practices. SPST
mainly consists of classroom training but an acquisition of professional knowledge
through practical work experience may also be provided. After successfully com-
pleting the course, participants usually obtain a certificate indicating the contents
of the course, i.e. the refreshed or newly acquired skills and the amount of theory
and practical work experience. Such a certificate is supposed to serve as an addi-
tional signal to potential employers and to increase the matching probability since
the provision of up to date skills and techniques is considered to be a strong signal
in the search process. The provision of specific professional skills and techniques
aims at sustained reintegration into the labor market by improving skills as well as
providing signals.
Compared to retraining, which is a far more formal and thorough training on a range
of professional skills and which provides a complete vocational training degree, the
role of SPST for a participant’s occupational knowledge is weaker. However, the
amount of occupation specific knowledge imparted in SPST certainly exceeds the
level provided in short–term programs (not evaluated here) that usually aim at
improving job search techniques or general social skills. Thus, SPST ranges in the
middle between very formal (and very expensive) courses and very informal and
short courses (improving general human capital).
Retraining (RT) consists of the provision of a new and comprehensive vocational
training according to the regulation of the German apprenticeship system. It is
targeted to individuals who already completed a first vocational training and face
severe difficulties in finding a new employment within their profession. It might
however also be offered to individuals without a first formal training degree if they
fulfill additional eligibility criteria.
Retraining provides widely accepted formal certificates. It comprises both, theoret-
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ical training and practical work experience. The theoretical part of the formation
takes place in the public education system. The practical part is often carried out in
firms that provide work experience in a specific field to the participants, but some-
times also in interplant training establishments. This type of treatment leads to a
certified job qualification in order to improve the job match. Ideally, the training
occupation in retraining corresponds to qualifications which are in high demand in
the labor market.
2.2.3 Financial Incentives for Participation
Participants in the training programs considered are granted an income maintenance
(IM, Unterhaltsgeld). To qualify, they must have been employed for at least one year
or they must be entitled to unemployment benefits or subsequent unemployment
assistance.2
Since 1994, IM is equal to the standard unemployment benefits (UB, Arbeitslosen-
geld). It amounts to 67% of previous net earnings for participants with at least
one dependent child and 60% otherwise (note that in 1993 replacement ratios for
IM were higher at 73% and 65%, respectively). In contrast, unemployed, whose
UB expired, can receive the lower, means tested unemployment assistance (UA, Ar-
beitslosenhilfe) which amounts to 57% (with children) and 53% (without children).
This means that for these unemployed IM during the program is higher than UA.
Additionally, participants could defer the transition from UB to the lower UA and,
in some cases, even requalify for the higher UB.
Concluding, there are positive financial incentives for the unemployed to join a
program. In addition, the BA bears all costs directly incurred through participation
in a further training scheme, especially course fees.
2.3 Data
We use a database which integrates administrative individual data from three dif-
ferent sources (see Bender et al. (2005) for a detailed description). The data contain
2For a more detailed description of the institutions, see Bender et al. (2005), Fitzenberger,
Osikominu and Vo¨lter (2006), or Wunsch (2006).
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spells on
• employment subject to social insurance contributions,
• transfer payments by the BA,
• and participation in training programs.
Further details on the compilation of the data can be found in the additional ap-
pendix.
The basic data source is the IAB Employment Subsample (IAB Bescha¨ftigten-
stichprobe, IABS) for the time period 1975–97, see Bender et al. (2000) and Bender et
al. (2005, chapter 2.1). The IABS is a 1% random sample drawn from employment
register data for all employees subject to social insurance contributions. Therefore,
we restrict the analysis to inflows from employment to unemployment. For this
study, we merge additional information for 1998–2002 to the basic data.
The second important source is the Benefit Payment Register (Leistungsemp-
fa¨ngerdatei, LED) of the Federal Employment Office (BA), see Bender et al. (2005,
chapter 2.2). These data consist of spells on periods of transfer payments granted
by the BA to unemployed and program participants. Besides unemployment ben-
efit or assistance, these data also record very detailed information about income
maintenance payments related to the participation in training programs.
The third data source records training participation (FuU-data). The BA collects
these data for all participants in further training, retraining, and other training
programs for internal monitoring and statistical purposes, see Bender et al. (2005,
chapter 2.3). For every participant the FuU-data contains detailed information
about the program and about the participant.
The FuU–data were merged with the combined IABS–LED data by social insurance
number and additional covariates. Numerous corrections have been implemented in
order to improve the quality of the data, see Bender et al. (2005, chapters 3–4),
FS, and the additional appendix for more information. The IABS provides informa-
tion on personal characteristics and employment histories. The combination of the
transfer payment information and the participation information is used to identify
the likely participation status regarding the different types of training programs.
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When an individual is not observed in any of the three spell types (employment,
transfers, training participation), we interpret this as being out of the labor force.
The spell information on the employment state of an individual is first transformed
into monthly dummy variables (based on the dominating state). We construct sep-
arately monthly dummy variables for training status. Then, for our analysis, the
data is aggregated to a quarterly frequency.
Inflow Sample into Unemployment: To analyze the effect of training programs
on employment and benefit recipiency of unemployed individuals, we base our empir-
ical analysis on the sample of inflows into unemployment during the years 1993/94 in
East Germany, omitting Berlin. We consider individuals who experience a transition
from employment to nonemployment and for whom a spell with transfer payments
from the Federal Employment Office starts during the first 12 months of nonemploy-
ment or for whom the training data indicate program participation before a new job
is found.3 The start of the nonemployment spell is denoted as the beginning of the
unemployment spell. We condition on receipt of unemployment compensation or
program participation to exclude individuals who move out of the labor force.4 This
rule concerns almost exclusively individuals who do not participate in any training
program during their nonemployment spell. A treatment is only considered if the
unemployed does not start employment before the second month of treatment (to
omit training while holding a job). Furthermore, we restrict our samples to the 25
to 55 years old in order to rule out periods of formal education or vocational training
as well as early retirement. For RT, we restrict the sample to the 25 to 50 years old.
We choose the years 1993/94 because data for East Germany start in 1992 and
we want to control for one year of labor market experience before the beginning of
unemployment. Our merged data allow to follow individuals until the end of 2002.
Table 2.1 gives information about the size of the inflow samples and the incidence
of training.
Participation by Type of Training: We focus on the three types of training
programs PF, SPST, and RT, as described in section 2.2.2 above. These programs
are targeted to the unemployed and do not involve on–the–job training (training
while working in a regular job). The total inflow sample comprises 6,135 spells for
women and 5,911 spells for men. There are 1,550 training spells for females and 835
3This design allows the same individual to be in the sample more than once if it has more than
one transition from employment to unemployment in 1993/94.
4Only 1% of training participants do not receive transfer payments during the first 12 months.
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for men. Thus, about 25% of the females and 14% of the men participate in one
of the three training programs considered, which reflects the large scale of training
programs during the East German transition process. Among these programs, SPST
represents the largest with 78% and 63% of the training spells, respectively for
females and males. For females 13% and for men 28% of all training spells are
RT, and PF represents the smallest group in both samples. In absolute numbers,
there are 145 (73) PF spells in the female (male) inflow sample, 1,210 (528) SPST
spells and 195 (234) RT spells. Table 2.2 shows the frequency of training by elapsed
duration of unemployment.
Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics on the elapsed duration of unemployment
at the beginning of treatment. Our discussion focuses on quantiles because averages
may be misleading. The median entrant in PF has been unemployed for 10 months
for females and only for 5 months for males. Late starts (75%–quantile) of PF occur
after 14 months for females and after 11 months for men. SPST is the program
which starts latest with a median of 11 months for females and 7.5 months for men.
RT is the program which starts the earliest for females. The median is 8 months.
The median for males of 6 months is higher than the value for PF. In general, females
start later than men.
Table 2.4 provides descriptive information on the duration of training spells. The
average durations are quite different between the programs but comparable across
genders. Participation in PF is shortest. On average woman stay 6.5 months in PF
and men 6.1 months. Participation in SPST has an average duration of 9.1 months
for females and 8.8 months for males. Participation in RT lasts almost twice as long
as in SPST with an average of 18.7 months for women and 17.3 months for men.
2.4 Evaluation Approach
Our goal is to analyze the effect of K = 3 different training programs on two out-
come variables, namely the individual quarterly employment rate (ER) and the
individual quarterly benefit recipiency rate (BR), both measured as quarterly aver-
ages of monthly dummy variables.5 In a situation where individuals have multiple
treatment options, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
5These quarterly rates can take the four values 0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1.
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of one training program against nonparticipation in any of the three programs.6
Extending the static multiple treatment approach to a dynamic setting, we follow
Sianesi (2003, 2004) and apply the standard static treatment approach recursively
depending on the elapsed unemployment duration. This dynamic evaluation ap-
proach is implemented for our problem as in FS and Fitzenberger et al. (2006).
The estimated dynamic ATT parameters mirror the decision problem of the case
worker and the unemployed who decide recurrently during the unemployment spell,
whether to begin any program now or to postpone participation to the future.
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potential–outcome–approach to causal-
ity, see Roy (1951), Rubin (1974), and the survey of Heckman, LaLonde, Smith
(1999). Lechner (2001) and Imbens (2000) extend this framework to allow for mul-
tiple, exclusive treatments. Let the 4 potential outcomes be {Y 0, Y 1, Y 2, Y 3}, where
Y k, k = 1, ..., 3, represents the outcome associated with training program k and Y 0
is the outcome when participating in none of the 3 training programs. For each
individual, only one of the K + 1 potential outcomes is observed and the remain-
ing K outcomes are counterfactual. We estimate the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) of participating in treatment k = 1, 2, 3 against nonparticipation
k = 0.7
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003, 2004) argue that a static evaluation analysis,
which assigns unemployed individuals to a treatment group and a nontreatment
group based on the treatment information observed in the data, yields biased treat-
ment effects. This is because the definition of the control group conditions on future
outcomes or future treatment. For Sweden, Sianesi (2004) argues that all unem-
ployed individuals are potential future participants in active labor market programs,
a view which is particularly plausible for countries with comprehensive systems of
active labor market policies (like Germany).8 This discussion implies that a purely
6For the large scale training programs implemented in East Germany, it is likely that the
Stable–Unit–Treatment–Value assumption is violated because general equilibrium effects exist.
What we actually estimate is a meaningful ATT for the following scenario: Suppose one changes
treatment status for one random treated individual to being nontreated (including the possibility
of later treatment). The estimated ATT estimates the expected value of the change in the outcome
variable times -1. In this sense, our estimates reflect meaningful effects of such a marginal policy
change.
7Using the same approach, a pairwise comparison of the differential effects of the programs
would be feasible, see Lechner (2001) or Fitzenberger et al. (2006). Such a pairwise comparison is
not pursued in this paper for the sake of space.
8In East Germany, active labor market programs were implemented after unification at an
unprecedented scale.
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static evaluation of the different training programs is not warranted. Following
Sianesi (2003, 2004), we analyze the effects of the first participation in a training
program during the unemployment spell considered conditional on the starting date
of the treatment. We distinguish between treatment starting during quarters 1 to 2
of the unemployment spell (stratum 1), treatment starting during quarters 3 to 4
(stratum 2), and treatment starting during quarters 5 to 8 (stratum 3).
Our approach differs from Sianesi (2003, 2004) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2003,
2004) in the following important aspects. We believe the starting date of the treat-
ment to be somewhat random (relative to the elapsed duration of the unemployment
spell) due to available programs starting only at certain calendar dates. Based on
this argument, we pool the treatment Probit for all eligible persons in unemployment
for a longer stratum than Sianesi (2003, 2004), who uses months, and we exclude
individuals who start treatment later within the same stratum as possible control
persons. Fredriksson and Johansson (2003, 2004) define a treatment parameter
which integrates the treatment effects over program starting dates. In devising their
estimators in discrete time, these authors assume that all individuals who do not
receive treatment during the next (short) time period can serve as control persons
for estimating counterfactual hazard rates. We do not think that this assumption is
justified in our context because of the aforementioned randomness of starting dates.
Our estimated ATT parameter has to be interpreted in a dynamic context. We
analyze treatment conditional upon the unemployment spell lasting at least until the
start of the treatment k and this being the first treatment during the unemployment
spell considered. Therefore, the estimated treatment parameter is
θ(k;u, τ) = E(Y k(u, τ)|Tu = k, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0)(2.1)
−E(Y 0(u, τ)|Tu = k, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0) ,
where Tu is the treatment variable for treatment starting in quarter u of unem-
ployment and U is the completed duration of the unemployment spell. Y k(u, τ)
and Y 0(u, τ) are the potential treatment outcomes for treatments k and 0, respec-
tively, in periods u + τ , where treatment starts in period u and τ = 0, 1, 2, ...,
counts the quarters since the beginning of treatment. The nontreatment outcome
Y 0(u, τ) refers to the case where the individual does not receive any treatment until
the end of the stratum considered. Actually, we estimate the treatment parameter
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θ(k; τ) =
∑
u guθ(k;u, τ) , which is averaged within a stratum with respect to the
distribution gu of starting dates u.
We evaluate the differential effects of multiple treatments assuming the following
dynamic version of the conditional mean independence assumption (DCIA)9
E(Y 0(u, τ)|U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0, Tu = k,X, ben(u))(2.2)
= E(Y 0(u, τ)|U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = Tu = ... = Tu¯ = 0, X, ben(u)) ,
where X are time–invariant (during the unemployment spell) characteristics, ben(u)
is the number of months the unemployed were receiving benefits during the unem-
ployment spell before the start of the treatment u, and u¯ denotes the last quarter of
the stratum considered. We effectively assume that conditional on X, conditional
on being unemployed until period u−1, conditional on having received benefits the
same number of months before u, and conditional on not having received a treatment
before u, individuals treated in u are comparable in their nontreatment outcome to
individuals who do not start any treatment until u¯ (recall from above, that Y 0(u, τ)
involves no treatment until u¯).
Building on Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) result on the balancing property of the
propensity score in the case of a binary treatment, Lechner (2001) shows that the
conditional probability of treatment k, given that the individual receives treatment
k or no treatment 0, P k|k0(X), exhibits an analogous balancing property for the
pairwise estimation of the ATT’s of program k versus no participation 0. This
allows to apply standard binary propensity score matching based on the sample of
individuals participating in either program k or in no program 0 (Lechner, 2001;
Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; Sianesi, 2003). For this subsample, we simply estimate
the probability of treatment k and then apply a bivariate extension of standard
propensity matching techniques. Implicitly, we assume that the actual beginning of
treatment within a stratum is random conditional on X.
To account for the dynamic treatment assignment, we estimate the probability of
treatment k given that unemployment lasts long enough to make an individual ‘eligi-
ble’. For treatment during quarters 1 to 2, we take the total sample of unemployed,
9In addition to DCIA, we also assume that the probability of treatment is less than one con-
ditional on the conditioning variables in equation (2.2) and that the Stable Unit Treatment Value
assumption holds. These are further assumptions needed to estimate an ATT parameter, see
Heckman, LaLonde, Smith (1999).
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who participate in k or in no program during quarters 1 to 2 (stratum 1), and
estimate a Probit model for participation in k. This group includes those unem-
ployed who either never participate in any program or who start some treatment
after quarter 2. For treatment during strata 2 and 3, the basic sample consists of
those unemployed who are still unemployed at the beginning of the stratum.
We implement a stratified local linear matching approach by imposing that the
matching partners for an individual receiving treatment k are still unemployed in
the quarter (of elapsed unemployment duration) before treatment k starts and have
received benefits the same number of months until the quarter before treatment
starts. The expected counterfactual employment outcome for nonparticipation is
obtained by means of a local linear regression on the propensity score and the
starting month of the unemployment spell to match on calender time. We use a
bivariate crossvalidation procedure to obtain the bandwidths in both dimensions
(propensity score and beginning of unemployment spell).
An estimate for the variance of the estimated treatment effects is obtained through
bootstrapping based on 200 resamples.10 Effectively using a block bootstrap proce-
dure for clustered inference, we resample the entire time series of observations for
one individual. Our bootstrap procedure takes account of the sampling variability
in the estimated propensity score and it is autocorrelation robust.
As a balancing test, we use the regression test suggested in Smith and Todd (2005) to
investigate whether the time–invariant (during the unemployment spell) covariates
are balanced sufficiently by matching on the estimated propensity score P k|k0(X)
using a flexible polynomial approximation. Furthermore, we investigate whether
treated and matched nontreated individuals differ significantly in their outcomes
before the beginning of treatment, in addition to those already used as arguments of
the propensity score. We estimate these differences in the same way as the treatment
10Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that the bootstrap fails for nearest neighbor matching because
of a lack of smoothness resulting in local convergence not being uniform (see also Heckman et al.,
1998, p. 276). In contrast, local linear matching with appropriate trimming to guarantee com-
mon support and under a weak convergence condition for the bandwidth parameters, is shown by
Heckman et al. (1998, p. 278) to exhibit sufficiently smooth convergence for standard asymptotic
distribution theory to hold. In particular, the estimated ATT parameter has a standard asymp-
totically linear representation and it is asymptotically normally distributed with
√
N convergence
rate. Although we are not aware of a formal proof, the bootstrap is therefore likely to be valid
for local linear matching. Horowitz (2001, section 2) discusses the consistency of the bootstrap
for
√
N asymptotically normal estimators with an asymptotically linear representation. Although
local linear matching involves an intermediate nonparametric estimation step, a similar result is
likely to hold.
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effects after the beginning of the program. By construction, treated individuals
and their matched counterparts exhibit the same unemployment duration until the
beginning of treatment.
Finally, we need to discuss why we think that the DCIA (2.2) is plausible for our
application. As Sianesi (2004), we argue that the participation probability depends
upon the variables determining re-employment prospects once unemployment be-
gan. Consequently, all individuals are considered who have left employment in
the same two years (matching controls for beginning of unemployment) and who
have experienced the same unemployment duration and the same number of months
receiving benefits before program participation. Furthermore, observable individ-
ual characteristics and information from the previous employment spell have been
included in the propensity score estimation. E.g., we consider skill information,
regional information, occupational status, and industry which should be crucial for
re-employment chances. Unfortunately, our data lack subjective assessments of la-
bor market chances of the unemployed (e.g. by case workers). We argue that these
are proxied sufficiently by the observed covariates in so far as they affect selection
into the program. This is particularly plausible, since participation occurred at a
large scale, assignment was not very targeted, and case workers lacked practical
experience on ’what works’ in a quickly changing economic environment. Support-
ing our point of view, Schneider et al. (2006) argue that until 2002 assignment to
training was strongly driven by the supply of available courses.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Estimation of Propensity Scores
Our empirical analysis is performed separately for females and males. To estimate
the propensity scores, we run Probit regressions for each of the three programs for
taking part in this program versus not taking part in any program (“waiting”) for
training starting during the three time intervals for elapsed unemployment duration,
i.e. 1–2 quarters (stratum 1), 3–4 quarters (stratum 2), and 5–8 quarters (stratum 3).
The additional appendix reports our preferred specifications, which are obtained af-
ter extensive specification search, summary statistics of the covariates used, detailed
results of the balancing tests, and figures on common support.
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The covariates considered are all defined for the beginning of unemployment and are
thus time–invariant for an individual during the unemployment spell. Personal char-
acteristics considered are age, marital status and formal education (with/without
vocational training degree, tertiary education degree). In addition, we use informa-
tion about the last employer, namely industrial sector and firm size, and a number
of characteristics of the previous job such as employment status and information
on earnings in the previous job. Regarding the employment and program participa-
tion history, we consider the employment history and participation in any ALMP
program in the year before the beginning of unemployment. Differences in regional
labor market conditions as well as supply of programs are the reason to include
regional variables in the specification. We use the federal state and the population
density at the district level. Finally, we also use the calendar month of the beginning
of the unemployment period.
Our specification search starts by using as many as possible of the covariates men-
tioned above without interactions. The specification search is mainly led by the
following two criteria: (i) single and joint significance, and (ii) balance of the co-
variates according to the regression based balancing test in Smith and Todd (2005).
In general, insignificant covariates are dropped. We also test for the significance of
interaction effects, in particular interactions with age. In order to achieve balance
of covariates, we test different functional forms and interaction effects. In a few
cases, we keep insignificant covariates or interactions, when they help to achieve
balance. As we find the balancing test to be somewhat sensitive to small cell sizes
we occasionally aggregate small groups that have similar coefficients.
The results for the Probit estimates show that the final specifications vary consid-
erably between men and women and the three time intervals for a given program.
Age effects are significant in most cases. In particular, participants in retraining are
younger than individuals in other groups.
Our chosen specifications for the propensity score pass the regression based balancing
test (no rejection) of Smith and Todd (2005) for a sufficiently large number of
covariates. We graphically examine the common support requirement for estimating
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Overall, we are satisfied with
the overlap of support in all cases and proceed without restricting the samples.11
11In four cases (out of 16) we have to drop one and in one case two treated individuals from the
treatment effect estimations due to numerical problems.
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2.5.2 Estimated Treatment Effects
We estimate the effects of the three types of training programs PF, SPST, and
RT, separately for males and females. The two outcome variables considered are
the individual quarterly employment rate (ER) and benefit recipiency rate (BR:
UB, UA, or IM; see section 2.2.3). We match participants in treatment k and
nonparticipants in any treatment, who are still unemployed in the quarter before
treatment starts and have received benefits the same number of months until the
quarter before treatment starts, by their similarity in the estimated propensity scores
and the starting month of the unemployment spell. The ATT is then estimated
separately for quarters τ since the beginning of program k for stratum 1, 2, and 3.
In the case of PF for males, we only estimate the ATT for stratum 1, because the
number of treated individuals in strata 2 and 3 is very small, see table 2.2.
Figures 2.1–2.6 display the estimated treatment effects θˆ(k; τ) on the vertical axis
against quarter τ ≥ 0 since the beginning of treatment or quarter τ < 0 before the
beginning of treatment. The time axis is divided into three parts by two vertical
lines, which denote the last quarter before the unemployment spell starts and the
treatment start τ = 0, respectively. The left part shows the four quarters before
unemployment starts, the middle part the gap between the beginning of the unem-
ployment spell and the beginning of treatment and the right part the time since
treatment start. Each figure contains a panel of three times four graphs (except
PF for males, with only stratum 1 in figure 2.2), where each row represents one
stratum of elapsed duration of unemployment. The first and third column show
the evolution of average outcomes for treated individuals (solid line) and their esti-
mated nontreatment counterfactual (dashed line). The differences of these lines are
displayed in the second and fourth column (solid line), respectively, as the estimated
treatment effects together with pointwise 95%–confidence bands (dashed lines).
To summarize the graphical evidence in a systematic way, tables B.26 and 2.7 provide
cumulated treatment effects (
∑L−1
τ=0 θˆ(k; τ)) over the first L = 8, 16, and 24 quarters
since beginning of treatment and average treatment effects during quarter 4 to 23
and 8 to 23 [1/(24 − l)∑23τ=l θˆ(k; τ) for l = 4, 8].12 These aggregated effects are
calculated as sums or averages of the effects over time since treatment start τ . Note
that we do not sum across strata k, i.e. we do not aggregate treatment starting dates
12For the bootstrap, we calculate the aggregate effect for each resample and then take the
empirical standard deviation across the resamples as our estimate of the standard error of the
estimated aggregate effect in the sample.
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across strata – something which is done in Fredriksson and Johansson (2004). The
cumulated effects as sums of the graphically depicted quarterly effects are measured
in quarters of employment or benefit recipiency. They are a way of contrasting the
initial negative lock-in-effects with the later positive program effects and can be
seen as the net present value of participation measured in quarters of the outcome
variable assuming a discount rate of zero. When the cumulated employment effect is
positive the lower employment rate during the lock-in-effect can be compensated by
the higher employment rate afterwards. And with benefit recipiency it is a negative
cumulated effect, which indicates that a lower recipiency rate in the medium and long
run can compensate for the higher rate during the lock-in. The average effects over
the period between one or two years and six years from the beginning of treatment
serve the purpose of giving precisely estimated medium– to long–run program effects
unaffected by the short–run lock-in-effects.
The treatment PF (figures 2.1–2.2) basically shows significant (here and in the fol-
lowing, significant refers to statistically significant effects) negative lock–in effects
on ER during the first six quarters (the solid line in the first columns lies below the
dashed line)13 and no significant positive ER effects afterwards. The BR effects are
almost symmetric, with positive BR effects during the lock–in period and mostly
no significant BR effects afterwards, except for stratum 3 for women where the BR
effect seems to be quite volatile and often significantly positive in the medium– and
long–run. The results are quite similar in stratum 1 for both genders. The graphical
evidence is confirmed in tables B.26 and 2.7. We restrict our discussion of the ag-
gregated effects to the cumulated effects over 24 quarters and to the average effects
during quarter 8 to 23. None of the aggregated ER effects is significant. For BR,
we find no significant aggregated effects on women for stratum 1 and 2. For Men
in stratum 1 the cumulated effect on BR is significantly positive, but the average
effect is insignificant. For stratum 3, we find both effects to be significantly positive.
Thus, the treatment PF shows no positive employment effects, but it increases the
benefit recipiency rate for women starting treatment later in their unemployment
spell.
The evidence for SPST in figures 2.3–2.4 is much more positive and confirms the
results in FS. After strong negative lock–in effects during a period of almost two
years, we find positive and mostly significant medium– and long–run employment
13We discuss lock–in effects for the time it takes for the treated individuals to catch up with the
nontreated individuals.
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effects of around 10 percentage points (pp), which typically persist until the end of
the observation period. The effects on BR are similar to PF, i.e. treatment increases
BR in the short run, and the medium– and long–run effects are not significantly
different from zero. The cumulated ER increases lie between 0 and 1.5 quarters.
They are significant for stratum 1 and insignificant for the later strata. For men
participating in SPST in stratum 1 we find the largest positive cumulated employ-
ment effects in this study. These men are on average 1.5 quarters longer employed
during the course of six years since treatment start than comparable men who do
not participate in a program in stratum 1. The average ER effects of SPST are
highly significant and amount to about 10 pp in all cases. All cumulated BR effects
are positive and significantly so for strata 2 and 3. The average BR effects are never
significant. The effects for both genders are very similar.
For RT, the evidence in figures 2.5–2.6 is more mixed. As to be expected, we find the
longest (typically lasting 10 quarters) and deepest lock–in effects for this treatment,
with stratum 1 for men showing the strongest decline. The medium– and long–
run ER effects are only significantly positive for males in stratum 1 and females in
stratum 3. For women in stratum 1 the effects are sometimes significantly positive.
The three other cases basically show insignificant ER effects in the medium– and
long–run, although they are positive in most periods. Again, we find positive BR ef-
fects during the lock–in period and typically insignificant BR effects in the medium–
and long–run for strata 2 and 3. For stratum 1 we see a medium– and long–run
reduction, but which is only sometimes significant. Almost all of the cumulated ER
effects are insignificantly negative, stratum 2 for men shows a significantly nega-
tive effect and stratum 3 for women an insignificantly positive one. Confirming the
graphical evidence, the average ER effects are significant only for males in stratum 1
(around 12 pp) and females in stratum 3 (around 16 pp). All cumulated BR effects
are significantly positive. The average BR effects are only significant for males in
stratum 2 and 3.
No case in figures 2.1–2.6 shows significant differences in outcomes before the be-
ginning of the unemployment spell. Since we include the employment history in
the propensity score estimation, this is not a pre-program test of the CIA. But the
results show that our matching approach balances well the employment history of
treated and nontreated individuals. Note furthermore that lock–in effects last fairly
long in comparison to results for West Germany, see Lechner et al. (2005a), LMW,
FS, and Fitzenberger et al. (2006). A likely reason is that search frictions in the
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labor market are higher in East Germany compared to West Germany.
Overall, our results do not confirm the gender differences in the treatment effects as
found in LMW. Neither for SPST, which comprises most of the long training as in
LMW, and nor for RT, we find that employment effects are higher for females com-
pared to males and that males show zero or negative long–run effects.14 To explore
reasons for the differences in results, we first would like to reexamine the evidence on
gender differences in the content of training as reported in LMW, which the authors
identify as a potential reason for the gender differences in the treatment effects.
Programs are characterized by the target profession of training. This information is
contained in table 2.5 stratified by gender, program, and stratum. Large differences
show up between genders as also documented in LMW. PF for women mainly train
in office professions (38%–48%) and in broader programs (20–27%), which can not
be related to a specific profession. For female participants in SPST these fields are
also the most important with 20–30% for office professions and 13–31% for broader
programs. RT for women train mainly in service professions (17–28%), office profes-
sions (12–25%) and health professions (10–22%). For males, the programs PF and
RT are dominated by target professions in construction, which have a share of at
least 40%, and even 56% for men in RT in stratum 3. Metal professions are second
most important for PF and RT in stratum 1 and 2 with about 25%. RT in stratum
3 trains only 12% in metal professions. SPST for men is concentrated in service
professions (13–22%) and technical professions (13–19 %) for all strata. In strata
1 and 2 metal professions are most important with 27 and 23% and construction
is also important with 13 and 17%. In the third stratum broad programs are most
important with 32%. Thus, our data show similar gender differences in the content
of training as reported by LMW.
Now, we explore further possible explanations of the differences in the estimated
treatment effects for RT. We focus on RT because SPST differs from long training
as defined in LMW and target professions in construction have a fairly small share in
SPST. First, the differences to LMW are not due to the fact that LMW use a static
evaluation approach, while we estimate the effects of treatment versus waiting. To
investigate this, we reestimate the treatment effects in stratum 1 excluding the future
participants in any training program from the control group (around 10% of the male
14As one exception, we find positive effects of RT for females and not for males in stratum
3. However, the number of treated males in stratum 3 is very small and the results in LMW
correspond mainly to stratum 1 and 2 because the construction of the treatment sample in LMW
oversamples early treatments, see discussion below.
82
and around 20% of the female controls are excluded, see additional appendix). The
results for males basically do not change while the estimated treatment effects for
females are reduced to some extent (these results are available upon request). Thus,
the difference in evaluation approach should work in the opposite direction and can
not explain the differences in the results. Second, since LMW suggest that males do
not show positive long–run employment effects from RT because of the large share
of target professions in construction, we estimate the treatment effects of RT for
males separately with target profession in construction and in nonconstruction. We
exclude the cases where the target profession is missing. The results (see additional
appendix for details) clearly show that the employment effects for target profession
construction are by no means smaller than for target profession nonconstruction.
In fact, the point estimates for stratum 1 and 2 even suggest that in most cases
the medium– and long–run employment effects are higher for target professions in
construction (these differences are, however, not significant). Third, the differences
in the sample construction (see table in additional appendix for a juxtaposition)
between our paper and LMW show that LMW oversample early treatments. This
should work in the opposite direction of the differences in the results, because in
stratum 1 men but not women show positive employment effects for RT (see footnote
14). There are a number of further differences in the construction of the sample
which, however, seem unlikely to explain the differences in results.
Concluding, we can not replicate the gender differences in results reported in LMW
and we can not confirm differences in treatment effects by target profession as sug-
gested by LMW. We have explored possible reasons to rationalize these differences
but, unfortunately, the reason for these differences in results remains an open ques-
tion.
2.6 Conclusions
Using a dynamic multiple treatment framework, this study analyzes the effects of
three exclusive training programs for inflows into unemployment for the two years
1993/94. We evaluate medium– and long–run treatment effects both for employment
and benefit recipiency up to 24–30 quarters after the beginning of the treatment
depending on the starting date of the treatment and we distinguish by gender. Our
results imply positive medium– and long–run employment effects for the largest
83
program, Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (SPST), a program
which involves sizeable off–the–job class room training. In contrast, practice firms
show no positive employment effects and this holds also for retraining (the longest
program) in four out of six cases. Furthermore, we do not find any of the three
programs to reduce significantly the benefit recipiency rate in the medium and long
run, in the short run all programs show the lock–in effect with an increase in the
benefit recipiency rate, thus providing evidence for ’benefit churning’ as in Kluve et
al. (2004). The fact that we see increased ER and constant BR in the long run for
SPST means that nonparticipation in the labor market went down. This suggests
that such programs prevent its participants from leaving the labor force. Overall,
the treatment effects are quite similar for females and males, thus, we can not
confirm the gender differences found in Lechner et al. (2005b). Our evidence confirms
the necessity to analyze long–term effects of sizeable training programs because
all programs show strong negative lock–in effects in the short run. The positive
assessment of SPST compared to practice firms is in contrast to the conventional
wisdom in most of the literature. As two final caveats, an overall assessment of
the microeconomic effects is not possible, because various necessary information for
a comprehensive cost–benefit–analysis are lacking in our data set, and our paper
ignores the likely general equilibrium effects of the large scale training programs
implemented in East Germany.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Descriptive Statistics and Description of Data
Table 2.1: Participation in First Training Program for the Inflow Samples into
Unemployment
Training Program Frequency Percent of Percent among
inflow sample treated
Women
Practice Firm 145 2.4 9.4
SPST 1,210 19.7 78.1
Retraining 195 3.2 12.6
No training program above 4,585 74.7 –
Total inflow sample 6,135 100 100
Men
Practice Firm 73 1.2 8.7
SPST 528 8.9 63.2
Retraining 234 4.0 28.0
No training program above 5,076 85.9 –
Total inflow sample 5,911 100 100
Remark: Programs that start before a new job is found are considered. We exclude training
programs which start together with a job (like integration subsidies) or which involve a very
small number of participants since they are not targeted on inflows into unemployment (as
career advancement and German language courses).
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Table 2.2: Number of Training Spells and Length of Unemployment before Program
Start
Practice Firm SPST Retraining
Women Men Women Men Women Men
1–2 quarters 37 40 254 200 61 (61) 113 (107)
3–4 quarters 51 15 374 141 76 (75) 82 (79)
5–8 quarters 48 14 435 144 53 (53) 35 (33)
>8 quarters 9 4 147 43 5 (5) 4 (4)
Total 145 73 1,210 528 195 (194) 234 (223)
Remark: The time intervals indicate the quarter of program start relative to the beginning
of the unemployment spell. The numbers in parenthesis for RT are participants who are less
than 51 years old when entering unemployment.
Table 2.3: Elapsed Duration of Unemployment in Months at Beginning of Training
Spell
Practice Firm SPST Retraining
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Average 10.9 8.1 12.8 10.4 8.9 6.8
25%–Quantile 5 2 6 4 4 3
Median 10 5 11 7.5 8 6
75%–Quantile 14 11 18 15 12 10
Table 2.4: Realized Duration of Training Spells in Months
Practice Firm SPST Retraining
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Average 6.5 6.1 9.1 8.8 18.7 17.3
25%–Quantile 6 4 6 4 15 12
Median 6 6 10 9 21 21
75%–Quantile 7 8 12 12 22 22
Remark: The duration of the training spell is defined as the number of months of continuous
training. No interruptions are allowed. If in any month we do not identify the program we
assume the program has ended the month before.
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Table 2.5: Program fields of (target) profession
Program field (see below)
Stratum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 missing
Women
PF 1 14 5 5 3 0 0 8 0 38 0 0 27 0
PF 2 6 4 6 2 4 2 4 4 43 0 6 20 0
PF 3 4 2 2 2 2 6 4 0 48 0 8 21 0
SPST 1 5 0 4 0 3 9 1 18 30 6 11 13 26
SPST 2 4 2 5 0 4 11 2 10 20 8 14 20 30
SPST 3 3 2 2 1 2 11 0 7 21 6 13 31 31
RT 1 6 0 4 2 0 10 2 8 12 20 28 8 18
RT 2 9 1 4 6 4 1 0 1 16 22 27 6 12
RT 3 12 2 4 8 4 8 0 0 25 10 17 8 9
Men
PF 1 2 25 0 42 2 0 0 2 2 0 5 18 0
SPST 1 3 27 1 13 13 3 8 4 1 0 22 5 29
SPST 2 2 23 1 17 19 4 5 6 1 2 13 5 34
SPST 3 2 10 1 7 15 0 7 4 1 0 21 32 43
RT 1 3 27 0 43 2 1 7 0 0 2 12 3 17
RT 2 1 26 1 40 6 4 7 0 1 6 6 1 12
RT 3 0 12 0 56 3 0 3 0 6 3 15 3 3
Total 4 9 3 10 5 6 3 6 16 5 14 17 25
Remark: The table shows the distribution of the fields of profession for the programs by
stratum and gender in percent of the nonmissing information. The fields are the following:
1 agriculture, basic materials, leather, textiles 2 metal 3 food 4 construction 5 technical 6
retail sales 7 transport 8 accounting 9 office 10 health 11 services 12 broader program. The
last column gives the share of missing information.
2.8.2 Estimated Effects of Further Training Measures
Figures 2.1–2.6 display the estimated treatment effects θˆ(k; τ) on the horizontal
axis against quarter τ ≥ 0 since the beginning of treatment or quarter τ < 0
before the beginning of treatment. The time axis is divided into three parts by two
vertical lines, which denote the last quarter before the unemployment spell starts
and the treatment start τ = 0, respectively. The left part shows the four quarters
before unemployment starts, the middle part the gap between the beginning of the
unemployment spell and the beginning of treatment and the right part the time
since treatment start.
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Chapter 3
Regional Unemployment and
Regional Mobility in
West Germany
99
3.1 Introduction
The unemployment rates in West Germany exhibit strong regional variation. In
1997, the last year of this study, they range from a minimum of 4.8% in Erding
to a maximum of 20.9% in Bremerhaven. These differences are quite persistent
over time as for instance Bu¨ttner (1999) shows. Equalizing such regional disparities
would be efficiency enhancing and regional mobility can be one factor in order to do
so. Herzog et al. (1993) in their survey on migration as spatial job search consider
regional mobility a macro-based measure of labor market efficiency. Blanchard and
Katz (1992) show that in the US regional mobility is an effective mechanism in
equalizing disparities in regional unemployment rates. In Europe this is less so the
case, as Decressin and Fata´s (1995) find.
In this paper I analyze the relationship between regional unemployment rates and
regional mobility at the individual level in Germany. Are individuals in high un-
employment areas regionally more mobile than individuals in low unemployment
areas?
The literature on regional mobility is very extensive (for an overview on internal
migration see Greenwood (1997)). So I will rather selectively discuss some papers
relevant to this study, which analyze regional mobility at the individual level and
consider regional unemployment rates as one factor. In an older survey of eight
studies for the US, Herzog et al. (1993) conclude that higher regional unemployment
induces higher migration, but admit the evidence to be not overwhelming. In a newer
paper, Yankow (2002) focusses on the job search behavior of displaced workers in
the US. He estimates a competing-risk hazard model for exits from unemployment
into employment in the local labor market compared to exits into employment in
other labor markets via migration. He finds that higher local unemployment rates
are associated with a decreased likelihood of finding employment locally but are
unrelated to the likelihood of finding employment via migration. So the proportion
of exits via migration is higher.
For Germany I will briefly review four studies. Hatzius (1994) estimates yearly mi-
gration probabilities at the individual level in West Germany using GSOEP data.
Migration is defined as migration between federal states. He finds regional un-
employment to have an insignificantly (10%) positive effect on individual migration
probability. Windzio (2004) analyzes regional mobility between Northern and South-
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ern Germany using the IAB data for 1984 to 1997, the same data for the same period
as this study does. In a hazard rate model he finds that higher regional unemploy-
ment at the district level lowers the migration probability, where migration is defined
as mobility between northern and southern Germany. Arntz (2005) investigates the
regional job search behavior of unemployed workers in Germany also using the IAB
data. She uses a competing risk framework for exits into employment within the
same region as opposed to exits into employment into other regions (comparable
to Yankow (2002)). Her measure of local economic conditions is not purely the
unemployment rate, but the unemployment vacancy ratio. She finds that a higher
unemployment vacancy ratio increases the migration hazard and lowers the rate of
finding jobs locally. Lastly, Schu¨ndeln (2007) looks at migration within Germany
using microcensus data. He estimates conditional logit models of the migration de-
cision between German federal states. He finds migration to be responsive to the
state unemployment rate. A higher state unemployment rate lowers the probabil-
ity that individuals stay within the state or move towards the state. Summarizing
the evidence for Germany, three studies find a moderately positive relationship be-
tween regional unemployment and regional mobility, but Windzio (2004) finds the
contrary. This conflicting evidence motivates further investigation.
In the previous literature the regional unemployment rate is treated as one factor
among others influencing regional mobility. The contribution of this study is its sole
focus on the link between the regional unemployment rate and regional mobility.
My specific approach in this paper is to analyze regional mobility based on job
changes. The measure for regional mobility is the share of job changers which starts
a new job in another region. The first question investigated is if regional mobility is
higher in regions with higher unemployment. Indeed I find that regional mobility is
higher in regions with a higher regional unemployment rate. A higher share of job
changers coming from high unemployment regions also leaves the region. A second
question analyzed is, if the destination choice of those who are regionally mobile is
lead by differentials in unemployment rates. Only if those who are regionally mobile
move towards regions with lower unemployment rates, regional mobility can help
in equalizing unemployment rate differentials. I find that on average the regionally
mobile move towards regions with lower unemployment rates.
I study job changes of men in West Germany between 1984 and 1997 using IAB
employment register data. My intention is to explore the relationship between re-
gional unemployment and regional mobility in a simple and descriptive fashion. It
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is beyond the scope of this study to model migration decisions. This would also
require information unavailable in the IAB data about the household context and
home ownership.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the data and the constructed sample. Section 3.3 gives the results and section 3.4
concludes.
3.2 Data and Sample
3.2.1 Data
Basic data set for this study is the IABS employment subsample (IAB Bescha¨ftigten-
stichprobe, IABS ) of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) for the time
period 1975 to 1997, for details see Bender et al. (2000). The IABS is a 1% random
sample of employment subject to social insurance contributions and covers 591,627
individuals. For those individuals in the sample the IABS comprises all employment
spells between 1975 and 1997 as well as all spells during which the individuals have
received unemployment benefits. In effect the IABS contains complete employment
histories with the exception of self employment periods since the self employed do
not have to pay social insurance contributions. For the same reason lifetime civil
servants are not included in the IABS.
The regional information in the IABS is the district (Kreis) where the employer
is located. Western Germany consists of 327 districts. So, the districts give quite
a detailed picture about work place locations. However, the data include no in-
formation about the employees residential locations. As a consequence, regional
mobility in this paper always means geographical mobility between workplaces and
not residential mobility. I can not distinguish whether individuals actually migrate
or commute. Since the focus of this study is the mobility of labor, this is only a
small drawback. The question is if labor is geographically mobile and for this study
it is of minor importance if this mobility is achieved by migrating or by commuting.
As a measure of distance between two districts I calculate the straight-line distance
between the two district capitals by using latitudes and longitudes.
The unemployment rate at the district level is provided by the Federal Employ-
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ment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, BA). I use yearly averages of the district
unemployment rates, because the rates are given by the BA in varying frequency.
Since this study is limited to males it would be desirable to have unemployment
rates for men. Unfortunately, for the time period under consideration unemploy-
ment rates at the district level differentiated by sex are not available. So I have to
use unemployment rates for men and women together as a proxy.
3.2.2 Sample
The observational units to be analyzed in this study are job changes. The question
is if the job changes take place within regions or between regions. Using the IAB
data I have constructed a sample of job changes. Since the IABS is a representa-
tive sample of all individuals who have been employed subject to social insurance
contributions at least once between 1975 and 1997, the job change sample is repre-
sentative for all job changes of those individuals. Note, that as a consequence the
sample is not representative for individuals. If some individuals change jobs more
often than others do (for instance the younger) than these individuals contribute
relatively more observations to the job change sample. A conventional alternative
to the job based analysis of regional mobility would have been to keep the indi-
vidual as the observational unit and use the IABS as a panel. Limitations of the
IAB data prevented me from doing so. The geographical information (the employers
location) is only available for periods of employment, but not for periods of non-
or unemployment. Aggregating the spell based IABS into a yearly (or monthly)
panel in order to estimate person based migration rates would thus have resulted in
missing values for periods of un- or nonemployment. The job based analysis chosen,
however, has the advantage that geographical information is always available for the
jobs. Another alternative would have been to use a different data set, the GSOEP,
the main household panel for Germany. But since regional mobility is a rather rare
event I consider the much larger sample size of the IABS an important advantage.
Now I come to the details of the sample of job changes constructed from the IABS.
This job change sample comprises job changes of men aged 20 to 65 during the
years 1984 to 1997 within West Germany. The first year, 1984, is the first year for
which district unemployment rates are available and the last year, 1997, is the last
year covered by the IABS version used for this study. I exclude Berlin and East
Germany in order to study a homogeneous and connected area. The job change
103
sample contains direct job-to-job transitions, in which the new job starts within
7 days after the old job ends, as well es job changes characterized by an un- or
nonemployment period of up to two years between both jobs. I exclude job changes
with an intervening period of more than two years, because within such a long time
it is more likely that some relevant event occurred, which is not recorded in the
data, like for instance self-employment. The IAB data record many employment
spells which last only for a few days. A typical example are engagements of artists.
In order to obtain a sample of job changes between relatively stable jobs I restrict
the sample to job changes between jobs which each last longer than 31 days.
Next I will explain how I define job changes. There are two classes of job changes
in the sample. The first class are plant changes. This is determined by the IAB
data, which identify firms at the plant level. The second class are recalls. I view
recalls as job changes which result in a new job at the previous firm, but could have
resulted in a new job at another firm. Since job changes of those, who expected to be
recalled by their old firm but ended up at another firm, are by construction included
in the first class of job changes, I decided to include recalls in the job change sample
as well, since I consider expected recalls and realized recalls as quite comparable.
Recalls make up 17% of the total sample.1
An overview about the constructed job change sample can be found in table 3.1. The
sample contains 308,841 job changes from 115,548 men. Looking at the geographical
distance between both jobs, about 62% of the job changes take place within the same
district denoted by “0 km”.2 Distances between 1 and 50 km are covered by 22%
of the job changes and distances between 51 and 100 km by 6%. Job changes with
distances of more than 100 and up to 250 km make up 5% of the sample and 4% of
all job changes are in the category with more than 250 km. In order to simplify the
following analysis I aggregate the five distance categories into just two, referred to as
changes within regions and changes between regions. All job changes with distances
of up to 100 km are called changes within regions and changes with distances of more
than 101 km are called changes between regions. Using this binary classification
there are 90.7% changes within regions and 9.3% changes between regions.
Differentiating the job changes by potential events between the old and the new
1Note that recalls necessarily are job changes within a region, because the new employer is the
old one. Excluding recalls thus would increase measures of regional mobility.
2This category also contains changes between adjacent districts as long as they share the district
capital.
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job results in three types of job changes. The first and largest type with 44% are
direct changes without an interruption of more than 7 days between the old and
the new job. The other two types are characterized by an interruption of more
than seven days between both jobs. The second type of job changes is described
by an intervening period of unemployment with receipt of unemployment benefits
for at least one day and comprises 35% of the sample. The third type with the
remaining 21% is characterized by a period of non-employment without reception
of unemployment benefits. The composition of this third type is potentially quite
diverse, which makes the interpretation difficult. Individuals can for instance by un-
employed without benefit payments or be self employed, which both is not recorded
in the data.
An overview about the characteristics of the job changers is given in table 3.2.
They are rather young, 45% in the sample are between 20 and 29 years old at the
time of the job change.3 The dominant education category is a vocational training
degree with 77%. No vocational training degree have 16%, a university or technical
college degree have 8%. Since the education variable given in the IABS has quality
deficiencies, I applied the imputation procedure (IP2B) described in Fitzenberger
et al. (2006) to improve its quality. In the sample, married are 41% and foreign
12%. Migration and employment history is captured by three variables. In the last
two years before the job change considered, 7% have been regionally mobile (had at
least one job change which also was a regional change), 13% have been recalled by
an old employer and 29% have been unemployed with payment of benefits.
Several variables describe the old job and the old employer: employment status,
earnings, tenure and firm size. Occupations and industries are accounted for with
two sets of dummy variables. Occupations, which are given in the IAB data at the
two-digit level, were aggregated into 25 occupations (table 3.3). The classification
is adopted from Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004). Main occupations in the sample are
transportation occupations with 14 percent of the observations and mechanics as
well as construction related occupations each with 12 percent of the sample. The
two-digit level industries were grouped into 18 industries (table 3.4). The largest
3Note, that the time of the job change has to be defined, in case the ending date of the old job
is not the starting date of the new job. In my sample the intervening period can be up to two
years. I define the time of the job change as the time when the new job starts. My reason for doing
so is that I want it to be the date of the actual migration in case the job change is accompanied
by migration. The time of the actual migration is also unobserved, but is likely to be (close to)
the time when the new job starts. Gregg et al. (2004) argue for the UK that it is very rare for the
unemployed to move before they have found a new job.
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industry in the sample is construction with 18 percent of the observations4, followed
by wholesale and retail trade with 13 percent.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Regional Mobility and Regional Unemployment
The first question to be analyzed is how the regional unemployment rate influ-
ences regional mobility. Does a higher regional unemployment rate increase regional
mobility? I operationalize this question by looking at the probability that a job
change is also a regional change, i.e. the geographical distance between both jobs
is larger than 100 km. I analyze the share of regional changes among job changes
in a linear probability model, depending on the regional unemployment rate and
other covariates. The coefficient of interest is the coefficient of the district level
unemployment rate in the district where the old job is located measured in the year
of the job change. A positive coefficient would show that the probability of outmi-
gration is higher in regions with higher unemployment. In the estimations I include
control variables for (i) personal characteristics, (ii) attributes of the last job, (iii)
the employment and migration history and (iv) regional information as well as year
dummies. The consideration of the regional situation is done in two ways. In the
first alternative I limit myself to the use of just one urban dummy for job changes
originating in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. In the second alternative I
include a full set of dummies for all 327 districts of the old job. This is important if
there are permanent differences between districts in regional mobility (for instance
due to differential road and rail links or central opposed to peripheral location) and
these differences are correlated with differences in unemployment rates. Then dis-
trict dummies would take up the permanent variation in the unemployment rates
between districts and the coefficient on unemployment would be driven by variation
in unemployment within districts over time. It would measure the relationship be-
tween regional mobility and relative regional unemployment, where relative means
relative to the district specific average unemployment rate over time.
As a starting point I analyze the relationship between the unemployment rate and
4Construction as an industry has a notably larger share than construction related occupations
since the occupation classification is finer than the industry classification and some occupations
like painters are not contained in the general group construction related occupations.
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regional mobility in a set of regressions without or with a very few covariates. Ta-
ble 3.5 contains the estimates. The dependent variable is a dummy for regional
mobility multiplied by 100, so that the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as
percentage points of mobility. Regressing mobility on the unemployment rate at the
district level (alq) gives an insignificant5 coefficient (column 1). Hence overall, there
is no significant correlation between the regional unemployment rate and regional
mobility. One can see the regional unemployment rate as the sum of the national
unemployment rate and the deviation between the regional unemployment rate and
the national one. This difference is a relative regional unemployment rate, relative
to the national one. It is quite likely that the national and the relative regional
unemployment rate relate differently to mobility. Regressing mobility only on the
national unemployment rate (alqwd) results in a significantly negative coefficient of
-0.14 (column 2). If the national unemployment rate is 1 percentage point higher,
mobility is 0.14 percentage points lower. Regional mobility shows to be procycli-
cal, as commonly found in the literature, see Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) or
Greenwood (1997). The regression of mobility on both, the regional and the na-
tional unemployment rate, shows that both coefficients go in different directions
(column 3). The regional unemployment rate has a significantly positive coefficient
with 0.046 and the national unemployment rate a significantly negative coefficient
with -0.192. This shows that the national unemployment rate is negatively corre-
lated with mobility but relative regional unemployment is positively correlated. A
slightly more general specification, in which year dummies instead of the national
unemployment rate take up business cycle effects (column 4) results in the same
coefficient for the regional unemployment rate with 0.046. Later on I will generally
include time dummies instead of the national unemployment rate. Nevertheless,
the interpretation of the coefficient for the district unemployment rate remains. It
describes relative regional unemployment, relative to the national unemployment
rate.
West Germany is quite heterogeneous and region specific effects might be correlated
with regional mobility as well as with regional unemployment. In order to abstract
from such district specific effects I include a complete set of district dummies in
a fifth regression as described above (column 5). In this case the interpretation
of the coefficient on the regional unemployment rate is relative in a double sense.
5The criterion for significance is significance at the 5% level. Reported coefficients without
indication of significance are significant unless otherwise stated. The regression standard errors
are robust standard errors clustered at the person level.
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First it is relative to the national unemployment rate because time dummies are
included and second it is relative to the district specific average deviation from the
national unemployment rate because district dummies are included. The estimated
coefficient is 0.154, which is three times larger than the coefficient without district
specific effects. This shows that within districts higher unemployment is correlated
with higher mobility, but between districts it is negatively correlated.
Regional Mobility and Regional Unemployment
Now I come to the main results from the estimations with covariates. They can be
found in table 3.6. The left column shows the estimates without district dummies
and the right column with district dummies. It can be seen that a one percentage
point increase in the regional unemployment rate is related to an increase in regional
mobility by 0.09 percentage points (pp) in the model without district dummies. This
means that regional mobility is higher in districts with higher relative unemployment
(relative compared to the national average since year dummies are included). In the
right column we see that additionally controlling for district specific effects results
in a coefficient of 0.199. Compared to the coefficient without district dummies this
is twice the size, but the absolute size is still small. Even a 5 percentage point higher
regional unemployment rate would mean a just one percentage point higher regional
mobility. This has to be compared to an average rate of mobility of 9.3 percent.
Regional Mobility and Other Factors
Table 3.6 also shows how regional mobility varies with the control variables. For
the sake of brevity I will limit the discussion to some important covariates and only
report the coefficients for the estimation with district dummies. The coefficients for
the estimation without district dummies are of comparable size. The by far largest
coefficient has the dummy for regional mobility in the past, which can be seen as
a lagged endogenous variable. Those men, who have had a regional change in the
last two years before the job change considered (mexp100y2 ), have a 33.0 pp higher
probability that the actual job change is also a regional change than those who have
not been mobile in the last two years. Possible reasons include return migration
(Dustmann (2003)) and generally higher levels of regional mobility for those who
have been geographically mobile before. Men who have been unemployed in the last
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two years with receipt of unemployment benefits (LEDexpy2 ) are 2.9 pp less likely
to be regionally mobile. Education is the second most important factor. Those with
a university degree (edu h) are 7.5 pp more likely to be regionally mobile than those
with a vocational training degree (edu m), whereas the difference between those
with and without a vocational training degree is only 0.6 pp. Also important is
the occupational status in the last job. White collar employees (stib4 ) are 3.7 pp
more mobile than skilled blue collar employees. Tenure in the old job (and hence
in the region) is negatively correlated with regional mobility. One year more tenure
(tenure) means 0.3 pp less mobility. The relationship between age and mobility
as measured in this framework is astonishingly small. Compared to men in their
twenties men in their thirties (age3039 ) are 0.9 pp more likely to change the region
when they change their job and men aged 50 and above (age5065 ) are 0.6 pp less
likely. Married men are around one pp less mobile than unmarried men. Foreigners
are 0.4 pp more mobile than natives. This is a comparatively small difference in
contrast to Schu¨ndeln (2007), who finds (recent) immigrants to be considerably more
mobile.
It is also informative to compare the order of magnitude of the coefficients for the
covariates just discussed with the coefficient for regional unemployment. It shows
that other factors than regional unemployment are considerably more important
in explaining regional mobility at the individual level, notably previous regional
mobility, education and employment status.
Regional Mobility and Regional Unemployment within Subgroups
In this subsection I want to explore if and how the relationship between regional
mobility and regional unemployment differs between subgroups of job changes or
job changers. I do so by introducing interaction effects in the analysis as well as by
conducting the analysis separately for certain subgroups.
Results for estimations with interaction effects, which otherwise use the same speci-
fication as in table 3.6, are contained in table 3.7. Regarding age, the interaction of
the regional unemployment rate with dummies for four age groups shows, that the
relationship between regional unemployment and regional mobility is only significant
for those below the age of 40. For men aged 40 and above no significant relationship
is found. Accordingly are the estimated coefficients for regional unemployment for
those below age 40 up to 50 percent higher than in estimations where regional un-
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employment is not interacted with age. A likely interpretation for the difference by
age would be that regional unemployment works as a push factor out of a region for
the young but not for the old because the young have a longer time horizon. They
can gain from better economic conditions elsewhere for a longer period. Above we
have seen that previous mobility is the single most important predictor for regional
mobility. However, the relationship between regional mobility and regional unem-
ployment does not differ by whether or not someone has been mobile before. The
interaction effect for regional unemployment and the dummy for mobility within the
last two years is insignificant. In the last subsection we have also seen that tenure
is negatively related to regional mobility. Interacting the regional unemployment
rate with a dummy for at least one year of tenure results in a significantly positive
coefficient. So the relationship is stronger for those with more tenure. The time
period under consideration, 1984–1997, can be divided into the years before and af-
ter German reunification. The reunification is important for this study of mobility
within West Germany because it was accompanied by a large migration wave from
East to West Germany and because of its macroeconomic implications in general.
Interacting the regional unemployment rate with a dummy for the years until 1989
and another one for the years from 1990 onwards we see the significantly positive
relationship with regional mobility only for the eighties, in the nineties no significant
relationship can be found.6
Now I want to examine three subgroups of job changes in some more detail: direct job
changes, job changes with an intervening period of unemployment and job changes
with an intervening period of nonemployment. The incidence of mobility is different
between these three subgroups. Among the direct job changers 11.5% also change the
region, whereas among those who experience unemployment between the jobs only
6.5% change the region. The probability for those with a spell of nonemployment
is in between with 9.8%. I am interested in how the relationship between regional
unemployment and regional mobility differs between the three subgroups. Therefor
I repeat the main analysis from above for each subgroup. Table 3.8 contains the
results. Looking first at direct changes, it can be seen that the estimated coefficients
for the district unemployment rate are somewhat higher than in the full sample. In
the estimation without district dummies the coefficient is 0.099 compared to 0.090
6Results for interaction effects with other covariates (including education, employment sta-
tus and nationality) can not be discussed in detail in order to keep the paper short. Regarding
education and employment status I find no differences in the relationship between regional unem-
ployment and regional mobility. Regarding nationality, foreigners are significantly more responsive
to unemployment rate differentials than Germans.
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and in the estimation with district dummies the coefficient is 0.267 compared to
0.199. In the second group of those, who experience personal unemployment, we
have a different picture. The coefficient for the district unemployment rate in the
estimation without district dummies is insignificant. In the estimation with district
dummies the estimated coefficient is 0.161. This is somewhat smaller than in the
full sample. The last group are those, who have a spell of nonemployment. The
estimates for the regional unemployment rate are 0.234 for the estimation without
district dummies and 0.404 with district dummies. This is each about twice the size
of the coefficients in the full sample. Summarizing the evidence, we have the weakest
relationship between regional unemployment and regional mobility for those, who
are personally unemployed. The strongest relationship can be found for those who
have a spell of nonemployment and the direct job changers are in between.
Finally, as a robustness check, I have analyzed the sensitivity of the relationship
between regional unemployment and regional mobility to the definition of regional
mobility. Instead of defining regional mobility as job changes which cover geograph-
ical distances of more than 100 km I also tried 50 km, 75 km, 125 km and 150 km
as alternative cut-off points. The two cut-offs 75 km and 125 km, which are closest
to the one used, both give quite comparable results to the ones presented. With
some minor exceptions this is also true for the cut-off 150 km. Taking 50 km as the
cutoff does not in general repeat the results from the cutoff 100 km. I take this as
evidence that geographical distances of slightly more than 50 km are more likely to
be covered within regions than between regions.
3.3.2 Direction Index
In this second part of the analysis I want to look at the destination choice of those
who are regionally mobile. This means that now I concentrate on the 9.3% of the
job changes which are regional changes. Table 3.9 gives an overview. The question I
want to explore is if the movers move into the direction of lower unemployment. In
order to do so, I take the regional changes i and compare the regional unemployment
rate in the destination district udestinationi with the regional unemployment rate
in the origin district uorigini. I call this difference directionindexi:
directionindexi = udestinationi − uorigini.
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The sign of the index indicates the direction of a regional change. If it goes into the
direction of lower unemployment the index is negative, if it goes into the direction of
higher unemployment the index is positive. Table 3.10 shows the average direction
index. In the eighties, between 1984 and 1989, the average direction index is -0.36.
This means that for all regional changes the unemployment rate in the destination
districts is on average a third of a percentage point lower than in the origin districts.
So we see a significant relationship between the destination choice of the regionally
mobile and the regional unemployment rate and it goes in the right direction in
order to equilibrate regional disparities in the unemployment rate. In the nineties,
from 1990 to 1997, the average direction index is -0.08. It is much smaller than in
the eighties. The table also shows the direction index for the three subgroups of job
changes. The average direction index for direct job changes is -0.30 in the eighties
and -0.07 in the nineties. This is only slightly different from the full sample. For job
changes with an intervening period of unemployment we have an index of -0.61 in
the eighties and -0.16 in the nineties. This is each about twice the size than for the
full sample. And for the last group, job changes with a period of nonemployment
we have a value of -0.19 in the eighties, which is roughly half the index in the
full sample, and an insignificant index for the nineties. Taken together, we see
in all three groups a much stronger relationship between the direction of regional
changes and differences in regional unemployment rates in the eighties than in the
nineties. Between the three groups, the unemployed show the strongest tendency to
move towards regions with lower regional unemployment rates. Job changers with
nonemployment have the weakest tendency and direct job changers lie in between.
It remains to be discussed how the direction index differs with sociodemographic
covariates. In order to investigate this question I have regressed the direction index
on sociodemographic covariates and dummies for the eighties and nineties sepa-
rately for direct changes, changes with an unemployment period and changes with a
nonemployment period. The results are shown in table 3.11. It can be seen that for
all three groups of job changes age, education, marital status and nationality have
no explanatory content for the direction index. However, the migration experience
dummy has in all three groups a positive coefficient in the order of magnitude of the
negative dummy for the eighties. This means that the overall tendency of regional
changes to go towards regions with lower unemployment is not present for those
who have recent migration experience. One likely explanation for this fact is return
migration. Since return migration goes into the opposite direction than the original
migration every association between the direction of migration and regional unem-
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ployment is mitigated by return migration. The relationship between the direction
index and some remaining covariates shows notable differences between the types
of job changes. Being in an apprenticeship or having just finished one (stib0 ) has
a sizable negative coefficient for job changes with unemployment with -0.96 and to
a lesser degree also for job changes with nonemployment with -0.59 but is insignif-
icant for direct job changes. This shows, that those who change the region at the
beginning of their career and in combination with a career interruption through un-
employment or nonemployment have a stronger tendency to move towards regions
with lower unemployment than job changers later in their career. This differentia-
tion between apprentices and men later in their career can not be found for direct
job changes. It is likely that these are more led by individual opportunities. Finally
there are two factors which are only significant for job changes with unemployment.
First, unskilled blue collar employees (stib1) have a coefficient of 0.51, which lessens
their average tendency to move towards regions with lower unemployment compared
to skilled blue collar employees. And second, an unemployment benefit payment in
the last to years (LEDexpy2 ) has a negative coefficient of -0.43, which means that
the drift towards regions with lower unemployment is stronger for unemployed with
a history of unemployment.
Again, as a robustness test, I have also checked the sensitivity of the direction index
to the definition of regional changes. I have repeated the analysis for all job changes
which cover distances of at least 50, 75, 125 and 150 km, respectively. The results for
the cut-offs 75, 125 and 150 km are quite comparable to the results shown for the cut-
off 100 km. This is mostly also true for the cut-off 50 km. In general, the magnitude
of the index is the larger the higher the minimum distance for regional changes is.
This means the tendency to move towards regions with lower unemployment rates is
somewhat stronger for job changes which cover longer distances than for job changes
which cover shorter distances.
3.4 Conclusion
Motivation for this study are large and persistent regional differences in unemploy-
ment rates in West Germany. Equalizing this differences would be efficiency en-
hancing. Here regional mobility can play an important role. In this paper I analyze
two specific questions relevant in this context. First, I explore if regional mobility is
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sensitive to regional unemployment rate differentials and look if regional mobility is
higher in regions with higher regional unemployment rates. And second, I examine
the destination choice of those who are regionally mobile. I investigate if they on
average move towards regions with lower unemployment rates.
The analysis is based on a sample of job changes of men in West Germany between
1984 and 1997. I use register data, the IAB employment subsample.
The first question analyzed is if regional mobility is higher in regions with higher
unemployment rates. My measure of regional mobility is the share of job changes
which cover a geographical distance of more than 100 km. Indeed I find regional
mobility to be sensitive to regional unemployment rates. It is somewhat higher if
regional unemployment is higher. In a linear probability model for the share of
regional changes among job changes I find regional mobility to be 0.1 percentage
points higher when regional unemployment is 1 percentage point higher. When I in-
clude district specific effects the estimate is twice the size with 0.2 percentage points.
However, compared to the average share of regional mobility of around 9 percent
and also to personal covariates (especially recent regional mobility, education and
employment status) the explanatory content of regional unemployment for regional
mobility is rather small. Furthermore it is noteworthy that the sensitivity of regional
mobility to regional unemployment is not homogeneous. Regarding age, only for the
up to 40 year old regional mobility is higher when regional unemployment is higher.
For older men I find no responsiveness. Comparing the two decades, the 80ies and
the 90ies, the responsiveness is only present in the 80ies. No relationship between
regional unemployment and regional mobility is found for the 90ies.
The second question I seek to answer is if those who are regionally mobile move to-
wards regions with lower unemployment rates. This would be necessary in order to
equalize unemployment rate differentials via regional mobility. Taking all regional
changes (i.e. all job changes which cover a geographical distance of at least 100
km) I compare the unemployment rates in the origin region and in the destination
region. I find that the unemployment rates in the destination regions are on average
a third of a percentage point lower than in the origin regions in the eighties but less
than 0.1 percentage point lower in the nineties. So those who are mobile on average
move towards regions with lower unemployment rates. Comparing the 80ies and the
90ies this is much less the case in the nineties than in the eighties. A second no-
table difference between groups is, that job changers who experience unemployment
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between both jobs have a stronger tendency to move towards regions with lower
unemployment than job changers who directly change jobs.
Of course, many open questions remain. How responsive is regional mobility after
1997? How responsive is it in East Germany? How do the results of the job change
based analysis of regional mobility chosen in this paper relate to results based on in-
dividuals? What role plays regional unemployment in a structural model of internal
migration compared to other economic factors and the household context?
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.1: Job Change Sample Overview
Frequency Percent
Distance
0 km 192,172 62.22
1–50 km 68,048 22.03
51–100 km 19,804 6.41
101–250 km 16,811 5.44
251 km 12,006 3.89
Interim period between old and new job
Direct change without interruption 134,759 43.63
Unemplyoment 109,620 35.49
Nonemployment 64,462 20.87
Recalls 51,851 16.79
N 308,841 100.00
Persons 115,548
Note: This table shows in its top part the geographical distance between the old job and the
new job in km grouped into five distance categories. The sample can also be divided into direct
changes, changes with unemployment and changes with nonemployment. Direct changes are job
changes without interruption, in which the meantime between the old and the new job is less than
8 days. Job changes with an intervening period of at least 8 days are subdivided into changes with
unemployment (at least one payment of unemployment benefits) and changes with nonemployment
(no payment of unemployment benefits). Recalls are job changes in which the firm of the new job
is the same as the one of the old job identified by a plant identifier.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Description of Variable Mean SD
move Dummy for geographical distance between
jobs of at least 100 km. Multiplied by 100.
9.331 29.086
distanzkm Geographical distance between both jobs in
km
34.020 84.897
alq Regional unemployment rate at district level 9.028 3.477
alqwd National unemployment rate 8.498 1.253
direct Dummy. Direct job change 0.436 0.496
persunemp Dummy. Job change with intervening unem-
ployment
0.355 0.478
persnonemp Dummy. Job change with intervening
nonemployment
0.209 0.406
age2029 Dummy. 20 ≤ Age ≤ 29 0.447 0.497
age3039 Dummy. 30 ≤ Age ≤ 39 0.278 0.448
age4049 Dummy. 40 ≤ Age ≤ 49 0.162 0.369
age5065 Dummy. 50 ≤ Age ≤ 65 0.113 0.316
edu l No vocational training degree 0.161 0.368
edu m Vocational training degree 0.770 0.421
edu h University or Technical College degree 0.069 0.253
married Married 0.410 0.492
foreign Not German 0.123 0.329
stib0 Apprentice 0.055 0.227
stib1 Unskilled blue collar employee 0.310 0.462
stib4 White collar employee 0.225 0.417
earn Real daily earnings in 1995 German Mark 124.551 52.313
earnsq earn squared / 100 182.497 146.992
earncens Dummy for earnings censored at social insur-
ance threshold
0.044 0.204
tenure Tenure in years 2.595 3.702
tenure1yr Dummy. Tenure of more than one year 0.483 0.500
firmsize1 9 Dummy. Number of employees 1–9 0.238 0.426
firmsize10 99 Dummy. Number of employees 10–99 0.407 0.491
firmsize100 999 Dummy. Number of employees 100–999 0.239 0.426
Continued on next page...
117
... table 3.2 continued
firmsize1000plus Dummy. Number of employees 1000+ 0.117 0.321
mexp100y2 Dummy. At least one regional change in the
last two years
0.071 0.256
rclexpy2 Dummy. At least one recall in the last two
years
0.129 0.335
LEDexpy2 Dummy. At least one unemployment spell
with payment of benefits in the last two years
0.294 0.456
urban Dummy. City with more than 100,000 inhab-
itants.
0.369 0.483
year85 0.067 0.25
year86 0.072 0.258
year87 0.070 0.255
year88 0.071 0.258
year89 0.076 0.265
year90 0.081 0.272
year91 0.077 0.267
year92 0.072 0.259
year93 0.067 0.251
year94 0.070 0.256
year95 0.070 0.256
year96 0.071 0.257
year97 0.072 0.258
Note: The covariates can either relate to the old job or to the new one. Personal covariates (like
age) relate the new job, i.e. are based on information reported by the new employer. Job related
covariates (like earnings and firm size) relate to the old job. The unemployment rate in the district
of the old job is measured at the time when the new job starts.
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Table 3.3: Occupation Classification
No. Designation Groups Mean SD
1 Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations 01–06 0.035 0.185
2 Miners, Extraction Workers 07–09 0.005 0.070
3 Building Material Production Workers, Ceramists 10–13 0.010 0.101
4 Chemical Workers and Plastic Workers 14–15 0.017 0.129
5 Paper- and Woodworkers, Printing Workers 16–18 0.016 0.126
6 Metal Workers 19–24 0.029 0.167
7 Mechanics 25–30 0.118 0.323
8 Electricians 31 0.044 0.205
9 Assembly Workers, Other Metal Workers 32 0.018 0.131
10 Textile and Apparel Workers 33–36 0.004 0.064
11 Leather Workers 37 0.002 0.044
12 Food Related Occupations 39–43 0.047 0.212
13 Construction Related Occupations 44–47 0.120 0.325
14 Plasterer, Insulation Workers, Tiler, Interior Dec-
orators
48–49 0.019 0.135
15 Cabinetmakers 50 0.021 0.145
16 Painters 51 0.029 0.167
17 Machine Operators 54 0.012 0.111
18 Technicians 62–63 0.036 0.186
19 Retail and Wholesale Sales Workers 68 0.052 0.222
20 Financial Services Clerks, Forwarding Agents 69–70 0.025 0.157
21 Transportation Occupations 52, 71–74 0.139 0.346
22 Managers, Office and Administrative Support Oc-
cupations
75–78 0.076 0.264
23 Other Occupations 79–93 0.087 0.282
24 Engineers, Natural Scientists 60–61 0.021 0.144
25 No Occupation 98–99 0.018 0.132
Note: The two-digit occupations given in the IAB data (groups) were aggregated into 25 oc-
cupations. The classification is adopted from Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004). The table shows
the means and standard deviations of the respective dummy variables.
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Table 3.4: Industry Classification
No. Designation Groups Mean SD
1 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 00–03 0.029 0.167
2 Utilities and Mining 04–08 0.012 0.108
3 Chemical Manufacturing 09–13 0.030 0.171
4 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 14–16 0.023 0.150
5 Primary Metal Manufacturing 17–22 0.028 0.166
6 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing, Ma-
chinery Manufacturing and Transportation Equip-
ment Manufacturing
23–32 0.106 0.307
7 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component
Manufacturing
34–38 0.056 0.230
8 Wood Product and Furniture Manufacturing,
Printing and Textiles
39–51 0.048 0.213
9 Apparel Manufacturing 52–53 0.003 0.056
10 Food, Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufactur-
ing
54–58 0.031 0.173
11 Construction 59–61 0.183 0.387
12 Wholesale and Retail Trade 62 0.128 0.334
13 Transportation 63–68 0.081 0.273
14 Finance and Insurance 69 0.019 0.136
15 Services for Consumers 70–73 0.060 0.237
16 Education, Publishing, Health 74–78 0.039 0.193
17 Services for Businesses and Misc. Services 79–86 0.080 0.271
18 Organizations, Private Households and Public Ad-
ministration
87–94 0.045 0.208
Note: The two-digit industries given in the IAB data (groups) were aggregated into 18 indus-
tries. The table shows the means and standard deviations of the respective dummy variables.
Table 3.5: Estimation Results: Regional Mobility without Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
alq 0.018 – 0.046∗ 0.046∗ 0.154∗∗
(0.017) – (0.018) (0.019) (0.044)
alqwd – -0.141∗∗ -0.192∗∗
– (0.047) (0.051) – –
Year Dummies – – – yes yes
District Dummies – – – – yes
Intercept 9.167∗∗ 10.525∗∗ 10.545∗∗ 8.513∗∗ 14.027∗∗
(0.170) (0.412) (0.412) (0.300) (2.032)
N 308,841 308,841 308,841 308,841 308,841
R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013
Note: Linear probability model for the probability of regional mobility in per-
cent. Dependent variable: move (dummy for regional mobility multiplied by
100). Robust standard errors clustered at the person level. †, ∗, and ∗∗ denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Estimation Results: Regional Mobility with
Covariates
District Dummies not included included
Variable Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
alq 0.090∗∗ (0.018) 0.199∗∗ (0.041)
age3039 0.952∗∗ (0.140) 0.943∗∗ (0.140)
age4049 0.669∗∗ (0.177) 0.647∗∗ (0.177)
age5065 -0.594∗∗ (0.191) -0.638∗∗ (0.191)
edu l -0.644∗∗ (0.134) -0.590∗∗ (0.135)
edu h 7.565∗∗ (0.414) 7.457∗∗ (0.412)
married -1.033∗∗ (0.123) -1.058∗∗ (0.123)
foreign 0.404∗ (0.169) 0.424∗ (0.173)
mexp100y2 33.279∗∗ (0.361) 32.955∗∗ (0.361)
rclexpy2 -1.066∗∗ (0.151) -1.344∗∗ (0.157)
LEDexpy2 -2.954∗∗ (0.133) -2.928∗∗ (0.133)
stib0 0.905∗∗ (0.268) 0.888∗∗ (0.267)
stib1 -0.455∗∗ (0.124) -0.428∗∗ (0.125)
stib4 3.787∗∗ (0.272) 3.749∗∗ (0.271)
earn -0.017∗∗ (0.005) -0.016∗∗ (0.005)
earnsq 0.020∗∗ (0.002) 0.021∗∗ (0.002)
earncens 3.372∗∗ (0.508) 3.361∗∗ (0.507)
tenure -0.274∗∗ (0.015) -0.274∗∗ (0.015)
firmsize1 9 -2.897∗∗ (0.157) -2.806∗∗ (0.158)
firmsize10 99 -1.948∗∗ (0.142) -1.917∗∗ (0.142)
firmsize1000plus -1.059∗∗ (0.198) -1.056∗∗ (0.199)
urban 0.100 (0.125)
year85 -0.211 (0.264) -0.210 (0.263)
year86 0.140 (0.270) 0.205 (0.273)
year87 -0.055 (0.270) 0.012 (0.271)
year88 -0.660∗ (0.266) -0.580∗ (0.267)
year89 -0.837∗∗ (0.267) -0.586∗ (0.284)
year90 -0.877∗∗ (0.271) -0.467 (0.303)
year91 -1.010∗∗ (0.276) -0.541† (0.326)
year92 -0.750∗∗ (0.284) -0.342 (0.324)
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.6 continued
Variable Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
year93 -1.634∗∗ (0.281) -1.371∗∗ (0.297)
year94 -1.741∗∗ (0.272) -1.579∗∗ (0.281)
year95 -2.016∗∗ (0.272) -1.899∗∗ (0.280)
year96 -2.242∗∗ (0.271) -2.225∗∗ (0.273)
year97 -1.854∗∗ (0.271) -1.910∗∗ (0.270)
Intercept 7.280∗∗ (0.510) 6.075∗∗ (0.646)
Occupation dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
District dummies no yes
N 305,849 305,849
R2 0.1479 0.1517
Note: Linear probability model for the probability of regional mobility
in percent. Dependent variable: move (dummy for regional mobility
multiplied by 100). Robust standard errors clustered at the person level.
†, ∗, and ∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 3.7: Estimation results: Regional Mobility with
Interaction Effects
District Dummies not included included
Variable Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
(1) Interaction with Age
alq age2029 0.124∗∗ (0.023) 0.234∗∗ (0.044)
alq age3039 0.137∗∗ (0.033) 0.259∗∗ (0.050)
alq age4049 -0.010 (0.038) 0.107∗ (0.052)
alq age5065 0.003 (0.038) 0.103∗ (0.052)
age3039 0.817∗ (0.356) 0.704∗ (0.356)
age4049 1.885∗∗ (0.428) 1.807∗∗ (0.429)
age5065 0.500 (0.431) 0.553 (0.434)
...
R2 0.1480 0.1517
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.7 continued
Variable Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
(2) Interaction with Previous Mobility
alq mexp100y2 -0.136 (0.104) -0.167 (0.105)
alq 0.100∗∗ (0.018) 0.210∗∗ (0.041)
mexp100y2 34.489∗∗ (1.003) 34.435∗∗ (1.003)
...
R2 0.1479 0.1517
(3) Interaction with Tenure
alq 0.037∗ (0.019) 0.155∗∗ (0.041)
alq tenure1yr 0.112∗∗ (0.014) 0.116∗∗ (0.014)
tenure -0.337∗∗ (0.017) -0.339∗∗ (0.017)
...
R2 0.1481 0.1519
(4) Interaction with Time
alq y8489 0.172∗∗ (0.021) 0.186∗∗ (0.041)
alq y9097 -0.043 (0.027) -0.001 (0.056)
...
R2 0.1480 0.1518
Note: In the estimations the regional unemployment rate is inter-
acted with the respective covariates. Otherwise they repeat the
specification from table 3.6.
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Table 3.8: Estimation results: Regional Mobility within
Subgroups
District Dummies not included included
Variable Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
(1) Only Direct Job Changes
alq 0.099∗∗ (0.031) 0.267∗∗ (0.077)
...
Intercept 6.581∗∗ (1.021) 6.997∗ (2.741)
N 133,797 133,797
R2 0.1597 0.1667
(2) Only Job Changes with Unemployment
alq 0.044† (0.025) 0.161∗∗ (0.053)
...
Intercept 7.481∗∗ (0.747) 12.357∗∗ (2.979)
N 108,829 108,829
R2 0.1314 0.1360
(3) Only Job Changes with Nonemployment
alq 0.234∗∗ (0.044) 0.404∗∗ (0.117)
...
Intercept 7.846∗∗ (1.070) 11.928∗ (5.295)
N 63,223 63,223
R2 0.1301 0.1374
Note: The estimations repeat the estimations from table 3.6 for
subgroups of job changes: direct job changes, job changes with an
unemployment period and job changes with an nonemployment
period.
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Table 3.9: Summary Statistics: Regional Changes
Type of Change All Direct Unemployment Nonemployment
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
distanzkm 256.72 (136.06) 255.02 (132.15) 256.47 (140.59) 261.15 (140.22)
direct 0.54 (0.50) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
persunemp 0.25 (0.43) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0)
persnonemp 0.22 (0.41) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0)
year8489 0.42 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.39 (0.49)
year9097 0.58 (0.49) 0.59 (0.49) 0.54 (0.50) 0.61 (0.49)
age3039 0.35 (0.48) 0.38 (0.49) 0.32 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46)
age4049 0.19 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41) 0.19 (0.39) 0.14 (0.34)
age5065 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.32) 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.23)
edu l 0.09 (0.29) 0.06 (0.23) 0.11 (0.31) 0.16 (0.37)
edu h 0.20 (0.40) 0.25 (0.43) 0.13 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35)
married 0.42 (0.49) 0.51 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48) 0.27 (0.45)
foreign 0.10 (0.30) 0.07 (0.25) 0.12 (0.32) 0.17 (0.38)
mexp100y2 0.32 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48)
rclexpy2 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.19) 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.26)
LEDexpy2 0.22 (0.41) 0.14 (0.35) 0.37 (0.48) 0.23 (0.42)
stib0 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.16) 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24)
stib1 0.19 (0.39) 0.12 (0.32) 0.26 (0.44) 0.30 (0.46)
stib4 0.47 (0.50) 0.61 (0.49) 0.33 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46)
N 28,817 15,441 7,073 6,303
Note: This table gives an overview about the regional changes, i.e. job changes with a geographical
distance between the jobs of at least 100 km. It also provides summary statistics for the three
subgroups of regional changes: direct job changes, job changes with an intervening period of
unemployment and job changes with an intervening period of nonemployment.
Table 3.10: Estimation Results : Direction Index on Time Dummies
Type of Change All Direct Unemployment Nonemployment
Variable
year8489 -0.362∗∗ -0.297∗∗ -0.614∗∗ -0.188∗
(0.035) (0.053) (0.084) (0.095)
year9097 -0.077∗∗ -0.068∗ -0.158∗∗ -0.015
(0.022) (0.032) (0.055) (0.053)
N 28,817 15,441 7,073 6,303
R2 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000
Note: Regression of the direction index for regional changes on two dummies
for the eighties and the nineties. Robust standard errors (clustered at the
individual level) in parenthesis. Samples are in column 1 all regional changes
and in columns 2–4 the three subgroups of regional changes.
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Table 3.11: Estimation Results : Direction Index on Covariates
Type of Change Direct Unemployment Nonemployment
Variable Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
year8489 -0.580∗∗ (0.099) -0.832∗∗ (0.144) -0.448∗∗ (0.145)
year9097 -0.331∗∗ (0.085) -0.436∗∗ (0.128) -0.257∗ (0.119)
age3039 -0.131 (0.080) -0.070 (0.128) 0.115 (0.123)
age4049 0.069 (0.094) 0.184 (0.153) 0.139 (0.163)
age5065 -0.087 (0.107) 0.351† (0.198) -0.203 (0.217)
edu l -0.127 (0.138) -0.223 (0.167) -0.078 (0.146)
edu h 0.112 (0.070) 0.012 (0.163) -0.095 (0.165)
married 0.070 (0.069) -0.037 (0.118) 0.075 (0.126)
foreign -0.024 (0.125) -0.248† (0.148) -0.113 (0.139)
mexp100y2 0.488∗∗ (0.081) 0.877∗∗ (0.131) 0.600∗∗ (0.121)
rclexpy2 0.122 (0.178) 0.062 (0.218) -0.120 (0.200)
LEDexpy2 -0.029 (0.102) -0.429∗∗ (0.130) -0.026 (0.133)
stib0 0.145 (0.217) -0.955∗∗ (0.272) -0.558∗ (0.240)
stib1 0.205† (0.122) 0.505∗∗ (0.149) 0.254† (0.140)
stib4 0.125 (0.076) 0.245† (0.132) -0.028 (0.143)
N 15,335 7,031 6,199
R2 0.004 0.017 0.008
Note: Regression of the direction index for regional changes on two time dum-
mies as in table 3.10 and additional covariates. Robust standard errors (clus-
tered at the individual level) in parenthesis. Samples are the three subgroups
of regional changes.
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Chapter 4
Imputation Rules to Improve the
Education Variable in the IAB
Employment Subsample
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4.1 Introduction
The IAB employment subsample (IABS) has become an important data source for
empirical research on the German labor market. The IABS is a panel data set
comprising administrative records for employment spells and for spells with transfer
payments during periods of unemployment, see Bender et al. (2000). Compared to
popular survey data sets like the German Socioeconomic Panel, the main advantages
of the IABS are its large size, the long time period it covers, the almost complete
absence of panel mortality, and the reliability of the core variables like date and
length of spells, earnings, or type of transfer payments. However, it is well known
that a number of variables are less reliable since they are not related to the purpose
of the administrative reporting process producing the data. Nevertheless, research
on the reliability of the IABS has been very scarce (see Fitzenberger, 1999, Steiner
and Wagner, 1998, for rare exceptions). Earlier work (Cramer, 1985, or Schma¨hl
and Fachinger, 1994) pointed to problems in administrative data on employment.
The returns to education and the skill bias in labor demand are two very impor-
tant issues studied in labor economics (see e.g. Card, 1999, Katz and Autor, 1999,
Fitzenberger, 1999) which require a reliable measure of formal education. The IABS
contains the variable BILD comprising information on secondary and tertiary school-
ing degrees as well as on completion of a vocational training degree (apprenticeship).
BILD is based on the reports by employers and the information is extrapolated to
subsequent transfer spells. This education variable exhibits a number of apparent
problems. First, there is missing information for 9.52% of the spells in the data set.
Second, the education variable suffers from a large number of inconsistencies for a
person over time. According to the reporting rule, employers are supposed to report
the highest formal degree attained by the employee and not the degree required for
the job. Hence, if a person is reported to have a certain educational degree and
afterwards is reported to have a lower degree, we know that at least one of these
reports must be wrong. We observe such inconsistent sequences of reports for 18.1%
of the individuals in the data set. If the incidence of these problems is not com-
pletely at random, using the uncorrected data may result in misleading conclusions
about the distribution of education and the relationship with other variables. Most
of the empirical literature based on the IABS seems to use the uncorrected education
variable and to exclude the observations with missings. Steiner and Wagner (1998)
interpret missings in the education variable as saying that the employee exhibits no
128
post secondary degree.
This paper develops various imputation procedures to improve the information in
the IABS education variable. The main idea of our imputation approach is as fol-
lows: The panel nature of the data does not only allow us to identify inconsistencies
but, under reasonable assumptions, it also allows us to deduce the likely educa-
tion level of a person whose education information is missing or is inconsistent for a
small number of spells. If the education information is missing for a small number of
spells, we impute the likely education from past or future information. If a reported
degree differs for a small number of spells from the likely education, we conclude
that the currently reported education is incorrect and we impute the likely education
instead. Imputation has been used before to improve the education variable in the
IABS. This paper extends upon the earlier work of Fitzenberger (1999, appendix)
and Bender et al. (2005, chapter 3.4). We develop a number of further refinements
of the basic imputation procedures. Using different versions of our imputation pro-
cedure as benchmarks, we investigate the sensitivity of empirical estimates in typical
applications.
Our deductive, nonstochastic imputation rule uses the available information in the
data to develop a heuristic solution to the complex problems of missing data and mis-
classified reports. Based on hypotheses about the reporting behavior of employers,
we impute logically correct values for the actual education level, which is basically
time invariant (after an individual has reached his highest degree), when missings
or inconsistencies occur. By using different hypotheses on the reporting behavior of
the employers, we evaluate qualitatively the sensitivity of estimation results to the
exact implementation of the imputation rule and we study the statistical nature of
reporting errors. A statistical validation of our imputation methods lies beyond the
scope of this paper.
There exist alternative approaches in the literature which use the misclassified data
directly and take misclassification into account. These methods are application
specific. Molinari (2004) makes exogenous assumptions about the misclassification
probabilities and estimates identification regions for the true distribution based on
the observed distribution of the misclassified data. Kane et al. (1999) estimate
the returns to education when education is misclassified. The study relies on two
measures of education which can both be mismeasured. These measures have to be
(mean) independent of each other and of the wage conditional on the true education.
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The latter assumption is not likely to hold in our context. For instance, as will be
discussed in detail below, if the inconsistencies in the education variable are mainly
due to underreporting the level of education for people who are overqualified with
respect to their position, underreporting is associated with a low wage given true
education. Lewbel (2003) gives necessary assumptions to estimate average treatment
effects when treatment is misclassified. Again, these conditions are unlikely to hold
in our context.
Multiple imputation methods are concerned with the problem of missing data.1
Gartner and Ra¨ssler (2005) apply multiple imputation to the problem of censored
wages in the IABS. The multiple imputation framework is appropriate in a situa-
tion where the underlying (non-)response process can be modeled using the observed
data. For the following reasons, an application of these methods would be very dif-
ficult in the present context. First, the variable BILD does not only suffer from
missing data but, in addition, there is also substantial misclassification in the non-
missing data, for which the classical measurement error model is not appropriate.
Second, even under the assumption that missing values are the only problem, it is
questionable whether the basic condition, that the occurrence of missing values is
random conditional on observed quantities, holds in the present context. In fact, if
an employee is overqualified for his job, his employer may well underreport or not re-
port at all the correct education of the employee because it does not match with the
requirements and/or the social standing of the job. In the case of non-response, this
would be correlated with the unobserved true education. Third, extensions of mul-
tiple imputation models to the panel data case can be computationally cumbersome
and note that we have spell data with different numbers of spells per individual.
In light of the above discussion, our deductive imputation approach has three impor-
tant advantages. First, we develop a heuristic and tractable solution to a complex
problem where it is very difficult to apply existing methods. Second, our method
is general in the sense that we do not rely on any (conditional) independence or
distributional assumptions (see discussion above on multiple imputation method
proposed in the literature). Third, using different versions of our imputation pro-
cedure as benchmarks, we can investigate the sensitivity of empirical estimates in
typical applications. However, this does not allow us to assess directly the statistical
variability induced by the imputation.
1An introduction and an overview over multiple imputation methods can be found in the text-
books of Little and Rubin (2002), Schafer (1997), or Rubin (1987).
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A limitation of our approach is that it is not possible to tell which one of the different
imputed education variables is the best. However, our results clearly suggest that
it is advisable to use some correction of the education variable instead of ignoring
the problem or resorting to ad hoc methods. As a practical rule, we recommend to
conduct the analysis based on all the imputation procedures proposed in this paper
and to check whether substantive results obtained are insensitive to the imputation
procedure employed.2
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the IABS
data and provides details on the problems concerning the education variable. Section
4.3 develops the different imputation procedures to improve the education variable.
Section 4.4 examines typical applications to compare the outcomes of the imputation
procedures. Section 4.5 concludes. The appendix includes detailed results.
4.2 The IAB Employment Subsample (IABS)
4.2.1 Basic Description of IABS and BILD
We use the IABS version for the time period 1975-1997 distributed with detailed
regional information, see Bender et al. (2000). Our imputation procedures are rele-
vant for all versions of the IABS. The data contain daily register data for 589,825
individuals in Germany on employment spells and on spells with transfer payments
from the Federal Labor Office (formerly Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit). The IABS is a
representative 1% sample of employment. After the end of the year and when a
job ends, employers have to report earnings and other socio-demographic informa-
tion about their employees like their educational degree. The earnings information
and the length of the employment spells are used to calculate contributions to and
benefits from the social insurance system and, hence, are very reliable. Periods of
self-employment and employment as life-time civil servants (Beamte) that are not
subject to (mandatory) social insurance are not included in the data.
The education information has to be reported with every employment spell but it
bears no relevance for the social security system. To our knowledge, reporting the
2For the case of nonresponse and censoring, identification of bounds on population parameters
also avoids untestable assumptions about the distribution of the missing data, see Horowitz and
Manski (1998, 2000). This method is useful for analyzing ‘worst-case’ scenarios. It could be fruitful
to explore this in future work as an alternative to our imputation approach.
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employee’s education incorrectly has no consequences. This explains why the educa-
tion variable BILD in the IABS is less reliable compared to information on earnings
or the beginning and ending of spells. Spells on transfer payments and technical
spells documenting gaps in the employment history, for instance, due to military
service or maternity leave, do not provide new information on the educational level.
Instead BILD is extrapolated during such spells based on the information in the
most recent employment spell. Thus, we base our imputation procedures only on
the information given in employment spells. On average, the data contain 14.6 spells
per person of which 12.3 are employment spells.
Since the variable BILD is based on employer reports to the social security system,
it is an important question how the reporting system changed between 1975 and
1997, possibly affecting the reported education. As mentioned before, the basis of
the IAB employment subsample is the integrated reporting system for the social
insurance, i. e. the statutory health, pension and long-term care insurance. The
notification procedure was introduced in the former Federal Republic of Germany
on 1 January 1973 and on 1 January 1991 – after the German reunification – in
the new La¨nder and Berlin-East, too. Since 1973 there have been several revi-
sions of the legislation governing the formal way of how the notifications have to
be submitted by the employers.3 However, these changes did not concern the con-
tent – for instance the precision – of the demographic variables contained in the so
called “Ta¨tigkeitsschlu¨ssel”.4 Thus, we conclude that inconsistencies in the educa-
tion variable over time are in fact attributable to employers’ unreliability and not
to institutional changes. This is supported by the finding that the probabilities of
inconsistent and missing education reports show only very slight changes over the
years (tables 4.2 and 4.5).
The education information in the IABS distinguishes four different educational de-
3A first major revision took place in 1981 when the “Zweite Datenerfassungsverordnung” and
the “Zweite Datenu¨bermittlungsverordnung” came into effect. Their main goal was to improve
the completeness of the overall amount of notifications in order to provide correct aggregate em-
ployment statistics (Wermter and Cramer, 1988). Second, in 1984 there was a change in the scope
of gross earnings which are subject to social security contributions (“A¨nderungsverordnung zur 2.
DEVO” (Bender et al., 1996, and Fitzenberger, 1999, appendix)). A third major revision of the no-
tification procedure came into effect in 1999 (“Datenerfassungs- und u¨bermittlungsverordnung”).
Now, all employers are required to provide uniform information which is automatically processed.
4The “Ta¨tigkeitsschlu¨ssel” comprises variables that describe the job content and the qualifica-
tion of the employee (cf. http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/
content/de DE/hauptstelle/a-07/importierter inhalt/pdf/schluessel.pdf).
The new “Datenerfassungs- und u¨bermittlungsverordnung” actually intended to introduce a new
“Ta¨tigkeitsschlu¨ssel” which though has not yet been implemented so far.
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grees (≡ successful completion): high school (Abitur), vocational training, technical
college (Fachhochschule), and university. University is considered the highest de-
gree, a technical college the second highest. Since there is no clear ranking between
high school and vocational training, employers have to choose among all four com-
binations between the two. Thus, BILD can take six possible meaningful values:
1. no degree at all (henceforth: ND),
2. vocational training degree (VT),
3. high school degree (HS),
4. high school degree and vocational training degree (HSVT),5
5. technical college degree (TC), and
6. university degree (UD).
We argue that these six educational outcomes can be ranked in increasing order ex-
cept that no ranking exists between the second degree VT and the third degree HS.
We consider the comprehensive degree HSVT to be higher than both HS and VT.
Furthermore, if the employee’s education is not known, it can be reported as miss-
ing. According to the reporting rule, employers are supposed to report the highest
degree attained by the employee, not the degree required for the current job. As a
consequence, the sequence of education records should be non-decreasing over time
because one can only attain higher degrees over time, not lose them. A decreasing
sequence violates the reporting rule and represents evidence for inconsistent report-
ing behavior. All imputation procedures developed in this paper provide a corrected
education variable with consistent information over time.
4.2.2 Spells with Missing Education
Table 4.1 (in the appendix) reports the distribution of the variable BILD in the
original data. As can be seen, 9.52% of the spells exhibit missing education infor-
mation. One might suspect that missing values are mostly a problem concerning
non-employment spells and short employment spells. Therefore, we also calculate
5In the following, we will refer to HSVT as if it is a separate degree even though it is in fact a
combination of two degrees.
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the distribution of the education variable among full time working males in 1995 ex-
cluding apprentices and weighting the spells by their length. The weighting changes
the unit of measurement from spells to person years to correspond to employment.
Still a weighted share of 7.35% has missing education information. Therefore, miss-
ing values are also a sizeable problem among employees.
Next, we investigate how the incidence of missing education information among
employees is related to other observed covariates in the IABS. We estimate a probit
modeling the probability of a missing education report as a function of personal
characteristics.6 The estimation is based on employment spells only. Table 4.2
displays the marginal effects on the probability of a missing report. Most of the
effects are significant but they are not very large compared to an observed rate
of 7.8% of missing information. Noteworthy are a 6.1 (SE 0.1) percentage points
(ppoints) higher probability of a missing report for foreigners relative to Germans, a
9.2 ppoints (SE 0.3) higher probability for part-time workers with less than half the
regular hours compared to fulltime salaried employees and considerable differences in
reporting quality across industries. Compared to the investment goods industry, the
probability of a missing report is 15.7 (SE 0.4) ppoints higher in consumer services
and 10.8 (SE 0.3) ppoints higher in the main construction trade.
4.2.3 Changes in Education across Spells
Compared to missing information, changes in the education information reported
across spells are more difficult to deal with and it is crucial to analyze the sequence of
reported education records across spells. If first a high degree and afterwards a low
degree is reported, we know that this sequence is inconsistent with the reporting rule,
but we do not know which report is incorrect. It can be the first one overreporting
or the second one underreporting or even both can be incorrect. However, we can
identify whether an entire sequence is consistent, i.e. nondecreasing. In the sample,
81.9% of the persons exhibit consistent sequences of education information while
18.10% do not.
6We thank Alexandra Spitz for providing a useful classification for occupations based on the
Alphabetisches Verzeichnis der Berufsbenennungen der Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (cf. the manual
accompanying the IABS). We adjusted the classification to the occupation information given in
the regional file (BERUF=1-117) as follows: (i) farmers/farm managers BERUF=1, 2 (ii) service
workers BERUF=97, 98, 110-116 (iii) operatives/craft BERUF=3-57, 78-85 (iv) sales workers
BERUF=70-73 (v) clerical workers BERUF=74-77, 89-96 (vi) administrative, professional and
technical workers BERUF=58-69, 86-88, 99-109.
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Example 1: Person with inconsistently reported education
SPELL BILD Education Employer Employed
1 1 ND 1 yes
2 1 ND 2 yes
3 5 TC 3 yes
4 1 ND 1 yes
5 1 ND 0 unemployed
6 1 ND 4 yes
7 2 VT 5 yes
8 2 VT 6 yes
9 2 VT 0 unemployed
10 2 VT 0 unemployed
11 -9 missing 7 yes
12 2 VT 8 yes
13 2 VT 0 unemployed
14 2 VT 9 yes
15 1 ND 10 yes
16 2 VT 9 yes
Example 1 shows a hypothetical but representative person (all examples in this paper
show hypothetical cases) with inconsistently reported education records. Only spell
3 shows education TC but all later spells show lower education with ND or VT or
missing education. We do not know if the report of TC is true, but the decrease in
reported education afterwards shows that some report violates the rule of reporting
the highest attained degree. Either the report of TC itself is wrong, or, in fact, the
employee obtained the degree after spell 2 and before spell 3. In the latter unlikely
case, all education reports after spell 3 showing a lower degree would be incorrect.
In this example, there exists a second inconsistency. The report of ND at spell 15
is lower than the report of VT at spell 14.
Some insights on the reporting behavior of employers can be gained by looking at
consecutive pairs of education records for the same employee. Overall, in 91.5% of
all cases, two consecutive reports are the same.7 But there is a sharp difference
depending on which employer issued the report. If both reports are by the same
employer, they coincide in 97.0% of the cases. However, if issued by two different
employers, this rate amounts to only 63.2%. The higher stability of reports by
the same employer is to be expected for the following reasons. First, attaining a
higher degree often coincides with changing the employer. The second explanation
7The descriptive statistics in this section are based on employment spells only.
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is rather technical and is related to the artificial splitting of some employment spells
in the IABS in order to assure data privacy. This results in two consecutive spells
by the same employer with the same education information. Third, this may also
indicate that employers just replicate their previous reports causing serial correlation
of reporting errors for reports on the same employee.
Furthermore, we investigate the conditional probabilities for reported education con-
ditional on the previous report for a given person. Such a transition matrix is cal-
culated for reports by the same employer in table 4.3 and for reports from differing
employers in table 4.4. The high numbers (above 93% except for HS) on the di-
agonal in table 4.3 confirm that the same employer is likely to repeat the report
given before. When the reporting employer changes, VT still has a probability of
76.9% to be repeated in the next record. The probability for UD to be repeated is
74.7%. This is not surprising since VT and UD are likely to be the highest degrees
people attain. The other educational outcomes are, on the contrary, reported in a
less stable way with probabilities of being repeated reaching at most 55.1%.
In table 4.5, we estimate the probability that consecutive pairs of education reports
on the same employee are inconsistent, i. e. the second report is lower than the
first one. Since with an inconsistent pair we do not know whether the first or
the second report is wrong, but only that at least one of them must be incorrect,
we consider reported characteristics both in the first and the second spell. The
covariates describing the employment status have the largest coefficients. Working
as a trainee (apprentice obtaining a VT) at the second spell of the consecutive pair
increases the probability of an inconsistent pair by 4.9 ppoints (SE 0.09), relative
to working as a salaried employee. This compares to an observed total rate of 2.1%
for all pairs. Working as a skilled worker at the first spell of the pair leads to a
3.4 ppoints (SE 0.06) higher probability of an inconsistent pair, again compared to
working as as salaried employee. Industry and nationality only weakly affect the
probability of inconsistent reports. This is in sharp contrast to the influence that
these variables have on the probability of a missing report (see table 4.2).
4.3 Imputation Procedures
This section develops three imputation procedures. All imputation procedures are
based on extrapolation of degrees which we will describe first.
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4.3.1 Extrapolation and Reporting Errors
Extrapolation of educational degrees is based on three facts:
(i) the formal education level of an individual can increase, when an additional
degree is attained, or stay constant but it can not decline,
(ii) the formal education of an individual remains mostly constant once the indi-
vidual has entered working life, and
(iii) employers have to report the highest attained degree.
Facts (i) and (ii) state that the education of individuals is monotonically increasing
but mostly constant. Fact (iii) ensures that the employers have to report the actual
education of their employees and not the education necessary for the particular job
which might be lower. Thus the reported education has to be equal to the actual
education and hence also to be monotonically increasing.
Extrapolating plausible education reports to later spells with lower or missing edu-
cation reports, we can construct an improved education variable which is monotoni-
cally increasing. For the extrapolation of education, it is helpful to distinguish three
types of reporting errors: (i) underreported education, (ii) not reported education
resulting in missings, and (iii) overreported education. Spells with underreported or
not reported education can be imputed with the correct education if one extrapolates
the correct education from an earlier spell. In contrast, overreported education can
not be corrected by extrapolation of a correctly reported degree because the overre-
ported degree is higher. Even worse, if one extrapolates an overreported degree to
later spells with correctly reported education the quality of the education variable
deteriorates. This is because extrapolation has a ratchet effect. After extrapolation,
the imputed education will monotonically increase but not go down.
The obvious challenge for every imputation rule is to detect spells which are likely
overreports and not to extrapolate the information. Since we do not have exogenous
information about the true education but only know the reported education we
cannot compare the results of an imputation rule with the true information. Hence
evaluation criteria for imputation procedures requiring the true values to be known,
like those in Chambers (2001), are also not applicable.8 Instead, we propose three
8Other evaluation criteria exist in the literature, see e.g. Rubin (1996).
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imputation procedures bounding the true education in distribution from above and
below. The first imputation procedure (IP1) extrapolates the highest education level
ever observed, including overreports. Thus, IP1 can be viewed as an upper bound
for the true education. The other two procedures IP2 and IP3 are more conservative
by only extrapolating reliable reports, thus resulting in lower bounds for the true
education level. IP2 uses the frequency of the report of a specific degree as an
indication of its reliability and only extrapolates degrees which are reported at least
three times. IP3 assesses the reporting quality of employers and only extrapolates
reports from reliable employers. Put together, these imputation procedures provide
benchmarks reflecting the range of the true education information. If substantive
results do not differ between IP1 and IP2 or IP3, we argue that they basically
coincide with results obtained for a correct measure of education. Then, it also
seems justifiable that standard errors for the estimated quantities are not adjusted
for the remaining uncertainty inherent in the imputation. The next subsections will
give details of the imputation procedures.9
4.3.2 Imputation Procedure 1 (IP1)
The first imputation procedure IP1 puts no restrictions in extrapolating degrees.
Every education report and hence also every overreport can be extrapolated. We
argue that this procedure is likely to impute the correct education or to overstate
the true education. Since we observe several education reports per person it is quite
likely the true education will be eventually reported or an overreport occurs. In these
cases the true education will be imputed or even an overreport will be imputed
to many spells due to the ratchet effect. It is also possible that this imputation
procedure understates the true education for some persons. An example is the case
where the true education level is never reported.
The imputation procedures are implemented in four steps. Step 1 defines which
reports can be extrapolated – either all as in IP1 or only reports deemed reliable
as in IP2 or IP3. The procedures only differ in this first step. The following three
steps contain the actual extrapolation and further adjustments. Next we describe
the details.
Step 1: Preparation for Extrapolation
9More details can be found in Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Vo¨lter (2005).
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Step 1 distinguishes valid spells with extrapolatable information and invalid other
spells. IP1 uses all employer reports for extrapolation. The nonemployment spells
in the IABS (benefit payment spells, interruption spells) do not carry independent
education information but repeat the education information of the most recent em-
ployment spell. Hence we do not use this information but treat the spells as spells
with missing information. Steps 2 and 3 will extrapolate information to these invalid
spells as to other spells with missing information. The original data include educa-
tional degrees for persons below the age of 18 years which often seem implausible.
Therefore, we first impute ND for all spells in this age range.
Step 2: Forward Extrapolation
Step 2 implements the extrapolation of degrees to later spells. The procedure goes
over all spells of an individual person starting with the first spell and ending with
the last one. It extrapolates degrees to later spells if the education information
reported in these later spells is lower or missing. The extrapolation stops if a spell
with a higher degree or the last spell of the person is reached.
The extrapolation of education information to subsequent spells has to account for
the fact that the degrees HS and VT cannot be ranked. When persons have both
degrees this has to be explicitly reported. Hence, the extrapolation rule imputes
HSVT if it reaches a spell with one of the two degrees and there is another previous
spell for this person with the other degree.
Step 3: Backward Extrapolation
The forward extrapolation in step 2 leaves the education information missing, when
spells with missing values precede a person’s first spell with a valid educational
report. Since the educational degree of a person is rather time constant, we also ex-
trapolate backwards the first valid educational degree to previous spells with missing
information. We do not extrapolate backwards degrees beyond degree specific age
limits, because the attainment of a certain degree implies a certain amount of years
of schooling. The age limits are the median ages at which the degrees are reported
for the first time for persons in the data. We do not impute backwards UD below
the age of 29 years, TC below 27 years, HSVT below 23 years, HS below 21 years,
and VT below 20 years. If the first information reported is ND, this is imputed
to all spells before. Note that the first spells of young persons can comprise miss-
ing education values, even if these persons show non-missings values in subsequent
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spells.
Step 4: Additional adjustments
For persons with missing education information in all spells, we impute VT if their
employment status is skilled worker (Facharbeiter), foreman (Polier) or master
craftsman (Meister). This is justified by the fact that in almost 90% of the cases
with valid education information we observe the degree VT together with such an
employment status. Therefore, we impute VT for those cases. Subsequently, we
also extrapolate the imputed information VT forwards and backwards analogous to
steps 2 and 3.
If persons only have employment spells with other information on employment status
and education is missing for all spells, we leave it at that.
The data contain a number of parallel spells for persons who hold two or more jobs
at the same time. If the imputed education variable so far takes different values
for parallel spells we finally impute the highest education information among the
parallel spells to these parallel spells.
Example 2 illustrates the implementation of IP1. The forward extrapolation (Step
2 ) extrapolates VT from spell 3 to spells 4 and 5, where the lower education level ND
is reported. At spell 7, HS is reported. With VT having been reported before, we
assume both degrees, HS and VT, are held and impute HSVT. HSVT is considered
higher than HS and extrapolated to spell 8 and 9. For spell 10, UD is reported. Even
though it is reported only once for this person, IP1 extrapolates UD to spells 11 and
12 because IP1 extrapolates every degree. Forward extrapolation alone would leave
spells 1 to 2 with missing information. Hence (Step 3 ), we extrapolate backwards
VT from spell 3 to spells 1 to 2. It can be seen that the imputed sequence is
consistent (i.e. non-decreasing), which by construction is the case for all imputed
data. In example 2, there is no missing information left. This is not necessarily the
case, especially when there is only missing information about a person.
4.3.3 Imputation Procedure 2 (IP2)
Imputation procedure 2 (IP2) is a conservative imputation procedure, which is likely
to understate the true education by restricting extrapolation to degrees which are
reported at least three times. The frequency of a report serves as a measure of
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Example 2: IP1
SPELL BILD Education IP1 IP1 Education
1 -9 missing 2 VT
2 -9 missing 2 VT
3 2 VT 2 VT
4 1 ND 2 VT
5 1 ND 2 VT
6 2 VT 2 VT
7 3 HS 4 HSVT
8 3 HS 4 HSVT
9 3 HS 4 HSVT
10 6 UD 6 UD
11 2 VT 6 UD
12 2 VT 6 UD
its reliability. If a degree is reported repeatedly, then we assume it has a lower
probability to be an overreport than if is reported only once or twice. There are
occasions in which a low frequency of a report arises quite naturally without indi-
cating a likely overreport, e.g. when two degrees are obtained within a short time
period. Therefore, we implement procedure 2 in two versions, IP2A and IP2B. Pro-
cedure IP2A strictly restricts extrapolation to degrees which are at least three times
reported. Procedure IP2B is less strict. Only when an inconsistent sequence of
education reports indicates reporting errors for a person, extrapolation is restricted
to degrees which are reported at least three times. If a person’s education sequence
is consistent, then IP2B extrapolates every report just as IP1.
Compared to IP1, IP2A and IP2B yield possibly lower imputed educational reports
since not all reported higher degrees are extrapolated. By construction, imputed
values for IP2B lie between IP1 and IP2A.
IP2A and IP2B proceed by the same four steps as described above for IP1. The
only differences involve step 1:
In step 1, IP2A accepts all employment spells as valid for extrapolation when the re-
ported degree is reported in at least three spells.10 When counting specific education
reports, we only count employment spells, not non-employment spells. This reflects
the fact that only information at employment spells is directly employer reported.
10If the total number of employment spells for a person is only four, the minimum frequency for
acceptance is reduced to two reports. If there are less than four employment spells, educational
information in every employment spell is treated as valid.
141
Example 3: IP2A
SPELL BILD Educa- Employed Frequency IP2A IP2A
tion of report Education
1 1 ND yes 7 1 ND
2 1 ND yes 1 ND
3 5 TC yes 1 1 ND
4 1 ND yes 1 ND
5 1 ND yes 1 ND
6 2 VT yes 3 2 VT
7 2 VT unemployed 2 VT
8 2 VT yes 2 VT
9 2 VT yes 2 VT
10 -9 missing yes 2 VT
11 1 ND yes 2 VT
12 1 ND yes 2 VT
13 1 ND yes 2 VT
Only information from valid spells will be extrapolated later. Spells with invalid in-
formation are later treated as spells with missing information, meaning information
will be extrapolated to them from valid spells. Analogous to IP1, nonemployment
spells are treated as invalid spells.
IP2B uses the same heuristic rule for extrapolation as IP2A but only for persons with
an inconsistent sequence of educational reports in the original data. For persons with
a consistent sequence, all employment spells are accepted as a basis for extrapolation.
Both IP2A and IP2B do not accept degrees for persons below the age of 18 but im-
pute ND instead. For young persons below the age of 23 years in vocational training
the educational information ND or HS is accepted even without being reported fre-
quently enough.
Example 3 illustrates the implementation of IP2A.
First, it is determined which degrees are reported at least three times to be valid
for extrapolation. ND is reported seven times and hence valid. TC is only reported
once. Thus, spell 3 will be treated as a spell with missing information. VT is
reported in three employment spells and hence also considered as valid. Actually,
it is reported four times in the example, but spell 7 is an unemployment spell just
repeating information from spell 6. Hence, spell 7 is treated as a spell with missing
information. Now, extrapolation can proceed. ND is extrapolated from spell 2 to
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spell 3 previously containing the invalid TC report. VT is extrapolated from spell 9
to spell 10 with missing information and spells 11-13 with the lower report of ND.
Since the reported information in this example is inconsistent, IP2B would proceed
the same way.
4.3.4 Imputation Procedure 3 (IP3)
Analogous to IP2, IP3 is designed as a conservative imputation procedure, likely
understating the true education. We do not take the frequency of a report as a sign
of its reliability but try to judge the reporting quality of the reporting employer.
We consider the reporting quality of an employer as being good, when he always
reports the same education for an employee or changes his report only once.11 We
only extrapolate reports from good reporters. IP3 treats reports from bad reporters
as missing and extrapolates reports from good reporters to these spells. The hy-
pothesis underlying this procedure is the following. Employers do not reevaluate
the educational degree of their employees every time they have to give a report but
tend to copy from previous reports. Thus, the frequency of the reports as such is
not that informative. It is more informative if an employer changes his report about
an employee. And since it is very unlikely that persons attain two (or more) new
degrees while being employed with one employer we think two (or more) changes in
the report indicate bad reporting quality. As noted above, education is constant for
most workers after entering the labor market.
Employers might change their reports in order to correct previous reporting errors.
IP3 tries to explicitly take this into account. We allow for two types of self correction.
The first type consists of errors corrected immediately: an employer changes the
reported degree only for one spell and switches back immediately afterwards. In
this case, we ignore the switch back–and–forth and the employer is still classified
as reliable. The second type of self correction concerns reliable employers. If they
inconsistently change their report from a higher degree to a lower degree, we assume
they always wanted to report the lower degree. If a reliable employer permanently
changes to a higher degree, we interpret this as the actual attainment of the higher
degree.
11Note that our data do not allow us to identify whether different employees are employed by
the same employer. We can only identify which of a person’s employment spells are with the same
employer. Hence the reporting quality is in fact match specific.
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Now, we start extrapolating a degree when it is reported for the first time by a
reliable employer unless the employer did not intend to report this higher degree
as a consequence of self correction. In the latter case, we first impute the intended
lower degree which becomes the basis for extrapolation.
Again, compared to IP1, IP3 yields potentially lower imputed educational reports
since not all reported higher degrees are extrapolated. In this respect, one cannot
rank IP3 relative to IP2A or IP2B.
Furthermore, IP3 proceeds by the same four steps as described above for IP1, IP2A,
and IP2B. The only differences regard step 1.
For a given individual, IP3 preliminarily accepts all employment spells with non-
missing education information which are the first reports of a given employer and, in
addition, all employment spells by the same employer whenever the reported degree
changes. When a change occurs, the type of reporting error is classified. If there is
an immediate self correction, we impute the intended report in the deviating spell.
Then, if we count not more than one change in the reported degree, the respective
employer is classified as reliable. Otherwise, the employer is classified as unreliable
and his reports are set to missing. Next, inconsistent reports by reliable employers
are corrected in the spells which were first accepted. As in all other procedures, we
impute spells from persons below the age of 18 with ND.
From this point onwards, extrapolation proceeds as for the other imputation proce-
dures.
Example 4 illustrates the implementation of IP3.
Before extrapolation can take place the reliability of the employers has to be deter-
mined and self corrected reporting errors have to be detected. Employer 1 changes
the reported information once and is hence reliable. Employer 2 changes the re-
ported information twice, thus he is not reliable. His spells (4-6) are treated as
spells with missing information. Employer 3 seems to change the reported level of
education three times. But we interpret the report of HSVT at spell 8 as an imme-
diate correction of a one time misreport because VT is reported by this employer
at spells 7 and 9. Hence, we count only one change and classify this employer as
reliable. We conclude that he intended to report VT at spells 7-10 and HSVT at
spell 11. Employer 4 changes the reported degree once and is hence reliable. But
the report of TC after UD is inconsistent. IP3 assumes this to be a self correction
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Example 4: IP3
SPELL BILD Edu- Em- Employer Intended IP3 IP3 Edu-
cation ployer reliable report cation
1 1 ND 1 yes 1 1 ND
2 1 ND 1 1 1 ND
3 2 VT 1 2 2 VT
4 2 VT 2 no 2 VT
5 3 HS 2 2 VT
6 4 HSVT 2 2 VT
7 2 VT 3 yes 2 2 VT
8 4 HSVT 3 2 2 VT
9 2 VT 3 2 2 VT
10 2 VT 3 2 2 VT
11 4 HSVT 3 4 4 HSVT
12 6 UD 4 yes 5 5 TC
13 5 TC 4 5 5 TC
14 5 TC 4 5 5 TC
15 5 TC 4 5 5 TC
16 4 HSVT 5 yes 4 5 TC
17 4 HSVT 5 4 5 TC
and that employer 4 always intended to report TC. Employer 5 never changes the
reported education and is classified as reliable. Now, extrapolation can take place
on the basis of the reliable employer’s intended reports (i. e. after taking account of
the self correction of reporting errors at spell 8 and 12). VT is extrapolated from
spell 3 to spells 4-6. TC is extrapolated from spell 15 to spells 16 and 17.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
This section compares the corrected education data resulting from the different im-
putation procedures to the original data. We study (i) the education mix in employ-
ment, (ii) wage inequality between and within education skill groups, (iii) earnings
regressions and how misreports are related to earnings, and (iv) the incidence of
underreports.
Our basic imputation approach is based on plausible assumptions about the report-
ing behavior of employers and the previous section shows the importance of missing
values and inconsistencies in the education variable. Therefore, we believe that em-
pirical results using the imputed education variable are more reliable than using
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the uncorrected data. If substantive empirical results do not differ considerably
(measured by the economic importance of the changes) when applying the different
imputation procedures, we argue that the results coincide with results obtained for
a correct measure of education. If results do differ, then we cannot provide a point
estimate for the quantity of interest and we suspect that the different estimates pro-
vide bounds for the point estimate based on the correct education data. We cannot
account further for the statistical uncertainty inherent in our imputation.
4.4.1 Education Mix in Employment
Table 4.6 shows the education shares for the original data and for the respective
imputed data resulting from procedures IP1, IP2A, IP2B, and IP3 where the shares
have been calculated based on the raw spells, i. e. all unweighted spells. To assess the
relevance of the imputation procedure for practical applications, table 4.7 reports
education shares for men working fulltime in 1995 in West Germany weighted by
the spell length. The tables show that all procedures could eliminate most of the
missing values. Their share decreases from 9.5% to 1.9-3.2% of the raw spells.
Considering the weighted sample, we see a similar picture at a lower level. The share
of missing values decreases from 7.4% to 1.2-2.1%. The remaining missing values
can be explained by two reasons: (i) persons with all education information missing
and (ii) the age limits for backwards extrapolation of degrees. The imputation
procedures do not only reduce the share of missing information but also the share of
ND and HS. The shares of the education groups VT, HSVT, TC, and UD increase
for the raw spells as well as for the weighted data. Next we discuss the results for the
weighted data in more detail. The by far largest increase in absolute terms concerns
the category VT with an increase of 5.6-6.9 ppoints (added to 65.3% initially).
HSVT shows the largest increase in relative terms: +1.1-2.4 ppoints (added to 2.7%
initially). Considering the higher education levels, UD gains more (+0.8-1.3 ppoints
added to 5.0% initially) than TC: 0.4-0.7 ppoints added to 4.0% initially. The
decrease in ND is 2.5-5.0 ppoints from 15.1%. The size and change of HS is small.
The imputation procedures decrease the shares of ND and HS and result in a higher
educational attainment among employed workers. The share of the employees hold-
ing any degree is higher (lower share of ND) and the share of the higher educational
levels (TC, UD) is higher.
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Comparing the different imputation procedures, IP1 shows the strongest impact
on the educational composition. IP1 results in the highest shares of the higher
education categories (HSVT, TC, UD) which is to be expected since it potentially
extrapolates any higher report. IP2A changes the educational composition least
strongly. The resulting shares of the high education categories (HSVT, TC, UD)
are the lowest. IP2B is comparable to procedure IP2A except for a lower share of
missing information and a higher share of VT. IP3 gives shares which are roughly
in the middle between procedure IP1 and procedure IP2A. This shows that our
acceptance rules based on frequency are stricter than the acceptance rule based on
the reliability of the employer.
Are the differences between the imputed data from the procedures small compared
to the difference to the original data? This would imply that it is important to
use an imputation rule, but not that important which one. Certainly the differences
between the different imputed data are small concerning the missing values and VT.
For the other categories the differences are also not too large except for the small
category of HSVT. Its share goes up from 2.7% to between 3.8% (IP2A) and 5.1%
(IP1). For this category, the differences between the procedures are not negligible.
Additional insights on how the different procedures work can be gained from look-
ing at the conditional imputation probabilities for the different education categories
given the reported education. These imputation matrices are reported in tables 4.8
to 4.11 based on the raw spells because the procedures are based on unweighted
employment spells. The tables are transformation matrices in which the diagonal
elements give the probability an original report remains unchanged by the imputa-
tion procedure and the off diagonal elements in each row give the probability it is
imputed with one of the other education categories. All procedures impute spells
containing missing information with ND in about 25% of all cases and with VT in
about 50% of all cases. The large values on the diagonals in the tables show that
all procedures leave at least 73% of the non-missing reports unchanged. Reports
from the largest category VT are rarely changed, with the procedures leaving more
than 95.6% unchanged. Only UD reports are changed less often, more than 97.1%
of them are unchanged. HS reports exhibit the highest rate of being imputed with
other information. They remain unchanged with a rate of only 73.0-77.1% and, if
changed, they are most likely to be imputed with HSVT in 9.9-18.9% of the cases.
ND reports are quite likely to be changed, too. 77.4-83.7% of them are unchanged.
15.7-21.3% are imputed with VT. Even if the broad picture looks similar and all
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procedures provide an upward correction of the education variable, there are differ-
ences between the procedures. Only IP1’s entries below the diagonal are all close
to zero. This reflects the fact that every reported non-missing degree is used for
extrapolation under the assumption of no overreporting. Procedures IP2 and IP3,
on the contrary, do not extrapolate every degree but some reported degrees classified
as unreliable are imputed with lower degrees. This mainly concerns HS which is in
1.3-4.4% of the spells imputed with ND and in 4.5-6.1% with VT. This also concerns
HSVT reports. Those reports stand a 3.3-5.7% chance of being imputed with VT.
In the literature, the six educational categories are often aggregated into three
groups: (U) without a vocational training degree [ND and HS], (M) with a vo-
cational training degree [VT and HSVT], and (H) with a higher educational degree
[TC and UD] (see for instance Fitzenberger, 1999). This makes imputations within
these groups irrelevant but a considerable number of imputations takes place across
the groups U, M, and H, like the imputation of VT to ND. Hence, the imputation
procedures are relevant at the more aggregated level as well. But the aggregation re-
duces the differences concerning the educational distribution, since the small group
HSVT with the largest differences is aggregated with VT.
4.4.2 Wage Inequality Between and Within Education
Groups
Now, we investigate the impact of the imputation procedures on measures of wage
inequality between and within skill groups. For illustrative purposes, we focus on
wage inequality among men working full time in West Germany and only consider
two years, 1984 and 1997. We aggregate the six education categories into three skill
groups, U, M, and H, as described in the last subsection. Table 4.12 shows the 20th,
the 50th and the 80th percentile of the daily wage (in German Marks/DEM) for
men in 1984 and in 1997 by the skill groups U, M and H. For the high skilled H, the
50th and the 80th percentiles cannot be calculated since wages are right censored
in the data at the social security threshold. The table shows that the percentiles of
the daily wage estimated with the imputed data are in most cases some DEM lower
compared to those calculated with the original data. In 1984, this only concerns the
wage percentiles for the skill groups M and H, which are estimated 1 to 4 DEM lower
with the imputed data than with the original data (originally 90-143 DEM). In 1997,
this concerns all skill groups, the estimated daily wage percentiles are up to 9 DEM
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lower for the imputed data. Lower estimated wage percentiles resulting from the
imputed data are consistent with our view that there are many more underreports
than overreports and underreports are associated with employees holding degrees
which employers do not consider necessary for the job. Therefore, employees with
underreports earn less than employees holding the same, correctly reported degree.
As a measure of wage inequality between skill groups, we consider the difference
in log daily wages between the skill groups M and U at the 50th and the 20th
percentiles and between the skill groups H and M only at the 20th wage percentile
due to censoring of the higher wages. The numbers are given in table 4.13. Imputing
the education variable has a noticeable influence on the estimates of wage inequality
between the low skilled U and the medium skilled M at the 20th wage percentile.
In 1984, the estimate is lower with 0.095 for all procedures instead of 0.118 with the
original variable, whereas in 1997 the estimate is higher, i. e. 0.168 to 0.219 compared
to 0.163. Since the differences go in the opposite direction the estimated 1984-97
increase in wage inequality varies considerably from 0.045 to 0.073-0.124. With
other words, one would underestimate the average yearly growth rate of between
wage inequality by a factor of at least two, i. e. amounting to 0.3% based on the
original variable compared to 0.6-0.9% using the corrected education variables. Note
further the large differences between the imputed variables themselves in the 1997
estimates which is translated to the trend estimates. The estimated inequality
measures between U and M at the 50th and between H and M at the 20th wage
percentile and the respective trends are not changed in a systematic way, however,
there are noticeable differences as well.
Table 4.14 reports wage inequality within the skill groups U and M. It shows the
differences in log wages between the 80th and the 50th wage percentiles as well
as the differences between the 50th and the 20th percentiles. Overall, the largest
impact of the imputation procedures on measured inequality can be found in 1997
for skill group U below the median: the 50%-20% log wage difference is measured as
0.257-0.269 instead of 0.228 where the results of the different imputation procedures
are quite close. The other measured within group wage inequalities are changed less
than half that much, at most by 0.014. Concerning the trend between 1984 and 1997,
the largest change can also be observed for the 50%-20% log wage difference for skill
group U. Whereas the original data result in an increase of 0.036, the imputed show
a larger increase of 0.065-0.086. The measured trend for U and M above the median
is almost not affected by the imputation procedures: the growth in the 80%-50%
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log wage difference for M shows a slightly smaller value with 0.003-0.014 compared
to 0.021 for the original data.
Summing up, imputation affects some measures of wage inequality, especially in the
lower part of the wage distribution of the low to medium skilled groups.
4.4.3 Mincer-type Earnings Regressions
This subsection investigates the effects of imputing education on estimated wage
regressions. Furthermore, we investigate whether and how the measurement error
in education is related to wages. We estimate the following Mincer-type earnings
equation (Mincer, 1974):
logw = α + βNDdND + βHSdHS + βHSV TdHSV T
+βTCdTC + βUNdUN + βX + ε
where logw is the log daily wage for fulltime employed men in West Germany in
1995. The education variables are dummies for five categories, the most frequent
category VT is the omitted category. We also control for age and age squared in X.
Since wages are censored from above at the social security threshold, we estimate
a Tobit model. The results without further controls are given in table 4.15. It
can be seen that the coefficients for ND, TC, and UN do not differ much between
the original data and the different versions of the imputed data. The differences are
below 8.7% of the coefficient obtained based on the original data. But the differences
are partly significant due to small standard errors.12 The intercept as a measure
for the VT log wage also does not seem to differ significantly. But the coefficients
for the smaller education categories HS and HSVT change. The difference is largest
for HSVT between the original data and the data based on IP1, the coefficients are
0.196 (SE 0.007)13 and 0.123 (0.005), respectively. IP3 gives results comparable to
IP1 and IP2 gives results between IP1 and the original data. The coefficient for HS
does not differ significantly due to large standard errors.
12We do not estimate the sampling variance of the difference when applying the different impu-
tation procedures. However, if the sample variance of the coefficient is small in all cases then the
variance of the difference is small because of the Cauchy-Schwarz-Inequality.
13Here and in the following standard error in parentheses.
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We have repeated the estimations with additional controls for being foreign, six oc-
cupations and 13 industries (see table 4.16). The picture remains qualitatively the
same. The additional controls reduce the coefficients in absolute value for the log
wage differences. Again the coefficients for ND, TC, and UN are quite comparable.
The intercept does not differ notably. The coefficients on HS differ but not signif-
icantly. The coefficients on HSVT again differ significantly. It is 0.086 (0.006) for
the original data and differs most strongly for IP1 with 0.035 (0.005).
Regarding these regressions, the impact of correcting the education variable is fairly
small. This is somewhat surprising since in tables 4.8-4.11 the composition of the
individual education categories differs between the original data and the imputed
data. For instance, with probability 21.3%, IP1 classifies a spell with reported
education ND as VT. It is not surprising that the imputation procedures do not
change the intercepts as estimates for the log wage for VT given the large size of
this group and the low rate of change for spells reporting VT initially. The difference
is largest for HSVT which is the education category affected most by the imputation
procedures.
Next, we analyze the relationship between the individual wage and the incidence as
well as the type of misreport estimating a wage regression. This is of importance
since wage estimations in the spirit of Kane et al. (1999), which take misclassifica-
tion explicitly into account, require conditional (mean) independence of wages and
measurement error given true education. We can explore whether this assumption is
likely to hold by assuming true education to be close to one of the corrected values.
Then, we construct a missing dummy, which is one if the education information in
the original data is missing, an overreport dummy, which is one if the report in the
original data is higher, and an analogous underreport dummy. If measurement error
is independent of the wage conditional on true education, the dummies for the mea-
surement error types should have insignificant coefficients in the wage regressions
with the improved data. The regression controls for being foreign, occupation and
industry since the incidence of missing education information was shown above to
be correlated with some of these variables.
The results can be found in table 4.17. The coefficient for a missing report varies
between -0.106 (0.005) and -0.120 (0.004). The coefficients for underreported edu-
cation are of similar size with values between -0.104 (0.004) and -0.116 (0.003). The
coefficient on overreported education is significantly negative for IP2A with -0.181
151
(0.012) and IP2B with -0.211 (0.017) but insignificant for IP3. Since procedure IP1
assumes there are no overreports for persons over 17 years there is no coefficient to
estimate. If we are willing to assume that the true education is not too far from one
of the imputed education variables, we can conclude that an underreported or not
reported education is associated with a 10% lower wage given the true education.
A lower wage, when education is underreported, is in accordance with the hypoth-
esis that some employers report the education required for the job, not the degree
attained by the employee. They pay a wage corresponding to the lower reported
education. The evidence on overreported education is not conclusive. Altogether
it seems that measurement error and wage are not conditionally independent given
the true education. Therefore, potential alternatives to imputation suggested in the
literature are not applicable here.
4.4.4 Underreports and Overreports
This section returns to the question of incorrect education reports. Comparing the
imputed data and the original data for employment spells in West Germany, the
share of underreports lies between 5.8% (IP2A) and 8.8% (IP1) and the share of
overreports between 0.2% (IP1) and 1.0% (IP2A). Underreports are quantitatively
as important as missing values, whereas overreports are much less frequent. For
this reason and because overreports differ by construction according to the different
imputation procedures, we focus on underreports in the following.
The incidence of underreports is analyzed by comparing the reported education to
the imputed education from IP2A in a probit regression with the set of regressors
also used when analyzing missing education reports (see table 4.2). The marginal
effects are reported in table 4.18. As the largest effect, we find a 5.7 ppoints (0.1)
higher probability of an underreport for a non-skilled worker compared to a salaried
employee. If the report comes from an employer who gives only one or two reports
about this employee, the probability of an underreport is 3.7 ppoints (0.1) higher
than when the employer gives more than five reports. Possibly, employers who antic-
ipate employing a person only for a short time spend less effort reporting correctly.
The effect of working in the main construction trade is also quite large, with a 2.6
ppoints (0.2) higher probability than in the investment goods industry. Note that,
for the probability of a missing report, the effect of this industry is four times as
large (see table 4.2) and, analyzing inconsistencies in table 4.5, there are almost no
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industry effects. In contrast to what we found for missing reports, foreigners are less
likely to have underreports. The results for the other imputation procedures (not
displayed here) are quite comparable.
4.5 Conclusion
The education variable in the IABS shows two apparent shortcomings: missing data
and observed data which is inconsistent with the reporting rule for the variable.
Based on the notion that the education variable should represent a person’s highest
degree, that the educational degree of a working person is rather time constant,
and that people can only attain degrees over time, but not lose them, we propose
different procedures to improve the variable by deductive imputation. There is no
exogenous information to validate our imputation procedures. Using plausible hy-
potheses about the reporting process, we argue that our basic imputation procedure
is likely to overstate true education and our two other refinements are likely to un-
derstate true education. If empirical results based on the different procedures are
close, we argue that the imputed education variable is basically correct. In order
to evaluate the impact of imputing the education variable, we analyze the educa-
tional distribution of employment as well as wage inequality between and within skill
groups, and we compare wage regressions using the original data and the corrected
data.
Imputation removes more than two thirds of the missing values. The corrected data
are by construction consistent with the reporting rule. Concerning the education
distribution of employment, the improvement of the data matters. All procedures
give higher shares for vocational training (with or without a high school degree),
technical college, and university degrees and lower shares for no degree or high school
only. The resulting shares do not differ a lot in size between the procedures, except
for the small category vocational training plus high school. In most dimensions, mis-
reporting educational degrees especially affects wage inequality measured at lower
percentiles in the low and medium skilled groups. We find, for instance, that for
the unskilled the measured growth from 1984 to 1997 in the difference between the
median wage and the 20th wage percentile is considerably higher compared to the
original data. In Mincer-type wage regressions, improving the data makes only a
small difference, except again for the small category vocational training plus high
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school. However, wages for three skill groups are typically lower at all degrees when
using the imputed data.
Overall, our results indicate that there is some evidence in favor of the hypothesis
that underreporting of educational degrees is a more severe problem than overre-
porting. In fact, employers tend to report the degree required for the position rather
than the highest formal qualification attained by the employee. Moreover, our find-
ings imply that usual ad hoc methods of dealing with or even ignoring the data
quality issues regarding the education variable may bias results, especially if the
focus of the analysis lies on subpopulations where the incidence of these problems is
not negligible. We have demonstrated that, by exploiting the available information
in the data as well as on the institutional context, it is possible to put so much
structure on the problem as to recover, in a heuristic way, an education variable
that is likely to be very close to the truth.
Our analysis does not provide a definite rule on how to choose among the different
imputation procedures. However, we recommend using some correction of the edu-
cation variable, as suggested in our paper, instead of the common practice in existing
studies involving the use of an inconsistent education variable with a large number of
missing observations. In addition, without correction, the education variable in the
IABS tends to understate the educational level of the employees. In actual applica-
tions, where the education variable is crucial, we recommend to use all imputation
procedures suggested here. If the substantive results obtained are insensitive to the
use of imputation procedure, then it is very likely that they are not affected by
the remaining uncertainty about the education variable. Clearly, more research on
improving the data quality in the IABS is strongly needed, in particular, since the
same database is used in recent evaluations of labor market reforms in Germany.
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4.7 Appendix
Table 4.1: Distribution of the Education Variable BILD in the Original
Data
Education (abbreviation)a Coded Number Share Weighted shareb
as of spells of spells male empl 1995
Missing -9 819,701 9.52 7.35
No vocational training de-
gree, no high school degree
(ND)
1 2,325,379 27.00 15.13
Only vocational training de-
gree, no high school degree
(VT)
2 4,794,512 55.66 65.28
Only high school degree, no
vocational training degree
(HS)
3 95,955 1.11 0.59
High school degree and
vocational training degree
(HSVT)
4 153,728 1.78 2.69
Technical college degree
(TC)
5 175,603 2.04 3.97
University degree (UD) 6 249,180 2.89 4.98
Total 8,614,058 100.00 100.00
Notes: a In German vocational training degree means abgeschlossene Berufsausbil-
dung, high school degree Abitur, technical college degree Fachhochschulabschluss and
university degree Hochschulabschluss. b Weighted Share describes the education re-
ported for fulltime working males in West Germany in 1995. Apprentices are not
included. Employment spells are weighted by their length.
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Table 4.2: Probit Regression of Education Information Missing
Regressors Marg eff Robust SE Regressors Marg eff Robust SE
≤19 years -0.018 (0.001)** spell≤30 days 0.023 (0.001)**
30-39 years 0.014 (0.001)** 30<spell≤180 days 0.015 (0.000)**
40-49 years 0.019 (0.001)** 1-2 reports by empl 0.038 (0.001)**
50-59 years 0.021 (0.001)** 3-5 reports by empl 0.023 (0.001)**
60+ years 0.024 (0.002)** year 75 0.009 (0.001)**
female -0.002 (0.001)** year 76 0.008 (0.001)**
married -0.009 (0.001)** year 77 0.005 (0.001)**
foreign 0.061 (0.001)** year 78 0.005 (0.001)**
trainee -0.039 (0.001)** year 79 0.005 (0.001)**
non-skilled worker 0.040 (0.001)** year 80 0.002 (0.001)**
skilled worker -0.023 (0.001)** year 81 0.001 (0.001)
master craftsman/foreman -0.034 (0.002)** year 82 0.001 (0.001)
home worker 0.129 (0.012)** year 83 0.000 (0.001)
part time ≤18h 0.092 (0.003)** year 84 0.000 (0.000)
part time >18h 0.028 (0.001)** year 86 -0.000 (0.000)
farmers/farm managers 0.011 (0.002)** year 87 0.000 (0.001)
service workers 0.019 (0.001)** year 88 0.001 (0.001)
sales workers -0.016 (0.001)** year 89 0.002 (0.001)**
clerical workers -0.028 (0.001)** year 90 0.005 (0.001)**
admin/profes/techn staff -0.020 (0.001)** year 91 0.007 (0.001)**
agriculture 0.014 (0.003)** year 92 0.008 (0.001)**
basic industry 0.015 (0.002)** year 93 0.010 (0.001)**
consumer goods industry 0.018 (0.002)** year 94 0.012 (0.001)**
food industry 0.045 (0.002)** year 95 0.013 (0.001)**
main construction trade 0.108 (0.003)** year 96 0.013 (0.001)**
construction completion trade 0.054 (0.003)** year 97 0.015 (0.001)**
trade 0.060 (0.002)**
transport and communication 0.084 (0.003)**
business services 0.090 (0.002)**
consumer services 0.157 (0.004)**
education, non profit org 0.022 (0.002)**
public administration 0.026 (0.002)**
Observed prob 0.078
Predicted prob at x¯ 0.057
N 6,369,039
Pseudo R2 0.123
Notes: Dependent variable: dummy for reported education missing. Estimation based on all
employment spells in West Germany. Base category: 20-29 years, male, not married, German,
working fulltime as a salaried employee, occupation group operatives/craft, investment goods in-
dustry, more than five reports by the employer about the employee, spell longer than 180 days,
1985. Intercept included in estimation. Robust standard errors with clustering at the person level.
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.
158
Table 4.3: Conditional Probabilities of Education Reported Given Previ-
ous Report by the Same Employer
Education repor- Education reported later by the same employer
ted previously Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD
Missing 94.43 1.68 3.47 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.13
ND 0.35 93.73 5.76 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.01
VT 0.26 0.69 98.86 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.03
HS 0.36 1.31 4.38 87.25 5.74 0.42 0.55
HSVT 0.34 0.35 2.26 0.21 96.15 0.32 0.37
TC 0.17 0.10 0.98 0.06 0.20 98.18 0.31
UD 0.15 0.05 0.46 0.06 0.11 0.23 98.94
Total 6.87 25.51 59.27 0.98 1.90 2.36 3.10
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities that the row education
will be reported for a person given the previous report for the person was
the column education and was reported by the same employer. Based on all
employment spells.
Table 4.4: Conditional Probabilities of Education Reported Given Previ-
ous Report by a Different Employer
Education repor- Education reported later by different employer
ted previously Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD
Missing 35.65 25.27 34.96 0.91 1.14 0.84 1.23
ND 12.48 53.12 31.62 1.16 0.70 0.46 0.47
VT 8.75 10.81 76.91 0.49 1.45 0.92 0.68
HS 7.92 15.94 23.12 25.61 10.52 5.10 11.80
HSVT 7.45 4.19 35.13 2.23 37.91 5.57 7.51
TC 5.70 1.89 21.77 1.05 5.35 55.08 9.17
UD 4.66 0.82 9.46 1.01 4.11 5.28 74.66
Total 12.84 24.34 54.71 1.19 2.08 1.88 2.96
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities that the row education
will be reported for a person given the previous report for the person was
the column education and was reported by a different employer. Based on all
employment spells.
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Table 4.5: Probit Regression of Inconsistent Reports
Regressors Marg. Robust Regressors Marg. Robust
Effect SE Effect SE
≤19 years -0.0071 (0.0001)** food industry -0.0006 (0.0003)
30-39 years 0.0005 (0.0001)** main construction trade 0.0062 (0.0004)**
40-49 years -0.0007 (0.0001)** construction completion trade 0.0012 (0.0004)**
50-59 years -0.0025 (0.0001)** trade -0.0002 (0.0002)
60+ years -0.0049 (0.0002)** transport and communication -0.0043 (0.0002)**
female -0.0002 (0.0001) business services 0.0019 (0.0003)**
married -0.0026 (0.0001)** consumer services -0.0001 (0.0003)
foreign -0.0013 (0.0001)** education, non profit org 0.0031 (0.0003)**
spell≤30 days 0.0059 (0.0002)** public administration 0.0025 (0.0004)**
30<spell≤180 days 0.0103 (0.0001)** agriculture (t-1) -0.0021 (0.0004)**
spell≤30 days (t-1) 0.0087 (0.0002)** basic industry (t-1) -0.0010 (0.0003)**
30<spell≤180 days (t-1) 0.0085 (0.0001)** consumer goods industry (t-1) 0.0004 (0.0003)
1-2 reports by empl 0.0065 (0.0002)** food industry (t-1) 0.0008 (0.0003)*
3-5 reports by empl -0.0004 (0.0001)* main construction trade (t-1) -0.0013 (0.0003)**
1-2 reports by empl (t-1) 0.0214 (0.0003)** construction compl trade (t-1) -0.0009 (0.0003)**
3-5 reports by empl (t-1) 0.0094 (0.0002)** trade (t-1) 0.0018 (0.0002)**
trainee 0.0486 (0.0009)** transport and comm (t-1) 0.0092 (0.0005)**
non-skilled worker 0.0331 (0.0006)** business services (t-1) 0.0012 (0.0003)**
skilled worker -0.0154 (0.0001)** consumer services (t-1) 0.0023 (0.0004)**
master craftsman/foreman -0.0089 (0.0001)** education, non profit org (t-1) -0.0036 (0.0002)**
home worker 0.0278 (0.0034)** public administration (t-1) -0.0038 (0.0002)**
part time ≤18h 0.0227 (0.0008)** year 75 0.0014 (0.0005)**
part time >18h 0.0096 (0.0004)** year 76 -0.0007 (0.0003)**
trainee (t-1) -0.0098 (0.0001)** year 77 0.0015 (0.0003)**
non-skilled worker (t-1) -0.0109 (0.0001)** year 78 0.0030 (0.0003)**
skilled worker (t-1) 0.0338 (0.0006)** year 79 0.0019 (0.0003)**
master craftsman/f (t-1) 0.0225 (0.0015)** year 80 0.0026 (0.0003)**
home worker (t-1) -0.0049 (0.0007)** year 81 0.0022 (0.0003)**
part time ≤18h (t-1) -0.0032 (0.0002)** year 82 0.0020 (0.0003)**
part time >18h (t-1) -0.0041 (0.0002)** year 83 0.0003 (0.0003)
farmers/farm managers 0.0021 (0.0006)** year 84 0.0001 (0.0003)
service workers 0.0023 (0.0003)** year 86 0.0002 (0.0003)
sales workers -0.0056 (0.0002)** year 87 -0.0003 (0.0003)
clerical workers -0.0037 (0.0002)** year 88 -0.0004 (0.0003)
admin/profes/techn staff -0.0071 (0.0002)** year 89 -0.0005 (0.0002)*
farmers/farm man (t-1) 0.0031 (0.0006)** year 90 0.0003 (0.0003)
service workers (t-1) -0.0009 (0.0002)** year 91 0.0002 (0.0003)
sales workers (t-1) 0.0112 (0.0005)** year 92 -0.0007 (0.0002)**
clerical workers (t-1) 0.0078 (0.0004)** year 93 -0.0006 (0.0002)*
admin/profes/techn (t-1) 0.0191 (0.0005)** year 94 -0.0011 (0.0002)**
agriculture 0.0006 (0.0005) year 95 -0.0012 (0.0002)**
basic industry 0.0010 (0.0003)** year 96 -0.0025 (0.0002)**
consumer goods industry 0.0017 (0.0003)** year 97 -0.0038 (0.0002)**
Observed prob 0.0213 N 5,474,652
Predicted prob at x¯ 0.0106 Pseudo R2 0.2092
Notes: Dependent variable: dummy for reported education lower than in the previous report. (t-1)
indicates variables concerning the previous employment spell. Estimation based on all employment
spells in West Germany. Base category: 20-29 years, male, not married, German, working fulltime
as a salaried employee, occupation group operatives/craft, investment goods industry, more than
five reports by the employer about the employee, spell longer than 180 days, 1985. Intercept
included in estimation. Robust standard errors with clustering at the person level. * significant at
5%, ** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.6: Distribution of Education Variable after Imputation, Un-
weighted Spells
Education Original data IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
Missing 9.52 1.90 3.10 2.09 3.24
No vocational training de-
gree, no high school degree
27.00 23.41 25.68 25.80 24.09
Only vocational training de-
gree, no high school degree
55.66 63.78 62.13 62.89 62.77
Only high school degree, no
vocational training degree
1.11 1.07 1.03 1.06 1.03
High school degree and vo-
cational training degree
1.78 3.63 2.47 2.54 2.99
Technical college degree 2.04 2.61 2.30 2.32 2.45
University degree 2.89 3.60 3.28 3.30 3.43
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: Shares based on all 8,614,058 spells.
Table 4.7: Distribution of Education Variable after Imputation, Weighted
Male Employment in 1995
Education Original data IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
Missing 7.35 1.18 2.09 1.28 2.01
No vocational training de-
gree, no high school degree
15.13 10.14 12.61 12.52 11.14
Only vocational training de-
gree, no high school degree
65.28 72.15 70.83 71.59 71.60
Only high school degree, no
vocational training degree
0.59 0.46 0.54 0.55 0.52
High school degree and vo-
cational training degree
2.69 5.05 3.76 3.83 4.21
Technical college degree 3.97 4.71 4.37 4.40 4.49
University degree 4.98 6.32 5.81 5.84 6.03
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: The table describes the education mix for men in West Germany working
fulltime in 1995. Apprentices are not included. Spells are weighted by their length.
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Table 4.8: Imputation Matrix for Procedure IP1
Imputed data
Original data Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD Total
Missing 19.61 24.77 49.30 0.87 2.50 1.38 1.57 100.00
ND 0.04 77.41 21.29 0.47 0.58 0.12 0.09 100.00
VT 0.03 0.27 95.83 0.00 2.56 0.83 0.47 100.00
HS 0.03 0.64 0.04 76.84 18.91 1.26 2.29 100.00
HSVT 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.01 89.64 5.04 5.14 100.00
TC 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 92.39 7.50 100.00
UD 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 99.92 100.00
Total 1.90 23.41 63.78 1.07 3.63 2.61 3.60 100.00
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities the column information will
be imputed given the spell originally contains the row information. Based on all
8,614,058 spells.
Table 4.9: Imputation Matrix for Procedure IP2A
Imputed data
Original data Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD Total
Missing 28.39 24.98 42.45 0.68 1.25 1.01 1.22 100.00
ND 0.53 82.79 16.17 0.26 0.16 0.05 0.04 100.00
VT 0.30 1.53 96.10 0.06 1.25 0.46 0.29 100.00
HS 4.56 4.37 4.53 73.82 10.11 0.91 1.70 100.00
HSVT 0.92 1.88 5.67 1.79 82.88 3.29 3.56 100.00
TC 0.56 0.69 2.61 0.24 0.54 90.48 4.88 100.00
UD 0.42 0.29 1.09 0.25 0.36 0.49 97.10 100.00
Total 3.10 25.68 62.13 1.03 2.47 2.30 3.28 100.00
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities the column information will
be imputed given the spell originally contains the row information. Based on all
8,614,058 spells.
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Table 4.10: Imputation Matrix for Procedure IP2B
Imputed data
Original data Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD Total
Missing 20.43 27.79 46.99 0.84 1.51 1.12 1.33 100.00
ND 0.17 83.66 15.68 0.25 0.16 0.05 0.04 100.00
VT 0.10 0.89 97.00 0.06 1.23 0.45 0.27 100.00
HS 2.10 3.87 4.53 77.12 9.94 0.86 1.58 100.00
HSVT 0.42 1.30 4.46 0.88 86.31 3.18 3.43 100.00
TC 0.29 0.46 2.07 0.16 0.44 91.84 4.74 100.00
UD 0.22 0.19 0.83 0.15 0.30 0.37 97.93 100.00
Total 2.09 25.80 62.89 1.06 2.54 2.32 3.30 100.00
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities the column information will
be imputed given the spell originally contains the row information. Based on all
8,614,058 spells.
Table 4.11: Imputation Matrix for Procedure IP3
Imputed data
Original data Missing ND VT HS HSVT TC UD Total
Missing 20.94 24.22 48.93 0.87 2.23 1.30 1.51 100.00
ND 2.53 78.97 17.55 0.39 0.41 0.09 0.06 100.00
VT 0.83 0.78 95.57 0.04 1.76 0.65 0.37 100.00
HS 2.37 1.32 6.09 72.97 14.31 1.08 1.86 100.00
HSVT 2.26 0.56 3.31 0.33 84.87 4.13 4.53 100.00
TC 1.14 0.26 1.74 0.13 0.51 90.21 6.01 100.00
UD 0.51 0.06 0.52 0.09 0.24 0.46 98.11 100.00
Total 3.24 24.09 62.77 1.03 2.99 2.45 3.43 100.00
Notes: The table contains the conditional probabilities the column information will
be imputed given the spell originally contains the row information. Based on all
8,614,058 spells.
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Table 4.12: Wage Percentiles for Men by Skill Group for 1984 and 1997
Year Skill group Percentile Orig. data IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
1984 U 20 80 80 80 80 80
50 97 96 97 97 97
80 116 115 116 116 117
M 20 90 88 88 88 88
50 110 109 109 109 109
80 145 142 143 143 142
H 20 143 139 141 141 140
1997 U 20 113 107 106 108 109
50 142 140 138 140 141
80 173 170 169 171 173
M 20 133 129 132 130 129
50 166 161 164 163 162
80 222 213 217 215 214
H 20 206 197 207 203 198
Notes: The table contains the percentiles of the daily wages in DEM for men working fulltime in
West Germany without apprentices. The skill group U comprises ND and HS, M comprises VT
and HSVT; H comprises TC and UD. The 50th and the 80th wage percentile for H cannot be
reported because the wage data is right censored.
Table 4.13: Wage Inequality for Men Between Skill Groups for 1984 and
1997
Year Groups At percentile Orig. data IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
1984 M-U 50 0.126 0.127 0.117 0.117 0.117
M-U 20 0.118 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095
H-M 20 0.463 0.457 0.471 0.471 0.464
1997 M-U 50 0.156 0.140 0.173 0.152 0.139
M-U 20 0.163 0.187 0.219 0.185 0.168
H-M 20 0.438 0.423 0.450 0.446 0.428
Change M-U 50 0.030 0.013 0.056 0.035 0.022
84/97 M-U 20 0.045 0.092 0.124 0.090 0.073
H-M 20 -0.026 -0.034 -0.022 -0.026 -0.036
Notes: The table contains differences in log daily wages between skill groups at specific wage
percentiles based on the wage values from table 4.12 .
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Table 4.14: Wage Inequality for Men Within Skill Groups for 1984 and
1997
Year Skill group Measure Orig. data IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
1984 U 50%-20% 0.193 0.182 0.193 0.193 0.193
80%-50% 0.179 0.181 0.179 0.179 0.187
M 50%-20% 0.201 0.214 0.214 0.214 0.214
80%-50% 0.276 0.264 0.271 0.271 0.264
1997 U 50%-20% 0.228 0.269 0.264 0.260 0.257
80%-50% 0.197 0.194 0.203 0.200 0.205
M 50%-20% 0.222 0.222 0.217 0.226 0.228
80%-50% 0.291 0.280 0.280 0.277 0.278
Change U 50%-20% 0.036 0.086 0.071 0.067 0.065
84/97 80%-50% 0.019 0.014 0.024 0.021 0.017
M 50%-20% 0.021 0.008 0.003 0.012 0.014
80%-50% 0.014 0.015 0.009 0.005 0.014
Notes: The table contains differences in log daily wages within skill groups between the respective
percentiles based on the wage values from table 4.12.
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Table 4.17: Earnings and Misreports – Mincer-type Earnings Regression
(Tobit)
IP1 IP2A IP2B IP3
ND -0.120 (0.003) -0.120 (0.003) -0.119 (0.003) -0.117 (0.003)
HS -0.032 (0.020) -0.039 (0.018) -0.034 (0.018) -0.017 (0.019)
HSVT 0.085 (0.005) 0.103 (0.006) 0.101 (0.006) 0.086 (0.005)
TC 0.244 (0.005) 0.253 (0.005) 0.252 (0.005) 0.250 (0.005)
UD 0.324 (0.005) 0.340 (0.005) 0.339 (0.005) 0.328 (0.005)
age/10 0.171 (0.005) 0.165 (0.005) 0.169 (0.005) 0.169 (0.005)
age sq/100 -0.012 (0.001) -0.012 (0.001) -0.012 (0.001) -0.012 (0.001)
reportmiss -0.120 (0.004) -0.106 (0.005) -0.112 (0.004) -0.120 (0.004)
underreport -0.110 (0.003) -0.106 (0.004) -0.104 (0.004) -0.116 (0.003)
overreport -0.181 (0.012) -0.211 (0.017) 0.008 (0.020)
foreign -0.068 (0.003) -0.065 (0.003) -0.067 (0.003) -0.068 (0.003)
farmer -0.217 (0.009) -0.216 (0.009) -0.217 (0.009) -0.215 (0.009)
service worker -0.047 (0.006) -0.044 (0.006) -0.047 (0.006) -0.046 (0.006)
sales worker 0.165 (0.005) 0.165 (0.005) 0.165 (0.005) 0.165 (0.005)
clerical worker 0.229 (0.003) 0.227 (0.003) 0.227 (0.003) 0.230 (0.003)
admin worker 0.282 (0.003) 0.279 (0.003) 0.280 (0.003) 0.282 (0.003)
agriculture -0.014 (0.005) -0.013 (0.005) -0.014 (0.005) -0.013 (0.005)
basic industry 0.012 (0.003) 0.013 (0.003) 0.013 (0.003) 0.013 (0.003)
consumer goods -0.089 (0.003) -0.087 (0.003) -0.088 (0.003) -0.088 (0.003)
food industry -0.112 (0.005) -0.111 (0.005) -0.111 (0.005) -0.112 (0.005)
main construction -0.039 (0.003) -0.039 (0.003) -0.038 (0.003) -0.039 (0.003)
constr completion -0.125 (0.004) -0.124 (0.004) -0.124 (0.004) -0.123 (0.004)
trade -0.178 (0.003) -0.177 (0.003) -0.177 (0.003) -0.178 (0.003)
transport & comm -0.140 (0.004) -0.138 (0.004) -0.138 (0.004) -0.139 (0.004)
business services -0.118 (0.004) -0.117 (0.004) -0.118 (0.004) -0.119 (0.004)
consumer services -0.359 (0.009) -0.350 (0.009) -0.357 (0.009) -0.359 (0.009)
education -0.198 (0.004) -0.198 (0.004) -0.199 (0.004) -0.198 (0.004)
public admin -0.182 (0.004) -0.182 (0.004) -0.182 (0.004) -0.183 (0.004)
intercept 4.660 (0.009) 4.664 (0.009) 4.664 (0.009)
lnsigma -1.217 (0.004) -1.225 (0.004) -1.220 (0.004) -1.218 (0.004)
N 153,431 151,769 153,199 152,258
censored 17,302 17,228 17,294 17,162
Notes: Dependent variable: log daily wage, which is right censored at the social security threshold.
Men in West Germany working fulltime 1995, no apprentices. The omitted education is VT, omit-
ted occupation salaried employee and omitted industry investment goods industry. Spells weighted
with their length. Robust standard errors clustered at the person level are in parentheses. report-
miss, underreport and overreport are defined in comparison to the original data. No overreport for
IP1 since this procedure assumes there are no overreports for persons over 17 years.
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Table 4.18: Probit Regression of Underreport Compared to IP2A
Regressors Marg eff Robust SE Regressors Marg eff Robust SE
≤19 years -0.048 (0.000)** 1-2 reports by empl 0.037 (0.001)**
30-39 years 0.015 (0.001)** 3-5 reports by empl 0.020 (0.001)**
40-49 years 0.007 (0.001)** spell≤30 days 0.016 (0.001)**
50-59 years -0.005 (0.001)** 30<spell≤180 days 0.011 (0.000)**
60+ years -0.017 (0.001)** year 75 -0.037 (0.000)**
female -0.007 (0.001)** year 76 -0.034 (0.000)**
married -0.003 (0.000)** year 77 -0.029 (0.000)**
foreign -0.020 (0.001)** year 78 -0.022 (0.000)**
trainee 0.029 (0.001)** year 79 -0.016 (0.000)**
non-skilled worker 0.057 (0.001)** year 80 -0.012 (0.000)**
skilled worker -0.028 (0.001)** year 81 -0.008 (0.000)**
master craftsman/foreman -0.024 (0.001)** year 82 -0.006 (0.000)**
home worker 0.042 (0.008)** year 83 -0.005 (0.000)**
part time ≤18h 0.023 (0.003)** year 84 -0.002 (0.000)**
part time >18h 0.012 (0.001)** year 86 0.001 (0.000)*
farmers/farm managers 0.012 (0.002)** year 87 0.002 (0.000)**
service workers -0.002 (0.001)* year 88 0.003 (0.000)**
sales workers -0.007 (0.001)** year 89 0.004 (0.001)**
clerical workers -0.002 (0.001) year 90 0.005 (0.001)**
admin/profes/techn staff -0.000 (0.001) year 91 0.005 (0.001)**
agriculture -0.006 (0.002)** year 92 0.005 (0.001)**
basic industry -0.002 (0.001) year 93 0.005 (0.001)**
consumer goods industry 0.006 (0.001)** year 94 0.004 (0.001)**
food industry -0.002 (0.001) year 95 0.003 (0.001)**
main construction trade 0.026 (0.002)** year 96 0.001 (0.001)
construction completion trade 0.002 (0.002) year 97 -0.001 (0.001)
trade 0.006 (0.001)**
transport and communication -0.003 (0.001)*
business services 0.007 (0.001)**
consumer services 0.003 (0.001)
education, non profit org 0.002 (0.001)
public administration -0.002 (0.001)
observed Prob 0.060
predicted Prob at x¯ 0.047
N 6,352,330
Pseudo R2 0.078
Notes: Dependent variable: dummy for reported education lower than imputed education (IP2A).
Estimation based on all employment spells in West Germany. Base category: 20-29 years, male,
not married, German, working fulltime as a salaried employee, occupation group operatives/craft,
investment goods industry, more than five reports by the employer about the employee, spell longer
than 180 days, 1985. Intercept included in estimation. Robust standard errors with clustering at
the person level. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.
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Appendix A
Additional Appendix to Chapter 1
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A.1 Estimation Results for the Propensity Score
A.1.1 Sample Sizes and Variable Definitions
Sample Sizes
Cohort 86/87
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Waiting 20,153 9,440 6,364
PF 74 60 69
SPST 503 257 176
RT 172 101 71
Cohort 93/94
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Waiting 24,223 13,751 9,244
PF 102 102 86
SPST 528 481 669
RT 198 138 106
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Variable Definitions
Table A.1: Variable Definitions
Label Definition
Personal Attributes
aXXYY Age at start of unemployment ≥XX and ≤ YY
age Age at start of unemployment
female Female
foreign No German citizenship
kids Has dependent children
married Married
qual u No vocational training degree
qual l No vocational training degree or education information miss-
ing
qual m Vocational training degree
qual h University/College degree
Last Employment
BER1 Apprentice
BER2 Blue Collar Worker
BER3 White Collar Worker
BER4 Worker at home with low hours or BER missing
BER5 Part–time working
pearn Daily earnings ≥ 15 Euro per day in 1995 Euro
earncens Earnings censored at social security taxation threshold
earn Daily earnings if pearn=1 and earncens=0, otherwise zero
logearn log(earn) if pearn=1 and earncens=0, otherwise zero
logearnsq logearn squared
earnp90 Daily earnings above 90th percentile
Last Employer
industry1 Agriculture
industry2 Basic materials
industry3 Metal, vehicles, electronics
industry4 Light industry
industry5 Construction
industry6 Production oriented services, trade, banking
<continued on next page>
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions <continued>
Label Definition
industry7 Consumer oriented services, organization and social services
frmsize1 Firm Size (employment) missing or ≤ 10
frmsize2 Firm Size (employment) > 10 and ≤ 200
frmsize3 Firm Size (employment) > 200 and ≤ 500
frmsize4 Firm Size (employment) > 500
Employment and Program History
preexM Employed M (M=6, 12, 24) month before unemployment
starts
preex60cumst Number of months employed in the last 60 months before
unemployment starts, standardized
preex60sq preex60cumst squared
pretxY Participation in any ALMP program reported in our data in
year(s) Y (Y=1, 2, 3–5) before unemployment starts
Regional Information
state6 Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg
state7 Niedersachsen-Bremen
state8 Nordrhein-Westfalen
state9 Hessen
state10 Rheinland-Pfalz/ Saarland
state11 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
state12 Bayern
denst population density (standardized)
densq denst squared
R1 Population density <100 inhabitants per square kilometer,
Rural area
R2 Population density ≥100 and < 150, Medium population den-
sity
R3 Population density ≥150 and < 400, Dense area
R4 Population density ≥400, Metropolitan area
ur Unemployment rate at district level (Kreis), 80s
ursq ur squared
urtb Unemployment rate at district level (Kreis), 90s
<continued on next page>
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions <continued>
Label Definition
urtbsq urtb squared
urtb100 urtb/100
Calendar Time of Entry into Unemployment
tnull First unemployment month (months counted from January
1960)
uentry First unemployment month (months counted from January
1986 (1993) in the 80s (90s))
uentry2 uentry squared
yYY Unemployment begins in year YY
qQ Unemployment begins in quarter Q of the year
yYYqQ Unemployment begins in quarter Q of year YY
Interaction of Variables
f female
for foreign
All variables are defined at the time of entry into unemployment and constant during the unem-
ployment spell.
A.1.2 Results of Propensity Score Estimations and Balanc-
ing Tests
Remark: The propensity score tables show the estimated coefficients of the probit
regressions of the conditional probability to participate in the first of the two treat-
ments mentioned in the header. The estimations are carried out separately for each
time window of elapsed unemployment duration (Stratum 1, 2, and 3). Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ means significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively, in a two–sided test. Each probit table is followed by a table indicating
how many regressors pass the Smith/Todd (2005) balancing test at different signifi-
cance levels using a cubic and a quartic of the propensity score, respectively. Graphs
with the densities of the propensity scores are in the next subsection.
175
Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment PF vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
state10 0.327 (0.140)∗∗
state79 0.479 (0.090)∗∗∗
a2529 0.362 (0.315)
a2534 0.104 (0.197)
a3034 -0.073 (0.124) 0.829 (0.307)∗∗∗
a3539 -0.020 (0.136) 0.050 (0.233)
a3544 0.734 (0.333)∗∗
a4044 -0.129 (0.154) 0.107 (0.239)
a4549 -0.070 (0.141) 0.240 (0.223) 0.487 (0.267)∗
a5055 -0.308 (0.177)∗
ur 0.094 (0.067) 0.149 (0.085)∗ 0.265 (0.095)∗∗∗
ursq -0.005 (0.003)∗ -0.007 (0.004)∗ -0.011 (0.004)∗∗∗
densq 0.094 (0.042)∗∗
denst -0.183 (0.081)∗∗
earn -0.021 (0.009)∗∗
f BER3 0.191 (0.198)
f a3034 0.546 (0.218)∗∗
f a3539 0.439 (0.306)
f a3544 0.355 (0.200)∗
f preex60cumst -0.089 (0.090)
female -0.388 (0.126)∗∗∗ -0.709 (0.202)∗∗∗ -0.468 (0.117)∗∗∗
frmsize23 0.211 (0.089)∗∗ 0.148 (0.116)
frmsize4 0.273 (0.154)∗
logearn 0.018 (0.071) 0.038 (0.066)
logearnsq 0.099 (0.048)∗∗
married -0.218 (0.107)∗∗
pearn -0.374 (0.384)
preex12 -0.305 (0.130)∗∗
preex24 0.205 (0.117)∗ -0.181 (0.098)∗
preex60cumst -0.063 (0.057) 0.189 (0.073)∗∗∗
preex60sq 0.084 (0.037)∗∗ 0.113 (0.043)∗∗∗
pretx1 -0.423 (0.281)
pretx2 0.652 (0.208)∗∗∗
pretx35 -0.232 (0.206)
qual l -0.528 (0.334)
qual l a2539 0.866 (0.356)∗∗
qual m a3544 0.088 (0.189)
qual m a4555 0.036 (0.263)
uentry 0.036 (0.028) 0.010 (0.007)
uentry2 -0.002 (0.001)
y86q2 0.705 (0.317)∗∗
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Propensity Score Estimates, PF vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87 – continued
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
y86q34 0.779 (0.290)∗∗∗
y87q1 0.812 (0.292)∗∗∗
y87q2 0.926 (0.303)∗∗∗
y87q3 1.050 (0.295)∗∗∗
y87q4 0.848 (0.296)∗∗∗
cons -3.935 (0.535)∗∗∗ -3.496 (0.555)∗∗∗ -4.605 (0.677)∗∗∗
N 20227 9500 6433
Balancing Tests, Treatment PF vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 21 22 23 23
Stratum 2 16 17 17 18
Stratum 3 16 21 21 22
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 15 17 17 23
Stratum 2 15 15 16 18
Stratum 3 12 14 17 22
Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment SPST vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER1 -0.003 (0.194)
BER2 -0.067 (0.126) -0.117 (0.121)
BER3 0.302 (0.054)∗∗∗ 0.275 (0.170) 0.202 (0.112)∗
BER3 a2539 -0.120 (0.127)
industry3 0.317 (0.065)∗∗∗ 0.163 (0.146)
industry4 0.098 (0.080) 0.081 (0.160)
industry5 -0.161 (0.076)∗∗
industry6 0.230 (0.050)∗∗∗ 0.112 (0.129)
industry7 0.014 (0.132)
a2529 0.404 (0.091)∗∗∗ 1.075 (0.235)∗∗∗
a3034 0.382 (0.094)∗∗∗ -0.030 (0.102) 1.192 (0.236)∗∗∗
a3539 0.445 (0.096)∗∗∗ 0.110 (0.226)
a3544 0.814 (0.256)∗∗∗
a4044 0.213 (0.118)∗ -0.096 (0.231)
a4549 0.233 (0.103)∗∗ -0.023 (0.238) 0.727 (0.191)∗∗∗
a5055 -0.504 (0.248)∗∗
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Propensity Score Estimates, SPST vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87 – continued
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
ur 0.134 (0.059)∗∗
ursq -0.006 (0.003)∗∗
denst 0.038 (0.034)
earncens 0.372 (0.232) 0.624 (0.240)∗∗∗
f BER2 -0.292 (0.094)∗∗∗
f BER3 0.063 (0.134)
f industry7 -0.224 (0.095)∗∗
f a2529 -0.069 (0.126)
f a3544 0.101 (0.168)
f a4044 0.355 (0.125)∗∗∗
f a4555 0.626 (0.205)∗∗∗
female 0.105 (0.056)∗ 0.012 (0.113) -0.217 (0.100)∗∗
for age -0.009 (0.003)∗∗∗
foreign -0.109 (0.083) -0.327 (0.142)∗∗
logearn 0.107 (0.044)∗∗
logearnsq 0.032 (0.010)∗∗∗
m industry5 -0.755 (0.293)∗∗∗
married -0.120 (0.042)∗∗∗ -0.191 (0.059)∗∗∗ -0.238 (0.073)∗∗∗
preex12 0.129 (0.049)∗∗∗
preex60cumst -0.045 (0.022)∗∗ -0.033 (0.029)
preex60sq 0.002 (0.033)
preex60sq a3544 0.125 (0.039)∗∗∗ 0.145 (0.056)∗∗∗
pretx1 0.204 (0.096)∗∗ 0.235 (0.122)∗ 0.372 (0.150)∗∗
pretx2 0.071 (0.095)
pretx35 0.066 (0.072)
qual h 0.277 (0.108)∗∗ 0.387 (0.196)∗∗
qual h a3544 -0.224 (0.299)
qual h a4555 0.252 (0.349)
qual m 0.261 (0.072)∗∗∗ 0.316 (0.143)∗∗
qual m a3544 -0.224 (0.208)
qual m a4555 0.077 (0.240)
uentry 0.024 (0.010)∗∗
uentry2 -0.001 (0.000)∗ -0 (0.000)∗∗∗
y86q2 -0.267 (0.141)∗
y86q3 -0.046 (0.127)
y86q4 -0.120 (0.131)
y87q1 -0.245 (0.134)∗
y87q2 -0.188 (0.134)
y87q3 -0.399 (0.146)∗∗∗
y87q4 -0.016 (0.124)
cons -3.345 (0.213)∗∗∗ -2.508 (0.233)∗∗∗ -3.316 (0.419)∗∗∗
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Propensity Score Estimates, SPST vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87 – continued
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
N 20656 9697 6540
Balancing Tests, Treatment SPST vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 24 26 26 27
Stratum 2 20 25 26 26
Stratum 3 24 27 27 29
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 19 23 25 27
Stratum 2 19 21 24 26
Stratum 3 20 22 23 29
Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment RT vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER3 -0.099 (0.121)
state10 -0.074 (0.128) -0.275 (0.186)
state11 0.081 (0.101) -0.088 (0.140)
state12 -0.245 (0.149)∗
state6 0.026 (0.132) -0.030 (0.183)
state612 -0.175 (0.086)∗∗
state7 -0.089 (0.099) -0.141 (0.128)
state710 0.347 (0.108)∗∗∗
state9 0.200 (0.100)∗∗ 0.077 (0.139)
a2529 0.837 (0.146)∗∗∗ 0.994 (0.301)∗∗∗
a2534 0.760 (0.356)∗∗
a3034 0.848 (0.150)∗∗∗ 1.062 (0.303)∗∗∗
a3539 0.666 (0.320)∗∗ 0.669 (0.425)
a3544 0.658 (0.151)∗∗∗
a4044 0.682 (0.326)∗∗ 0.400 (0.431)
a4549 0.449 (0.339)
densq -0.036 (0.029) -0.170 (0.077)∗∗
denst 0.110 (0.049)∗∗ 0.119 (0.072)∗ 0.061 (0.047)
f densq 0.072 (0.080)
f preex60cumst -0.137 (0.076)∗
f qual h 0.341 (0.144)∗∗
f uentry 0.009 (0.014)
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Propensity Score Estimates, RT vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87 – continued
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
female -0.112 (0.070) -0.585 (0.219)∗∗∗ -0.196 (0.196)
foreign -0.340 (0.130)∗∗∗ -0.577 (0.205)∗∗∗ -0.209 (0.188)
logearn 0.074 (0.061) 0.061 (0.055)
logearnsq 0.028 (0.017)∗
m BER2 -0.420 (0.207)∗∗
m BER3 -0.318 (0.228)
pearn -0.290 (0.329) -0.633 (0.355)∗
preex12 0.147 (0.073)∗∗
preex60cumst -0.150 (0.035)∗∗∗ -0.114 (0.064)∗
preex60cumst a2534 -0.072 (0.055)
preex60cumst a3544 0.164 (0.066)∗∗ 0.233 (0.104)∗∗ -0.018 (0.079)
preex60sq -0.061 (0.039)
pretx1 0.267 (0.118)∗∗
qual h 0.156 (0.263)
qual h a3544 0.587 (0.422)
qual m -0.138 (0.453)
qual m a2534 0.316 (0.472)
qual m a3544 0.423 (0.526)
uentry -0.003 (0.006) 0.001 (0.010)
y86q2 0.362 (0.147)∗∗
y86q23 0.155 (0.120)
y86q4 0.208 (0.125)∗
y87q1 0.192 (0.119)
y87q2 0.235 (0.136)∗
y87q3 0.371 (0.124)∗∗∗
y87q4 0.342 (0.119)∗∗∗
cons -3.308 (0.292)∗∗∗ -2.609 (0.411)∗∗∗ -2.950 (0.441)∗∗∗
N 20325 9541 6435
Balancing Tests, Treatment RT vs Waiting, Cohort 86/87
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 24 24 24 25
Stratum 2 19 22 23 24
Stratum 3 18 20 20 21
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 15 19 22 25
Stratum 2 11 12 15 24
Stratum 3 13 14 17 21
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Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment PF vs SPST, Cohort 86/87
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
R1 0.528 (0.226)∗∗
a2534 -0.197 (0.147)
densq 0.134 (0.078)∗
denst -0.304 (0.139)∗∗
f BER3 -0.621 (0.275)∗∗
f preex6 -1.006 (0.390)∗∗∗
f preex60sq -0.261 (0.129)∗∗
f tnull 0.037 (0.011)∗∗∗
female 1.510 (0.741)∗∗ -0.868 (0.200)∗∗∗
foreign 0.437 (0.256)∗ 0.691 (0.318)∗∗
logearn 0.729 (0.330)∗∗ 1.170 (0.446)∗∗∗
logearnsq -0.181 (0.069)∗∗∗ -0.066 (0.034)∗∗ -0.232 (0.086)∗∗∗
m logearn 0.301 (0.189)
m tnull 0.039 (0.012)∗∗∗
preex6 -0.342 (0.167)∗∗
qual mh -0.753 (0.235)∗∗∗
qual u 0.651 (0.227)∗∗∗
tnull 0.014 (0.013)
cons -13.225 (3.797)∗∗∗ -4.685 (4.442) -1.449 (0.647)∗∗
N 577 317 245
Balancing Tests, Treatment PF vs SPST, Cohort 86/87
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 8 9 9 9
Stratum 2 8 8 8 8
Stratum 3 5 5 6 6
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 8 9 9 9
Stratum 2 8 8 8 8
Stratum 3 6 6 6 6
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Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment PF vs RT, Cohort 86/87
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
state10 0.831 (0.335)∗∗
state12 0.580 (0.299)∗
state7 0.868 (0.266)∗∗∗
state9 0.634 (0.270)∗∗
industry7 -0.707 (0.275)∗∗
a2529 -1.428 (0.418)∗∗∗ -1.199 (0.326)∗∗∗
a3034 -1.033 (0.410)∗∗ -0.616 (0.318)∗
a3539 -0.592 (0.473) -0.663 (0.349)∗
a4044 -0.822 (0.543)
ur100 30.948 (21.463)
ursq -141.761 (95.828)
densq 0.103 (0.099) 0.352 (0.147)∗∗
denst -0.221 (0.157) -0.524 (0.187)∗∗∗
f a2534 -1.197 (0.386)∗∗∗
f preex12 -0.317 (0.489)
f preex24 0.924 (0.546)∗
female -1.041 (0.705) -0.544 (0.239)∗∗
foreign 1.455 (0.437)∗∗∗
m a2534 -1.121 (0.376)∗∗∗
m a3544 -0.868 (0.403)∗∗
married -0.356 (0.237)
tnull 0.007 (0.015)
cons -2.379 (4.870) 0.632 (0.411) -0.713 (1.168)
N 246 161 140
182
Balancing Tests, Treatment PF vs RT, Cohort 86/87
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 12 12 13 13
Stratum 2 8 8 9 9
Stratum 3 6 6 6 6
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 12 13 13 13
Stratum 2 8 8 9 9
Stratum 3 6 6 6 6
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Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment RT vs SPST, Cohort 86/87
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER2 0.327 (0.175)∗
BER3 -0.474 (0.118)∗∗∗
state1012 -0.450 (0.209)∗∗
a2529 1.051 (0.382)∗∗∗
a2534 1.004 (0.251)∗∗∗ 1.033 (0.263)∗∗∗
a3034 0.914 (0.393)∗∗
a3539 1.132 (0.406)∗∗∗
a3544 0.701 (0.265)∗∗∗ 0.392 (0.293)
a4044 0.759 (0.451)∗
densq -0.111 (0.053)∗∗ -0.119 (0.068)∗
denst 0.210 (0.086)∗∗
earnp90 -0.411 (0.265)
f preex60cumst -0.465 (0.162)∗∗∗
f preex60sq -0.269 (0.093)∗∗∗
preex60cumst -0.170 (0.070)∗∗
preex60sq -0.031 (0.053)
qual h -0.776 (0.330)∗∗
qual m -0.710 (0.229)∗∗∗
qual u 0.463 (0.185)∗∗
y87 0.299 (0.112)∗∗∗
cons -1.453 (0.267)∗∗∗ -0.372 (0.316) -1.624 (0.359)∗∗∗
N 675 358 247
Balancing Tests, Treatment RT vs SPST, Cohort 86/87
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 9 9 9 9
Stratum 2 8 9 9 9
Stratum 3 5 5 5 5
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 9 9 9 9
Stratum 2 8 9 9 9
Stratum 3 5 5 5 5
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Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment PF vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER2 0.225 (0.154) 0.192 (0.152) -0.157 (0.197)
BER3 0.275 (0.153)∗ 0.211 (0.156) -0.492 (0.241)∗∗
state10 0.216 (0.127)∗ 0.078 (0.186)
state1112 0.068 (0.143)
state67 0.367 (0.120)∗∗∗
state7 0.263 (0.101)∗∗∗ 0.259 (0.091)∗∗∗
state9 0.207 (0.108)∗ 0.085 (0.181)
industry6 -0.120 (0.126)
a3034 0.130 (0.104) -0.276 (0.122)∗∗
a3539 0.124 (0.114) 0.046 (0.110) 0.373 (0.129)∗∗∗
a4044 -0.075 (0.132) 0.368 (0.134)∗∗∗
a4049 0.274 (0.097)∗∗∗
a4549 -0.086 (0.139) 0.311 (0.147)∗∗
a5055 -0.304 (0.173)∗ -0.276 (0.138)∗∗ 0.071 (0.163)
urtb -0.015 (0.016) 0.275 (0.130)∗∗
urtbsq -0.013 (0.007)∗∗
densq 0.012 (0.034) 0.087 (0.040)∗∗
denst -0.013 (0.038) -0.074 (0.060) -0.211 (0.080)∗∗∗
f BER3 1.107 (0.260)∗∗∗
f industry6 0.338 (0.204)∗
f a4055 0.236 (0.156)
f a5055 0.518 (0.223)∗∗
f logearn 0.141 (0.128) 0.109 (0.111)
f qual m 0.670 (0.221)∗∗∗
f uentry 0.018 (0.010)∗
female -1.233 (0.559)∗∗ 0.014 (0.399) -0.977 (0.219)∗∗∗
foreign 0.070 (0.100) -0.202 (0.138)
logearnsq -0.009 (0.010) 0.004 (0.011)
m logearn 0.152 (0.089)∗
m pretx35 0.362 (0.137)∗∗∗
married -0.215 (0.097)∗∗
pearn -0.794 (0.420)∗
preex12 -0.171 (0.117)
preex24 0.119 (0.079)
preex60cumst -0.014 (0.041) 0.119 (0.058)∗∗
preex60sq -0.028 (0.046)
pretx35 0.240 (0.091)∗∗∗
qual m 0.205 (0.093)∗∗
uentry -0.007 (0.007) -0.012 (0.007)∗
y93q2 -0.251 (0.148)∗
y93q3 -0.065 (0.127)
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Propensity Score Estimates, PF vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94 – continued
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
y93q4 -0.162 (0.132)
y94q1 -0.117 (0.132)
y94q2 -0.175 (0.150)
y94q3 -0.125 (0.139)
y94q4 -0.319 (0.155)∗∗
cons -2.824 (0.264)∗∗∗ -2.391 (0.380)∗∗∗ -3.505 (0.686)∗∗∗
N 24325 13853 9330
Balancing Tests, Treatment PF vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 19 19 19 20
Stratum 2 23 24 25 25
Stratum 3 23 25 25 26
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 14 18 19 20
Stratum 2 17 17 19 25
Stratum 3 20 22 24 26
Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment SPST vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER1 0.481 (0.169)∗∗∗
BER2 -0.124 (0.073)∗ -0.088 (0.082) 0.039 (0.077)
BER3 0.270 (0.071)∗∗∗ 0.110 (0.083) 0.151 (0.080)∗
state10 0.199 (0.070)∗∗∗ 0.222 (0.085)∗∗∗
state11 -0.123 (0.063)∗ 0.031 (0.069)
state12 -0.027 (0.055) 0.096 (0.069)
state6 -0.047 (0.075) -0.003 (0.088)
state7 -0.100 (0.065) 0.021 (0.073)
state9 -0.118 (0.073) -0.128 (0.085)
industry3 0.147 (0.076)∗ -0.058 (0.086) 0.038 (0.080)
industry4 -0.010 (0.090) 0.076 (0.094) 0.007 (0.091)
industry5 -0.057 (0.094) -0.377 (0.120)∗∗∗ -0.223 (0.106)∗∗
industry6 0.073 (0.072) -0.003 (0.080) 0.026 (0.076)
industry7 -0.127 (0.079) -0.195 (0.088)∗∗ -0.085 (0.081)
a3034 0.019 (0.054) 0.097 (0.063) 0.155 (0.062)∗∗
a3539 -0.065 (0.069) 0.162 (0.068)∗∗ 0.189 (0.075)∗∗
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Propensity Score Estimates, SPST vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94 – continued
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
a4044 -0.483 (0.157)∗∗∗ -0.283 (0.119)∗∗
a4049 -0.085 (0.064)
a4549 -0.654 (0.162)∗∗∗ -0.482 (0.128)∗∗∗
a5055 -0.460 (0.082)∗∗∗ -0.891 (0.161)∗∗∗ -0.914 (0.128)∗∗∗
urtb -0.014 (0.008)∗
densq 0.036 (0.018)∗∗
denst -0.033 (0.037)
earncens 0.023 (0.190) 0.362 (0.335) -0.298 (0.306)
f industry5 0.851 (0.235)∗∗∗
f a2534 -0.192 (0.078)∗∗ -0.402 (0.107)∗∗∗
f a3544 -0.185 (0.109)∗
f for a2539 -0.181 (0.093)∗
f married -0.183 (0.066)∗∗∗
f qual h -0.623 (0.177)∗∗∗
f qual m -0.249 (0.086)∗∗∗
female 0.034 (0.058) 0.009 (0.081) 0.428 (0.118)∗∗∗
for a2534 -0.301 (0.098)∗∗∗
for a2539 -0.205 (0.084)∗∗
for a3544 -0.209 (0.119)∗
foreign -0.331 (0.062)∗∗∗
frmsize2 0.103 (0.046)∗∗
frmsize3 0.225 (0.068)∗∗∗
frmsize4 0.192 (0.064)∗∗∗
logearn -0.010 (0.036) 0.104 (0.070) -0.001 (0.063)
married -0.111 (0.047)∗∗
pearn -0.355 (0.319) 0.484 (0.306)
preex12 0.138 (0.049)∗∗∗ 0.087 (0.060)
preex60cumst 0.023 (0.030) 0.020 (0.025)
preex60sq 0.050 (0.025)∗∗ -0.028 (0.030)
pretx1 -0.033 (0.125) 0.105 (0.122)
pretx2 0.252 (0.097)∗∗∗ 0.021 (0.101)
pretx35 0.103 (0.068) 0.239 (0.063)∗∗∗
qual h 0.133 (0.114)
qual h a4055 0.578 (0.203)∗∗∗ 0.571 (0.169)∗∗∗
qual m -0.026 (0.073)
qual m a4055 0.571 (0.145)∗∗∗ 0.487 (0.104)∗∗∗
y93q2 0.109 (0.110) -0.011 (0.082)
y93q3 0.225 (0.103)∗∗ 0.058 (0.079)
y93q4 0.400 (0.098)∗∗∗ 0.104 (0.079)
y94q1 0.512 (0.096)∗∗∗ 0.124 (0.079)
y94q2 0.390 (0.055)∗∗∗ 0.507 (0.100)∗∗∗ 0.097 (0.084)
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Propensity Score Estimates, SPST vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94 – continued
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
y94q3 0.311 (0.056)∗∗∗ 0.567 (0.097)∗∗∗ 0.160 (0.081)∗∗
y94q4 0.409 (0.052)∗∗∗ 0.554 (0.097)∗∗∗ 0.021 (0.084)
cons -2.308 (0.168)∗∗∗ -2.229 (0.229)∗∗∗ -1.913 (0.241)∗∗∗
N 24751 14232 9913
Balancing Tests, Treatment SPST vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 29 30 30 31
Stratum 2 42 44 44 45
Stratum 3 33 37 37 37
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 29 30 30 31
Stratum 2 37 40 43 45
Stratum 3 34 36 36 37
Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment RT vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER2 0.312 (0.103)∗∗∗ 0.048 (0.124) 0.215 (0.145)
BER3 0.017 (0.107) 0.111 (0.127) 0.234 (0.152)
state11 -0.211 (0.106)∗∗
state1112 -0.174 (0.072)∗∗
state12 -0.210 (0.108)∗
industry3 -0.089 (0.108)
industry4 -0.096 (0.122)
industry5 -0.253 (0.129)∗
industry67 0.050 (0.092)
a2529 1.028 (0.188)∗∗∗ 0.424 (0.114)∗∗∗
a3034 -0.042 (0.069) 1.021 (0.181)∗∗∗ 0.605 (0.109)∗∗∗
a3539 0.811 (0.181)∗∗∗ 0.559 (0.119)∗∗∗
a3544 -0.556 (0.156)∗∗∗
a4044 0.612 (0.184)∗∗∗
a4549 -0.497 (0.135)∗∗∗
a5055 -0.822 (0.155)∗∗∗
urtb 0.019 (0.013)
denst -0.013 (0.030) -0.083 (0.035)∗∗
f age 0.016 (0.011)
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Propensity Score Estimates, RT vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94 – continued
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
f preex12 0.594 (0.197)∗∗∗
f preex60cumst -0.078 (0.055) -0.285 (0.081)∗∗∗
f qual m 0.331 (0.133)∗∗
female -0.216 (0.116)∗ -1.137 (0.397)∗∗∗
for age 0.015 (0.012) -0.009 (0.003)∗∗
foreign -0.951 (0.447)∗∗ -0.227 (0.115)∗∗
frmsize2 0.121 (0.068)∗
frmsize34 0.267 (0.078)∗∗∗
logearnsq 0.012 (0.010)
m preex60cumst -0.091 (0.047)∗
preex12 0.116 (0.072)
preex24 0.181 (0.078)∗∗
preex60cumst 0.071 (0.046) -0.043 (0.043)
pretx35 0.310 (0.103)∗∗∗
qual h -0.462 (0.209)∗∗
qual m -0.251 (0.086)∗∗∗
qual m a3544 0.462 (0.166)∗∗∗
uentry 0.015 (0.014) 0.012 (0.018)
uentry2 -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
y94q34 -0.260 (0.108)∗∗
cons -2.722 (0.216)∗∗∗ -3.049 (0.224)∗∗∗ -2.976 (0.196)∗∗∗
N 24421 13889 9350
Balancing Tests, Treatment RT vs Waiting, Cohort 93/94
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 25 26 26 27
Stratum 2 15 17 18 18
Stratum 3 8 10 10 10
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 23 23 25 27
Stratum 2 12 12 12 18
Stratum 3 7 9 10 10
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Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment PF vs SPST, Cohort 93/94
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER2 0.634 (0.204)∗∗∗
BER3 -0.708 (0.207)∗∗∗
state10 0.185 (0.248) -0.552 (0.329)∗
state11 -0.101 (0.274) -0.585 (0.260)∗∗
state12 0.232 (0.215) -0.033 (0.207)
state6 0.062 (0.283) 0.163 (0.267) 0.277 (0.207)
state7 0.743 (0.216)∗∗∗ 0.343 (0.212) 0.627 (0.162)∗∗∗
state9 0.665 (0.244)∗∗∗ 0.439 (0.252)∗
a2529 -0.356 (0.162)∗∗
a3034 -0.535 (0.245)∗∗
a3555 0.056 (0.165)
a4044 0.188 (0.174)
a4549 0.327 (0.203)
a5055 0.718 (0.194)∗∗∗
urtb100 -5.813 (2.990)∗
denst -0.222 (0.068)∗∗∗
f BER2 -0.303 (0.330)
f BER3 1.665 (0.340)∗∗∗
f a3034 -0.272 (0.411)
f logearn -2.979 (1.379)∗∗
f logearnsq 0.547 (0.195)∗∗∗
f preex12 -0.295 (0.312)
f preex24 0.196 (0.242)
f preex6 -0.063 (0.310)
f qual u -1.233 (0.455)∗∗∗
f tnull -0.006 (0.018)
female 0.671 (0.331)∗∗ 2.948 (2.640) -7.643 (8.579)
foreign 0.602 (0.201)∗∗∗
logearn 1.923 (1.307)
logearnsq -0.320 (0.170)∗
m tnull -0.023 (0.012)∗
preex60sq -0.175 (0.084)∗∗
qual u 0.523 (0.233)∗∗
y93q2 0.196 (0.271) -0.561 (0.317)∗
y93q3 0.208 (0.263)
y93q34 -0.458 (0.241)∗
y93q4 -0.118 (0.271)
y94q1 0.206 (0.269) -0.797 (0.267)∗∗∗
y94q2 -0.297 (0.255) -0.989 (0.292)∗∗∗
y94q3 -0.205 (0.249) -0.847 (0.269)∗∗∗
y94q4 -0.681 (0.268)∗∗ -1.246 (0.293)∗∗∗
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Propensity Score Estimates, PF vs SPST, Cohort 93/94 – continued
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
cons -0.853 (0.399)∗∗ -2.614 (2.603) 7.908 (4.722)∗
N 630 583 755
Balancing Tests, Treatment PF vs SPST, Cohort 93/94
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 24 24 24 24
Stratum 2 22 22 22 22
Stratum 3 10 10 10 10
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 23 24 24 24
Stratum 2 21 22 22 22
Stratum 3 7 9 10 10
Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment PF vs RT, Cohort 93/94
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER3 0.476 (0.197)∗∗ -0.540 (0.308)∗
state10 0.224 (0.440)
state11 0.323 (0.330) 0.061 (0.361)
state12 0.748 (0.246)∗∗∗ 0.698 (0.310)∗∗
state6 0.480 (0.340) 0.623 (0.360)∗
state7 0.615 (0.242)∗∗ 0.810 (0.275)∗∗∗
state9 0.844 (0.347)∗∗
state910 0.602 (0.247)∗∗
industry7 -0.724 (0.246)∗∗∗
a3034 -0.228 (0.257)
a3539 0.281 (0.228)
a3544 0.608 (0.239)∗∗
a4044 0.654 (0.224)∗∗∗
a4549 0.710 (0.408)∗ 1.763 (0.450)∗∗∗
a5055 0.412 (0.453) 2.046 (0.631)∗∗∗
f BER3 1.427 (0.481)∗∗∗
f BER34 1.923 (0.524)∗∗∗
f state10 -0.236 (1.087)
f state11 -0.768 (1.137)
f state12 0.781 (0.754)
f state6 0.054 (0.959)
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Propensity Score Estimates, PF vs RT, Cohort 93/94 – continued
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
f state7 0.448 (0.744)
f state9 0.206 (0.898)
f a3539 -0.410 (0.592)
f a4044 0.976 (0.536)∗
f a4055 1.568 (0.546)∗∗∗
f a4549 0.818 (0.652)
f married -0.503 (0.466)
f qual m 1.091 (0.487)∗∗
female -1.111 (0.481)∗∗ -0.804 (0.330)∗∗ -0.353 (0.926)
foreign 0.502 (0.307) 0.602 (0.276)∗∗
m BER25 1.370 (0.408)∗∗∗
m state10 0.971 (0.659)
m state11 0.165 (0.421)
m state12 -1.058 (0.642)∗
m state6 0.460 (0.501)
m state7 0.984 (0.407)∗∗
m state9 -0.066 (0.510)
m a3539 0.955 (0.351)∗∗∗
m a4055 2.325 (0.485)∗∗∗
m married -1.142 (0.384)∗∗∗
tnull -0.018 (0.015)
cons -1.212 (0.191)∗∗∗ 6.714 (5.956) -1.844 (0.511)∗∗∗
N 300 240 192
Balancing Tests, Treatment PF vs RT, Cohort 93/94
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 13 13 13 14
Stratum 2 14 16 17 17
Stratum 3 20 20 21 21
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 13 14 14 14
Stratum 2 15 17 17 17
Stratum 3 17 20 20 21
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Propensity Score Estimates, Treatment RT vs SPST, Cohort 93/94
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER2 0.808 (0.122)∗∗∗
state10 -0.512 (0.199)∗∗ -0.384 (0.234)
state11 -0.312 (0.186)∗ -0.338 (0.194)∗
state12 -0.404 (0.151)∗∗∗ -0.523 (0.185)∗∗∗
state79 0.278 (0.133)∗∗
a2529 1.612 (0.505)∗∗∗
a3034 1.511 (0.507)∗∗∗
a3539 -0.241 (0.154)
a3544 -0.323 (0.131)∗∗
a3549 1.046 (0.502)∗∗
a4044 -0.286 (0.169)∗
a4549 -0.725 (0.233)∗∗∗
a4555 -0.799 (0.196)∗∗∗
a5055 -0.896 (0.283)∗∗∗
f BER2 0.743 (0.242)∗∗∗ 0.473 (0.215)∗∗
f married -0.137 (0.179)
f preex60cumst -0.180 (0.117)
f qual m 0.382 (0.260)
f qual u -0.490 (0.297)∗
female 0.502 (0.163)∗∗∗ -0.893 (0.303)∗∗∗ -0.097 (0.164)
logearn 0.199 (0.127)
m married 0.360 (0.148)∗∗
m qual h -1.020 (0.359)∗∗∗
m qual m -0.303 (0.196)
married 0.354 (0.174)∗∗
marriedBER2 -0.302 (0.217)
pearn -0.658 (0.797)
qual h -0.458 (0.292)
qual u 0.521 (0.183)∗∗∗
y93q2 -0.187 (0.250) -0.427 (0.286)
y93q3 0.237 (0.218) -0.480 (0.265)∗
y93q4 -0.111 (0.224) -0.630 (0.250)∗∗
y94q1 0.084 (0.220) -0.567 (0.245)∗∗
y94q2 -0.215 (0.206) -0.602 (0.270)∗∗
y94q3 -0.289 (0.214) -0.933 (0.268)∗∗∗
y94q34 -0.340 (0.155)∗∗
y94q4 -0.481 (0.209)∗∗ -1.123 (0.270)∗∗∗
cons -0.900 (0.199)∗∗∗ -0.949 (0.545)∗ -1.088 (0.628)∗
N 726 619 775
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Balancing Tests, Treatment RT vs SPST, Cohort 93/94
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Cubic of Pscore
Stratum 1 20 20 20 20
Stratum 2 17 18 18 19
Stratum 3 10 11 11 11
Quartic of Pscore
Stratum 1 17 18 20 20
Stratum 2 17 18 19 19
Stratum 3 11 11 11 11
A.1.3 Common Support
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A.2 Background Information about the Data
Types of Further Training under the Labor Promotion Act
In this study we are interested in active labor market programs for unemployed
who have previously been employed and who have not already found a new job.
Here however, we want to give a short overview over the full set of training schemes
administered under the Labor Promotion Act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz, AFG).
Further Vocational Training (Berufliche Fortbildung)
A bunch of different training courses is subsumed under this heading. It includes
theoretical as well as practical training schemes within the occupation of the par-
ticipant.
Retraining (Umschulung)
This training scheme provides a complete, new vocational degree according to the
German apprenticeship system.
Short–term Training according to §41a AFG
These programs last only about four weeks and were offered from 1979 until 1992.
They are mainly intended to evaluate the participant’s problems in finding regular
employment. Starting 1993 such programs are no longer recorded as independent
programs but as part of the regular counseling for unemployed. Hence we can
not identify them in the inflow sample 1993/94. In order to make the samples
comparable we treat the programs according to §41a in the 1986/87 inflow sample
also as open unemployment. Thus if an unemployed first takes part in a §41a
program and later in the same unemployment spell in Retraining we would consider
the retraining the first program and evaluate it.
German Language Course (Deutschsprachlehrgang)
The German Language Courses are intended for newly arrived immigrants. So
the participants typically have not been employed in Germany before the German
Course and hence are not part of the focus group of this study, the previously
employed unemployed.
Career Advancement (Aufstiegsfo¨rderung)
These programs are typically targeted at the employed and have been more im-
portant when the Labor Promotion Act was introduced in 1969. By providing
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additional human capital the participant’s risk of becoming unemployed should be
lowered. Prime examples are courses in which the participants with a vocational
training degree obtain additional certificates which allow them to independently run
craftsman’s establishments and to train trainees in the dual system of vocational
training.
Integration Subsidy (Einarbeitungszuschuss)
Wage subsidies are paid for the employment of formerly long–term unemployed and
are intended to decrease the competitive disadvantage of these recruits for the period
of familiarization with the skill requirement of the job. Even if the target group of
wage subsidies are also unemployed we do not evaluate them because they require
a job for which the wage subsidy is paid. This means provision of wage subsidies
is already conditional on employment which is the success criteria for the other
programs.
Construction of the Monthly Panel
The IABS employment and LED benefit payment data are daily register data
whereas the FuU training data gives monthly information about program partic-
ipation. This study uses the merged data as described in Bender et al. (2005).
From the merged data we construct a monthly panel. If the original daily data con-
tain more than one spell overlapping a specific month we take the information from
the spell with the largest overlap as the spell defining the monthly information.
The defining condition to be part of our inflow sample into unemployment is a tran-
sition from an employment month to a nonemployment month, in which the last
employment month was between December 1985 (1992) and November 1986 (1993)
and thus the first unemployment month was between January 1986 (1993) and De-
cember 1987 (1994). In order to divide nonemployment (to be precise: not employed
subject to social security contributions) into unemployment and other states (like
labor market leavers, transition into self employment, employment as civil servant)
we additionally require a month with benefit payments from the employment office
within the first twelve month of nonemployment or indication of participation in
any labor market program in one of our data to be part of the inflow sample in
unemployment.
Later on we aggregate the information further from monthly to quarterly informa-
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tion. Whereas the monthly employment information is binary the quarterly employ-
ment information can take the values 0, 1/3, 2/3 or 1.
We identify program participation if a person starts a program while being in the
defining unemployment spell. The participant must not be employed in in the first
month of the program. Otherwise we would consider such a program as a program
which starts together with a job which we do not evaluate. In this case we would
treat such a person as being employed. The exact identification of the program
types will be explained in the following.
Identifying Program Participation from the Data
We identify participation in a further training program from a combination of FuU
training data information, the benefit payment information and the employment
status information. In principle, every participant in a further training program
should be recorded in the FuU training data and we would not need the benefit
payment data for identification of participation. There are two reasons to use the
benefit payment data as well. First, we find the training data to be incomplete,
many recipients of training related benefits are not contained in the training data.1
Only using the benefit payment data identifies these participants. Second, quite
often the type of training in the training data is given very unspecific as “Other
adjustment of working skills”. The benefit payment data can give more information
about these programs. Finally, we need the employment status to identify partic-
ipation because we only evaluate programs which start while being unemployed.
In particular we do not consider integration subsidies which are associated with a
regular job. We exclude programs starting together with a job because our outcome
variable is employment and program starts that are conditional on having found a
job are (partly) endogenous.
In the remaining part of this section we describe how we aggregated the benefit
payment information and the training data information. The next section contains
the exact coding plan. We disclose in detail which combination of information from
benefit payment and training data we identify as PF, SPST or RT.2
1Remember the purpose of the training data was only internal documentation. This might
explain its incompleteness.
2More details about the benefit payment data and training data can be found in Speckesser
(2004), Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007) and Bender et al. (2005).
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Benefit Payment Information in the LED–Data
The merged data we use contain three variables with benefit payment information
from the original LED data, (”parallel original benefit information 1–3” [Leistungsart
im Original 1–3 ] L1LA1, L2LA1, L3LA1). The main variable is L1LA1. If there
are two parallel payment informations in the original data L1LA2 also contains in-
formation and only if there is a third parallel payment spell L3LA1 is also filled. In
general we use L1LA1. Only if L1LA1 is not informative about program participa-
tion and L2LA1 is we use L2LA1 and only if L1LA1 and L2LA1 are not informative
but L3LA1 we use L3LA1. The benefit payment information is given in time vary-
ing three–digit codes (for the coding plan see Bender et al. 2005). We extracted
the program related information from the benefit payment information as given in
table B.20. The main distinction regarding program participation is the distinction
between no benefits at all or unemployment benefits/assistance on the one hand and
program related maintenance benefits on the other hand. There are five types of
program related benefits. Most important for us are the more general maintenance
benefits while in further training and the more specific maintenance benefits while
in retraining.
Table A.11: Aggregated types of benefit payment
German Abbreviation Description
ALG Unemployment benefits
ALHi Unemployment assistance
UHG §41a Income maintenance while in specific short term training program
UHG Fortbildung Income maintenance while in further training
UHG Umschulung Income maintenance while in retraining
UHG Darlehen Income maintenance as a loan
UHG Deutsch Income maintenance while in a German course
The original benefit payment information is given in three variables L1LA1, L2LA1 and L3LA1
with time varying three–digit codes.
Training Types in the FuU–Data
In this evaluation study one of the most important advantages compared to survey
data is the information about the precise type of training. It allows us to identify
homogeneous treatments for the evaluation. In the merging process, up to two
parallel FuU–spells were merged to one spell of the IABS data because in many
cases the FuU–data provided more than one parallel spell. These two parallel spells
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provide two variables indicating the type of course (Maßnahmeart [FMASART1,
FMASART2]).
Correcting Type of Training for 1986 The annual frequency for the type of
training 14 in 1986 looks very different than in the years before and after. Ad-
ditionally the distributions of the planned durations and the types of examination
completing the program 14 in 1986 are different than in the adjacent years. We
think this is due to a lacking recoding of 14 to 12, which was necessary for the
years until 1985 because the coding of FMASART changed over the years. Hence
we recode 14 to 12 in 1986 if the planned duration is less than 10 month.
Aggregating the training type information Since type of treatment (Maß-
nahmeart) is often coded as “other adjustment”
(FMASART1=12 [Sonstige Anpassungen]) in the FuU–data, we increase the preci-
sion of information about the type of treatment by relying on the second parallel
information about the type of training: The second FuU–spell is used if the first
FuU–spell is coded as “other adjustment” (“Sonstige Anpassungen”) and a second
spell includes a code different from 12. Such combined information of FMASART1
and FMASART2 is referred to as FMASART* in the following.
Combining the Information
When using information from different sources, the sources may give differing infor-
mation. If the training data indicated training participation and the benefit payment
data did not or vice versa we relied on the source which indicated training for the
following reasons. If somebody receives training related benefits it is more likely that
the employment agency forgot to fill in the training data record than the agency
wrongly induced payment of benefits. And if somebody is contained in the training
data but does not receive maintenance benefits he either receives no benefits, which
is possible while being in training, or receives unemployment benefits/assistance and
the payment is just wrongly labeled.
If both training and benefit payment data indicate program participation but differ
in the type of program we generally use the training data information. An exam-
ple: the benefit payment indicates maintenance payments for further training and
the training data indicates Retraining. We use Retraining from the training data.
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The only exception is unspecific program information from the training data “other
adjustment”. If in such cases the benefit payment data give specific information
like Retraining we use the information from benefit payment data. All possible
combinations of training and benefit payment information which we use to identify
participation in one of the three programs are given in the following section.
Coding Plan for the Treatment Information
This section gives the exact coding plans for identification of Practice Firm, SPST
and Retraining. In general we identify program participation as start of a program
in an unemployment spell before another employment begins. This means that we
only identify a start of a program if the employment status in the first month of the
program indicates no employment (BTYP=1).
Practice Firm
Practice Firm is a consolidation of the program types Practice enterprise and Prac-
tice studio from the FuU training data. There is no specific benefit payment type
related to Practice Firms, rather the participants shall receive the general main-
tenance payment for further training. Since the training data are more reliable
than the benefit payment data regarding type of the program we identify Practice
Firm whenever FMASART shows the codes 11 or 12 independently of the payment
information.
Program code Label Label in German
10 Practice enterprise U¨bungsfirma
11 Practice studio U¨bungswerkstatt
In table B.21 we show how often which combination of benefit payment information
and program type information identifies Practice Firm in the two inflow samples.
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Table A.12: Identification of Practice Firm with program type and benefit payment
type: Frequencies
Type of payment
No benefits UB/UA Income Maintenance for
Short–term Further Retraining
Program Training Training Total
Practice enterprise 4 5 1 198 2 210
Practice studio 11 19 0 311 20 361
Total 15 24 1 509 22 571
Both inflow samples together. BTYP=1 as an additional requirement.
Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques
We identify SPST in the following cases.
(a) Identification from training data and benefit payment data
We identify SPST if the training data indicates the general program “Other
adjustment” and the benefit payment information is no benefit payments,
unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance or maintenance payments
while in retraining.
Program
code
Label Label in German
12 Other adjustment of working skills sonst. Anpassung der berufl. Ken-
ntnisse
(b) Reliance on benefit payment data
We identify SPST if the program information from the training data is missing
and the benefit payment information is maintenance payments while in further
training.
Program
code
Label Label in German
-9 missing fehlende Angabe
(c) Additional program from training data
We also identify SPST when another program of little quantitative importance
but comparable content is recorded in the training data independent of the
benefit payment information.
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Program
code
Label Label in German
31 Further education of trainers and
multidisciplinary qualification
Heran-/Fortbildung v. Aus-
bildungskra¨ften/ berufs-
feldu¨bergreifende Qualifikation
(d) Additional combinatioin
Finally we identify SPST if the training data indicate the unspecific “other
career advancement” and the benefit payment information indicates further
training.
Program
code
Label Label in German
28 Other promotion sonstiger Aufstieg (< 97)
In table B.22 we show how often which combination of benefit payment information
and program type information identifies SPST in the two inflow samples.
Table A.13: Identification of SPST with program type and benefit payment type:
Frequencies
Type of payment
No benefits UB/UA Income
Maintenance for
Program further training Total
Missing 0 0 644 644
Other adjustment of working skills 57 89 2095 2241
Other promotion 0 0 150 150
Further education of trainers and
multidisciplinary qualification 0 1 1 2
Total 57 90 2890 3037
Both inflow samples together. BTYP=1 as an additional requirement.
Retraining
Retraining or longer “Qualification for the first labor market via the education sys-
tem” is taking part in a new vocational training and obtaining a new vocational
training degree according to the German dual education system. Additionally, but
quantitatively of little importance we see the make up of a missed examination “Cer-
tification” as comparable to retraining because the result is the same. Furthermore
and also only of marginal importance we see participation in the programs “Tech-
nican” or “Master of Business administration (not comparable to an american style
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MBA)” while not receiving maintenance benefits as a loan as Retraining. Conven-
tionally these two programs are considered as career advancement programs which
we do not evaluate. Benefits as a loan would underline their character as career
advancements.
(a) Identification from training data
We identify the following two programs as Retraining independent of the ben-
efit payment information.
Program
code
Label Label in German
29 Certification berufl. Abschlusspru¨fung
32 Retraining Umschulung
(b) Reliance on benefit payment data
If the training data is uninformative and maintenance benefits for Retraining
are paid we identify Retraining.
Program
code
Label Label in German
-9 missing fehlende Angabe
12 Other adjustment of working skills sonst. Anpassung der berufl. Ken-
ntnisse
(c) Other programs from training data
Two other programs are identified from the training data. They typically also
take two years full time and require an existing vocational training degree,
hence are somewhat comparable to retraining in a narrower definition. Not
identified if maintenance benefits are paid as a loan.
Program
code
Label Label in German
26 Technician Techniker (<97)
27 Master of business administration Betriebswirt (<97)
In table B.23 we show how often which combination of benefit payment information
and program type information identifies Retraining in the two inflow samples.
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Table A.14: Identification of Retraining with program type and benefit payment
type: Frequencies
Type of payment
No benefits UB/UA Income Maintenance
Program Further Training Retraining Loan Total
missing 0 0 0 110 0 110
Other adjustment of
working skills 0 0 0 65 0 65
Technician 2 1 5 2 0 10
Master of business
administration 0 2 1 1 0 4
Certification 4 1 20 7 0 32
Retraining 11 13 231 355 2 612
Total 17 17 257 540 2 833
Both inflow samples together. BTYP=1 as an additional requirement.
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B.1 Estimation Results for the Propensity Score
B.1.1 Sample Sizes and Variable Definitions
Sample Sizes by Stratum
Women
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Waiting 5783 (4652) 3855 (2996) 2294 (1671)
PF 37 51 48
SPST 254 374 435
RT 61 (61) 76 (75) 53 (53)
Men
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Waiting 5558 (4444) 2705 (2046) 1381 (997)
PF 40 15 14
SPST 200 141 144
RT 113 (107) 82 (79) 35 (33)
Remark: Numbers in Parentheses exclude the 51–55 year old. We use this further restricted
sample to evaluate RT. We do not evaluate PF for males in stratum 2 and 3 due to the
small sample size.
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Sample Sizes by Quarter
Quarter of Inflows Outflows controls share trt alternative alt share
unempl. Job PF SPST RT later controls trt later
Women
1 6135 621 12 119 33 5783 0.207 5971 0.232
2 5350 806 25 135 28 5162 0.232 5162 0.232
3 4356 582 28 206 42 3855 0.181 4080 0.226
4 3498 443 23 168 34 3273 0.213 3273 0.213
5 2830 408 21 157 31 2294 0.070 2621 0.186
6 2213 241 10 115 11 1886 0.085 2077 0.169
7 1836 155 10 99 7 1645 0.098 1720 0.137
8 1565 127 7 64 4 1490 0.108 1490 0.108
9+ 1363 1202 9 147 5 mean mean
0.175 0.206
Men
1 5911 1315 20 80 57 5558 0.087 5754 0.118
2 4439 1300 20 120 56 4243 0.114 4243 0.114
3 2943 729 10 84 52 2705 0.090 2797 0.120
4 2068 402 5 57 30 1976 0.123 1976 0.123
5 1574 272 4 52 23 1381 0.037 1495 0.110
6 1223 176 2 34 6 1109 0.046 1181 0.104
7 1005 102 3 29 3 933 0.055 970 0.091
8 868 68 5 29 3 831 0.061 831 0.061
9+ 763 712 4 43 4 mean mean
0.088 0.113
Remark: The table shows quarter by quarter of elapsed unemployment duration the number
of those who are still unemployed at the beginning of the quarter (inflows) and the number
of those who during the quarter start a job (job) or a treatment (PF, SPST, RT). Controls
are all those who are still unemployed at the beginning of the quarter but do not start a
treatment during the stratum. The share of the controls who start a treatment during a
later stratum is also given. An alternative definition of control persons (not pursued in the
paper) would take as controls all those, who are still unemployed at the beginning of the
quarter but do not start a treatment during the quarter. This would lead to a slightly higher
share of controls who receive treatment later. The means are weighted means. The table
considers the sample age 25–55 at the beginning of unemployment. The restricted version
age 25–50 for RT is available upon request from the authors. The number for outflows in
jobs in quarter 9+ include those, who never again start a job.
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Variable Definitions
Table B.1: Variable Definitions
Label Definition
Personal Attributes
aXXYY Age at start of unemployment ≥XX and ≤ YY
age Age at start of unemployment
married Married
qual l No vocational training degree or education information miss-
ing
qual m Vocational training degree
qual h University/College degree
Last Employment
BER1 Apprentice
BER2 Blue Collar Worker
BER3 White Collar Worker
BER4 Worker at home with low hours or BER missing
BER5 Part–time working
pearn Daily earnings ≥ 15 Euro per day in 1995 Euro
earnlow Daily earnings < 15 Euro per day in 1995 Euro
earncens Earnings censored at social security taxation threshold
earn Daily earnings
logearn log(earn) if pearn=1 and earncens=0, otherwise zero
Last Employer
industry1 Agriculture
industry2 Basic materials
industry3 Metal, vehicles, electronics
industry4 Light industry
industry5 Construction
industry6 Production oriented services, trade, banking
industry7 Consumer oriented services, organization and social services
frmsize1 Firm Size (employment) missing or ≤ 10
frmsize2 Firm Size (employment) > 10 and ≤ 200
frmsize3 Firm Size (employment) > 200 and ≤ 500
<continued on next page>
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Table B.1: Variable Definitions <continued>
Label Definition
frmsize4 Firm Size (employment) > 500
Employment and Program History
preexM Employed M (M=6, 12) month before unemployment starts
preex12cum Number of months employed in the last 12 months before
unemployment starts, standardized
pretx1 Participation in any ALMP program reported in our data in
the year before unemployment starts
Regional Information
state1 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
state2 Brandenburg
state3 Sachsen-Anhalt
state4 Sachsen
state5 Thu¨ringen
popdens population density (standardized)
Calendar Time of Entry into Unemployment
uentry First unemployment month (months counted from January
1993
Interaction of Variables / Functional Form
sq squared
interaction
All variables are defined at the time of entry into unemployment
and constant during the unemployment spell.
B.1.2 Summary Statistics
The following six tables document the mean values of the variables in the three
strata for women and men. The means are shown for the dynamic control group
and the participants in PF, SPST and RT, respectively. Since we restrict the age for
the evaluation of RT to lie between 25 and 50, we show the means for the dynamic
control group also for this more restricted group and for RT only for this age group.
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Table B.2: Women Stratum 1
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 40.088 36.886 40.757 39.819 33.689
married .59 .576 .514 .61 .738
qual l .108 .098 .081 .039 .066
qual m .843 .851 .892 .89 .869
qual h .049 .05 .027 .071 .066
BER1 .003 .004 0 0 0
BER2 .428 .425 .432 .252 .443
BER3 .391 .399 .405 .535 .393
BER4 .002 .002 0 0 0
BER5 .176 .171 .162 .213 .164
pearn .966 .967 .973 .996 1
earncens .004 .004 0 .004 0
logearn 3.447 3.445 3.521 3.647 3.657
industry1 .066 .064 .027 .047 .016
industry2 .047 .044 .027 .043 .115
industry3 .064 .064 .189 .075 .066
industry4 .074 .072 .081 .071 .033
industry5 .036 .038 .081 .035 .049
industry6 .264 .269 .162 .303 .18
industry7 .45 .45 .432 .425 .541
frmsize1 .229 .235 .081 .193 .18
frmsize2 .447 .447 .676 .433 .344
frmsize3 .152 .148 .189 .177 .213
frmsize4 .173 .169 .054 .197 .262
preex6 .842 .835 .784 .846 .934
preex12 .764 .747 .757 .827 .836
preex12cum 10.153 10.052 9.811 10.354 11.033
pretx1 .077 .083 .054 .031 .066
state1 .139 .144 .081 .154 .131
state2 .167 .169 0 .118 .246
state3 .209 .207 .162 .205 .115
state4 .304 .299 .216 .362 .377
Continued on next page...
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... table B.2 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
state5 .18 .179 .541 .161 .131
popdens 468.023 463.781 422.692 544.084 379.189
uentry 10.721 10.847 8.892 13 10.033
N 5783 4652 37 254 61
Table B.3: Women Stratum 2
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 40.777 37.183 41.176 38.623 33.12
married .587 .568 .667 .61 .627
qual l .133 .122 .039 .078 .08
qual m .828 .838 .863 .834 .893
qual h .039 .04 .098 .088 .027
BER1 .003 .003 0 .005 0
BER2 .432 .433 .353 .294 .427
BER3 .373 .378 .49 .559 .413
BER4 .002 .002 0 0 0
BER5 .191 .185 .157 .142 .16
pearn .963 .963 1 .979 1
earncens .003 .003 .02 .003 .013
logearn 3.427 3.419 3.562 3.593 3.609
industry1 .058 .058 0 .037 .053
industry2 .051 .048 .078 .029 .053
industry3 .061 .058 .098 .091 .08
industry4 .073 .073 .02 .056 .027
industry5 .038 .041 0 .027 .027
industry6 .261 .263 .294 .342 .32
industry7 .457 .459 .51 .417 .44
frmsize1 .222 .228 .176 .203 .173
frmsize2 .439 .439 .353 .428 .44
frmsize3 .156 .154 .235 .144 .16
Continued on next page...
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... table B.3 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
frmsize4 .182 .179 .235 .225 .227
preex6 .859 .85 .922 .832 .92
preex12 .793 .77 .784 .786 .867
preex12cum 10.374 10.242 10.843 10.257 11.027
pretx1 .072 .079 .059 .053 .08
state1 .135 .138 .157 .139 .227
state2 .172 .174 .02 .155 .147
state3 .216 .215 .333 .233 .147
state4 .292 .288 .275 .329 .36
state5 .185 .186 .216 .144 .12
popdens 466.479 461.806 520.108 561.464 392.724
uentry 10.321 10.433 8.157 13.024 11.733
N 3855 2996 51 374 75
Table B.4: Women Stratum 3
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 41.668 37.309 43.604 40.609 33.453
married .589 .57 .542 .591 .547
qual l .159 .147 .083 .099 .075
qual m .805 .814 .896 .857 .906
qual h .036 .038 .021 .044 .019
BER1 .003 .003 .021 0 0
BER2 .449 .454 .292 .368 .528
BER3 .341 .342 .583 .446 .434
BER4 .001 .002 0 .002 0
BER5 .206 .199 .104 .184 .038
pearn .959 .959 .938 .982 1
earncens .004 .003 0 .002 0
logearn 3.395 3.388 3.452 3.562 3.674
industry1 .06 .06 .042 .048 .038
Continued on next page...
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... table B.4 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
industry2 .051 .046 .125 .064 .075
industry3 .063 .059 .104 .057 .094
industry4 .075 .073 .042 .094 .075
industry5 .041 .045 0 .037 .038
industry6 .246 .247 .313 .308 .189
industry7 .464 .47 .375 .391 .491
frmsize1 .221 .23 .188 .152 .075
frmsize2 .436 .437 .438 .453 .396
frmsize3 .158 .151 .063 .182 .17
frmsize4 .185 .181 .313 .214 .358
preex6 .866 .855 .917 .906 .887
preex12 .804 .774 .813 .853 .849
preex12cum 10.448 10.284 10.979 10.906 10.755
pretx1 .06 .068 .083 .078 .057
state1 .121 .121 .229 .103 .189
state2 .167 .168 .021 .2 .094
state3 .228 .228 .229 .172 .208
state4 .289 .284 .333 .368 .226
state5 .195 .199 .188 .156 .283
popdens 453.54 451.059 642.06 559.151 534.315
uentry 10.242 10.373 9.458 9.874 6.755
N 2294 1671 48 435 53
Table B.5: Men Stratum 1
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 40.124 36.84 36.975 40.035 33.449
married .466 .435 .475 .56 .421
qual l .094 .089 .125 .06 .075
qual m .842 .851 .825 .75 .897
qual h .063 .059 .05 .19 .028
Continued on next page...
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... table B.5 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
BER1 .001 .002 .025 0 0
BER2 .794 .804 .85 .6 .86
BER3 .167 .161 .075 .34 .112
BER4 0 0 0 .005 0
BER5 .037 .033 .05 .055 .028
pearn .991 .991 1 .995 .991
earncens .015 .014 0 .03 0
logearn 3.647 3.649 3.72 3.711 3.727
industry1 .079 .074 .05 .05 .084
industry2 .072 .075 .075 .115 .103
industry3 .116 .113 .1 .165 .196
industry4 .056 .056 .05 .05 .065
industry5 .207 .227 .175 .115 .121
industry6 .221 .234 .15 .29 .262
industry7 .248 .222 .4 .215 .168
frmsize1 .255 .27 .175 .19 .131
frmsize2 .501 .503 .425 .49 .533
frmsize3 .12 .109 .1 .115 .121
frmsize4 .124 .118 .3 .205 .215
preex6 .845 .835 .875 .845 .869
preex12 .776 .761 .75 .87 .776
preex12cum 10.223 10.097 10.175 10.56 10.533
pretx1 .064 .069 .025 .03 .075
state1 .14 .141 .2 .2 .168
state2 .147 .152 .05 .13 .14
state3 .209 .213 .4 .165 .243
state4 .323 .319 .15 .35 .346
state5 .18 .175 .2 .155 .103
popdens 460.115 463.21 340.144 604.944 499.402
uentry 10.6 10.657 9.425 12.01 10.533
N 5558 4444 40 200 107
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Table B.6: Men Stratum 2
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 41.316 37.473 38.933 40.099 34.443
married .44 .396 .333 .44 .405
qual l .12 .118 .133 .078 .114
qual m .805 .812 .867 .801 .797
qual h .075 .07 0 .121 .089
BER1 .002 .002 0 0 0
BER2 .761 .771 1 .645 .823
BER3 .197 .19 0 .319 .165
BER4 0 0 0 0 0
BER5 .04 .037 0 .035 .013
pearn .988 .988 1 .993 1
earncens .019 .016 0 .021 .013
logearn 3.61 3.615 3.67 3.666 3.715
industry1 .06 .053 .2 .035 .051
industry2 .078 .081 0 .057 .089
industry3 .115 .107 .067 .128 .165
industry4 .053 .055 .133 .043 .076
industry5 .174 .195 .133 .149 .139
industry6 .23 .242 .133 .312 .241
industry7 .29 .266 .333 .277 .241
frmsize1 .229 .247 .133 .199 .19
frmsize2 .487 .489 .6 .447 .57
frmsize3 .131 .118 .2 .163 .139
frmsize4 .153 .146 .067 .191 .101
preex6 .839 .82 .867 .844 .886
preex12 .783 .761 .733 .787 .861
preex12cum 10.216 10.005 10.067 10.277 10.772
pretx1 .062 .07 .067 .043 .038
state1 .134 .135 .333 .113 .19
state2 .152 .157 0 .106 .114
state3 .232 .236 .333 .284 .177
state4 .308 .304 .133 .355 .304
Continued on next page...
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... table B.6 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
state5 .174 .167 .2 .142 .215
popdens 487.763 491.47 361.654 646.669 410.726
uentry 10.461 10.605 13.267 13.376 9.405
N 2705 2046 15 141 79
Table B.7: Men Stratum 3
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 42.142 37.872 41.929 42.201 34.364
married .433 .391 .5 .41 .333
qual l .125 .123 .071 .153 .242
qual m .791 .794 .929 .674 .727
qual h .084 .082 0 .174 .03
BER1 .001 .002 0 .007 0
BER2 .736 .741 .714 .611 .788
BER3 .218 .217 .286 .333 .182
BER4 0 0 0 0 0
BER5 .045 .04 0 .049 .03
pearn .986 .987 1 .986 .97
earncens .025 .022 0 .056 0
logearn 3.572 3.579 3.651 3.503 3.669
industry1 .056 .045 .071 .021 .03
industry2 .078 .077 .071 .069 .091
industry3 .122 .113 .143 .125 .091
industry4 .053 .06 .071 .035 .091
industry5 .152 .165 .071 .167 .182
industry6 .227 .237 .357 .236 .273
industry7 .311 .302 .214 .347 .242
frmsize1 .236 .259 .429 .16 .182
frmsize2 .461 .458 .5 .528 .455
frmsize3 .133 .116 0 .125 .182
Continued on next page...
220
... table B.7 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
frmsize4 .169 .166 .071 .188 .182
preex6 .857 .839 .857 .861 .788
preex12 .789 .767 .786 .819 .788
preex12cum 10.319 10.129 9.857 10.493 9.667
pretx1 .052 .055 .071 .063 .121
state1 .127 .128 .357 .146 .394
state2 .165 .176 0 .153 .061
state3 .217 .221 .214 .229 .333
state4 .322 .312 .071 .313 .091
state5 .169 .163 .357 .16 .121
popdens 508.681 505.011 311.301 555.184 460.436
uentry 10.345 10.395 10.5 10.833 8.758
N 1381 997 14 144 33
B.1.3 Results of Propensity Score Estimations and Balanc-
ing Tests
Remark: The propensity score tables show the estimated coefficients of the probit
regressions of the conditional probability to participate in the program mentioned
in the header against the alternative of not taking part in any program in the
stratum. The estimations are carried out separately for each time window of elapsed
unemployment duration (Stratum 1, 2, and 3). Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ means significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively, in a two–sided
test. Each probit table is followed by a table indicating how many regressors pass
the Smith/Todd (2005) balancing test at different significance levels using a cubic
and a quartic of the propensity score, respectively. Graphs with the densities of the
propensity scores are in the next subsection.
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Table B.8: Propensity Score Estimates Women Prac-
tice Firm
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
age 0.0669 (0.073) 0.0972 (0.065) 0.0615 (0.075)
age sq -0.000798 (0.00089) -0.00118 (0.00080) -0.000643 (0.00089)
married -0.221* (0.13) -0.169 (0.13)
qual l 0.254 (0.43)
qual m 0.255 (0.39)
BER2 -0.0267 (0.13) -0.0419 (0.20)
entglow 0.292 (0.55)
logearn sq 0.0298 (0.029) 0.0213 (0.018)
frmsize2 0.521*** (0.17)
frmsize3 0.457** (0.21)
state3 0.399* (0.24) 0.796** (0.36)
state4 0.337 (0.22) 0.707** (0.33) 0.840** (0.36)
state5 0.901*** (0.21) 0.779** (0.37)
BER3 married 0.193 (0.12)
preex12 -0.0887 (0.14) -0.0445 (0.16)
state1 0.801** (0.34) 1.084*** (0.37)
state35 0.870*** (0.32)
popdens 0.0436 (0.11)
popdens sq -0.0213 (0.064)
BER3 0.333* (0.19)
pearn -1.260* (0.74)
logearn 0.283 (0.19)
uentry sq -0.000311 (0.00040)
Constant -5.174*** (1.53) -5.103*** (1.36) -3.966** (1.56)
Observations 5820 3906 2342
PseudoR2 0.0977 0.0397 0.0685
Table B.10: Propensity Score Estimates Women SPST
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
a3034 0.0240 (0.11) 0.123 (0.098) 0.247** (0.11)
a3539 0.482* (0.26) 0.107 (0.10) -0.0693 (0.14)
a4044 0.523** (0.26) -0.0184 (0.10) 0.0334 (0.14)
a4549 0.124 (0.30) -0.223* (0.12) 0.0154 (0.14)
a5055 0.154 (0.30) -0.310*** (0.10) -0.288** (0.13)
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married -0.00535 (0.063) 0.0481 (0.059) -0.225** (0.11)
qual l -0.178* (0.10) -0.0439 (0.084) -0.199** (0.085)
BER2 -0.313*** (0.089) -0.0569 (0.088) -0.0701 (0.086)
BER3 -0.0116 (0.087) 0.250*** (0.089) 0.0820 (0.094)
logearn sq 0.0529*** (0.012)
earncens 0.510 (0.51) 0.842 (0.68) 0.822 (0.70)
state1 -0.0397 (0.094) -0.184* (0.10)
state2 -0.248** (0.098) 0.0280 (0.091)
state3 -0.0977 (0.085) -0.282*** (0.088)
state5 -0.152* (0.091) -0.214** (0.092)
uentry -0.0546*** (0.015) 0.113*** (0.017)
uentry sq 0.00324*** (0.00063) -0.00339*** (0.00069)
preex12 0.652*** (0.21)
preex12 a3544 -0.607** (0.29)
preex12 a4555 -0.748** (0.35)
preex12cum sq -0.0601 (0.071) 0.0410*** (0.015) 0.0333 (0.041)
preex12cum sq a3544 0.0320 (0.095)
preex12cum sq a4555 0.318*** (0.10)
preex12cum -0.244* (0.15) 0.168** (0.076)
preex12cum a3544 0.132 (0.20)
preex12cum a4555 0.636*** (0.24)
pretx1 -0.453*** (0.16) -0.286** (0.13) 0.333*** (0.12)
qual h 0.227* (0.13) -0.276 (0.17)
pearn -1.080*** (0.40) -0.765* (0.43)
logearn 0.350*** (0.10) 0.307*** (0.11)
industry3 0.364** (0.15) -0.153 (0.15)
industry4 0.0907 (0.16) 0.117 (0.14)
industry5 -0.149 (0.20) -0.102 (0.18)
industry67 0.112 (0.11)
industry6 0.0405 (0.11)
industry7 -0.175* (0.10)
frmsize2 0.247*** (0.087)
frmsize3 0.259** (0.11)
frmsize4 0.179* (0.11)
popdens 0.0718 (0.063)
popdens sq 0.00989 (0.037)
married a3544 0.318** (0.16)
married a4555 0.271* (0.15)
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Constant -2.601*** (0.25) -2.445*** (0.24) -1.346*** (0.25)
Observations 6037 4229 2729
PseudoR2 0.0742 0.0807 0.0550
Table B.12: Propensity Score Estimates Women RT
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
a2529 0.597*** (0.18) 1.106*** (0.37)
a3034 0.404** (0.18) 1.206*** (0.36)
a3539 0.0882 (0.21) 0.942** (0.37)
a4044 0.0421 (0.21) 0.818** (0.38)
married 0.377*** (0.12) 0.172 (0.11) -0.0573 (0.14)
qual l -0.159 (0.17) -0.116 (0.16) -0.731** (0.29)
qual h -0.0540 (0.25) -0.307 (0.32)
BER2 0.0616 (0.15) 0.592** (0.29)
BER3 -0.100 (0.17) 0.542* (0.30)
earn 0.0106** (0.0042) 0.0110*** (0.0038)
preex12cum 0.142** (0.064) 0.263* (0.14)
state1 0.211 (0.18)
state24 0.375*** (0.12)
uentry -0.0989*** (0.025) 0.133*** (0.033) -0.0368*** (0.013)
uentry sq 0.00431*** (0.0011) -0.00510*** (0.0014)
age 0.120 (0.10)
age sq -0.00243* (0.0015)
preex12cum sq 0.159* (0.082)
preex12cum sq a2539 -0.112* (0.066)
state2 -0.304* (0.18) -0.575** (0.26)
state3 -0.417** (0.18) -0.352 (0.22)
state4 -0.103 (0.15) -0.448** (0.22)
state5 -0.446** (0.19) -0.150 (0.21)
logearn sq 0.0538** (0.026)
frmsize4 0.376 (0.23)
frmsize4 uentry 0.00685 (0.022)
Constant -3.083*** (0.29) -4.104** (1.79) -3.394*** (0.56)
Observations 4713 3071 1724
PseudoR2 0.0950 0.117 0.162
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Table B.9: Balancing Tests Women Practice Firm
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 10 11 13 13
1 4 12 12 13 13
2 3 9 9 10 10
2 4 9 10 10 10
3 3 8 10 13 13
3 4 7 11 13 13
Table B.11: Balancing Tests Women SPST
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 23 24 26 27
1 4 23 24 27 27
2 3 20 20 21 21
2 4 19 21 21 21
3 3 29 29 32 32
3 4 30 31 32 32
Table B.13: Balancing Tests Women RT
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 13 14 14 15
1 4 9 10 14 15
2 3 14 14 15 15
2 4 11 13 15 15
3 3 14 14 16 16
3 4 14 15 16 16
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Table B.14: Propensity Score Estimates Men Practice
Firm
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1
age 0.0515 (0.067)
age sq -0.000821 (0.00085)
BER3 -0.231 (0.21)
earn -0.00313 (0.0050)
frmsize4 0.419*** (0.14)
state1 0.447** (0.18)
state3 0.490*** (0.16)
state5 0.363** (0.18)
uentry 0.0181 (0.030)
uentry sq -0.00119 (0.0013)
Constant -3.367*** (1.28)
Observations 5598
PseudoR2 0.0663
Table B.15: Balancing Tests Men Practice Firm
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 9 9 9 10
1 4 7 8 10 10
Table B.16: Propensity Score Estimates Men SPST
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
a2529 0.225 (0.15)
a3034 4044 0.476*** (0.10)
a3539 0.318** (0.15) 0.254 (0.19)
a4549 0.307** (0.12) -0.334 (0.26) 0.0794 (0.22)
married 0.133* (0.069) -0.0324 (0.087) -0.105 (0.097)
qual l -0.0892 (0.11) 0.0145 (0.11) 0.292 (0.22)
qual h 0.470*** (0.12) -0.104 (0.17) 0.438*** (0.16)
BER3 0.152 (0.096) 0.429* (0.24) 0.0447 (0.22)
logearn 0.128 (0.093) 0.0582 (0.096)
earncens 0.541 (0.43) 0.0931 (0.49)
industry6 0.0362 (0.088)
industry57 -0.208*** (0.078)
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frmsize2 0.163* (0.088) 0.275** (0.12)
frmsize3 0.148 (0.12) 0.154 (0.17)
frmsize4 0.356*** (0.11) 0.193 (0.15)
preex12 0.183 (0.12) -0.136 (0.12)
preex12cum sq 0.0195 (0.026) 0.0434 (0.033)
preex12 a4055 0.124 (0.10)
popdens 0.203*** (0.064)
popdens sq -0.104** (0.042)
uentry -0.0176 (0.016) 0.0954*** (0.026)
uentry sq 0.00145** (0.00068) -0.00260*** (0.00100)
a3039 0.000506 (0.14)
a4044 0.233 (0.15) 0.266 (0.20)
a5055 -0.674** (0.27) 0.227 (0.19)
BER2 0.0651 (0.22) -0.133 (0.21)
preex12 a4555 0.529** (0.26)
a3034 0.139 (0.18)
qual l a3544 -0.547* (0.33)
qual l a4555 -0.291 (0.29)
preex12cum sq a4055 -0.123** (0.061)
Constant -3.019*** (0.39) -2.551*** (0.42) -1.603*** (0.27)
Observations 5758 2846 1525
PseudoR2 0.0807 0.0567 0.0353
Table B.17: Balancing Tests Men SPST
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 17 20 22 22
1 4 17 20 22 22
2 3 14 14 15 15
2 4 11 13 15 15
3 3 15 15 17 17
3 4 13 14 17 17
Table B.18: Propensity Score Estimates Men RT
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
a2529 0.970*** (0.24) 0.843*** (0.22)
a3034 1.034*** (0.24) 0.683*** (0.22)
a3539 0.840*** (0.24) 0.684*** (0.22)
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a4044 0.651*** (0.25) 0.499** (0.22)
married 0.0561 (0.090) 0.0817 (0.11) 0.00675 (0.18)
qual l -0.174 (0.14) -0.193 (0.27) -0.179 (0.23)
qual h -0.604* (0.35) -0.244 (0.43)
logearn 0.0752 (0.092) 0.106 (0.15)
frmsize2 0.325*** (0.12)
frmsize3 0.377** (0.16)
frmsize4 0.511*** (0.15)
preex12 -0.303* (0.17) 0.213 (0.22)
preex12cum 0.352*** (0.13)
preex12cum sq 0.124** (0.056) -0.0654* (0.038)
state1 0.0417 (0.13) 1.031*** (0.27)
state2 -0.0132 (0.14) 0.0906 (0.36)
state3 0.0538 (0.12) 0.716*** (0.27)
state5 -0.290** (0.15) 0.380 (0.31)
popdens 0.250*** (0.089)
popdens sq -0.192*** (0.066)
uentry 0.00237 (0.0062) 0.0428 (0.029)
qual m -0.260 (0.24)
BER2 0.322 (0.41)
BER3 0.140 (0.43)
logearn sq 0.0196 (0.019)
uentry sq -0.00240* (0.0013)
age -0.0502 (0.13)
age sq 0.000270 (0.0017)
pretx1 0.530* (0.30)
Constant -3.085*** (0.44) -2.761*** (0.56) -1.474 (2.35)
Observations 4551 2125 1030
PseudoR2 0.0814 0.0509 0.118
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Table B.19: Balancing Tests Men RT
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 17 18 21 21
1 4 19 21 21 21
2 3 11 13 13 13
2 4 11 11 13 13
3 3 10 11 12 12
3 4 7 9 12 12
B.1.4 Common Support
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B.2 Background Information about the data
Other types of further training
In this study we are interested in active labor market programs for unemployed who
have previously been employed and who have not already found a new job. However,
we also want to give a short overview about other programs regulated by the labor
promotion act (AFG) which we do not evaluate.
German Courses
The German Courses are intended for newly arrived immigrants. So the participants
typically have not been employed in Germany before the German Course and hence
are not part of the focus group of this study, the previously employed unemployed.
Career Advancement
These programs are typical programs directed at the employed, which were more
important when the labor promotion act was introduced in 1969. By providing
additional human capital the participant’s risk of becoming unemployed should be
lowered. Prime examples are courses in which the participants with a vocational
training degree obtain additional certificates which allow them to independently run
craftsman’s establishments and to train trainees in the dual system of vocational
training.
Wage subsidies
Wage subsidies are paid for the employment of formerly long-term unemployed and
are intended to decrease the competitive disadvantage of these recruits for the period
of familiarization with the skill requirement of the job. Even if the target group of
wage subsidies are also unemployed we do not evaluate them because they require
a job for which the wage subsidy is paid. This means provision of wage subsidies
is already conditional on employment which is the success criteria for the other
programs.
Any program which starts together with a job
For the same reasons why we do not evaluate wage subsidies we also do not evaluate
any program which starts together with employment. Because we want to evalu-
ate the program’s effect on employment we do not consider programs which start
together with employment.
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Construction of the monthly panel
The IABS employment and LED benefit payment data are daily register data
whereas the FuU training data gives monthly information about program partic-
ipation. This study uses the merged data as described in Bender et al. (2005).
From the merged data we construct a monthly panel. If the original daily data con-
tain more than one spell overlapping a specific month we take the information from
the spell with the largest overlap as the spell defining the monthly information.
The defining condition to be part of our inflow sample into unemployment is a tran-
sition from an employment month to a nonemployment month, in which the last
employment month was between December 1992 and November 1993 and thus the
first unemployment month was between January 1993 and December 1994. In order
to divide nonemployment (to be precise: not employed subject to social security
contributions) into unemployment and other states (like labor market leavers, tran-
sition into self employment, employment as civil servant) we additionally require
a month with benefit payments from the employment office within the first twelve
month of nonemployment or indication of participation in any labor market program
in one of our data to be part of the inflow sample in unemployment.
Later on we aggregate the information further from monthly to quarterly informa-
tion. Whereas the monthly employment information is binary the quarterly employ-
ment information can take the values 0, 1/3, 2/3 or 1.
We identify program participation if a person starts a program while being in the
defining unemployment spell. The participant must not be employed in in the first
month of the program. Otherwise we would consider such a program as a program
which starts together with a job which we do not evaluate. In this case we would
treat such a person as being employed. The exact identification of the program
types will be explained in the following.
Identifying program participation
We identify participation in a further training program from a combination of FuU
training data information, the benefit payment information and the employment
status information. In principle, every participant in a further training program
should be recorded in the FuU training data and we would not need the benefit
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payment data for identification of participation. There are two reasons to use the
benfit payment data as well. First we find the training data to be incomplete, many
recipients of training related benefits are not contained in the training data.1 Only
using the benefit payment data identifies these participants. Second, quite often the
type of training in the training data is given very unspecific as “Other adjustment
of working skills”. The benefit payment data can give more information about these
programs. Finally we need the employment status to identify participation because
we only evaluate programs which start while being unemployed.
In the remaining part of this section we describe how we aggregate the benefit
payment information and the training data information. The next section contains
the exact coding plan. We disclose in detail which combination of information from
benefit payment and training data we identify as PF, SPST or RT.2
Benefit payment information from the LED-data
The merged data we use contain three variables with benefit payment information
from the original LED data, (”parallel original benefit information 1-3” [Leistungsart
im Original 1-3 ] L1LA1, L2LA1, L3LA1). The main variable is L1LA1. If there
are two parallel payment informations in the original data L1LA2 also contains in-
formation and only if there is a third parallel payment spell L3LA1 is also filled. In
general we use L1LA1. Only if L1LA1 is not informative about program participa-
tion and L2LA1 is we use L2LA1 and only if L1LA1 and L2LA1 are not informative
but L3LA1 we use L3LA1. The benefit payment information is given in time vary-
ing three-digit codes (for the coding plan see Bender et al. 2005). We extracted
the program related information from the benefit payment information as given in
table B.20. The main distinction regarding program participation is the distinction
between no benefits at all or unemployment benefits/assistance on the one hand and
program related maintenance benefits on the other hand. There are five types of
program related benefits. Most important for us are the more general maintenance
benefits while in further training and the more specific maintenance benefits while
in retraining.
1Remember the purpose of the training data was only internal documentation. This might
explain its incompleteness.
2More details about the benefit payment data and training data can be found in Speckesser
(2004), Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) and Bender et al. (2005).
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Table B.20: Aggregated types of benefit payment
German Abbreviation Description
ALG unemployment benefits
ALHi unemployment assistance
UHG §41a maintenance payment while in specific short term measure
UHG Fortbildung maintenance payment while in further training
UHG Umschulung maintenance payment while in retraining
UHG Darlehen maintenance payment as a loan
UHG Deutsch maintenance payment while in a German course
The original benefit payment information is given in three variables L1LA1, L2LA1 and L3LA1
with time varying three-digit codes.
Type of training from FuU-data
In this evaluation study one of the most important advantages compared to survey
data is the information about the precise type of training. It allows us to identify
homogeneous treatments for the evaluation. In the merging process, up to two
parallel FuU-spells were merged to one spell of the IABS data because in many
cases the FuU-data provided more than one parallel spell. These two parallel spells
provide two variables indicating the type of course (Maßnahmeart [FMASART1,
FMASART2]).
Aggregating the training type information Since type of treatment (Maß-
nahmeart) is often coded as “other adjustment”
(FMASART1=12 [Sonstige Anpassungen]) in the FuU-data, we increase the preci-
sion of information about the type of treatment by relying on the second parallel
information about the type of training: The second FuU-spell is used if the first
FuU-spell is coded as “other adjustment” (”Sonstige Anpassungen”) and a second
spell includes a code different from 12. Such combined information of FMASART1
and FMASART2 is referred to as FMASART* in the following.
Combining the information
When using information from different sources, the sources may give differing infor-
mation. If the training data indicated training participation and the benefit payment
data did not or vice versa we relied on the source which indicated training for the
following reasons. If somebody receives training related benefits it is more likely that
the employment agency forgot to fill in the training data record than the agency
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wrongly induced payment of benefits. And if somebody is contained in the training
data but does not receive maintenance benefits he either receives no benefits, which
is possible while being in training, or receives unemployment benefits/assistance and
the payment is just wrongly labelled.
If both training and benefit payment data indicate program participation but differ
in the type of program we generally use the training data information. An exam-
ple: the benefit payment indicates maintenance payments for further training and
the training data indicates Retraining. We use Retraining from the training data.
The only exception is unspecific program information from the training data “other
adjustment”. If in such cases the benefit payment data give specific information
like Retraining we use the information from benefit payment data. All possible
combinations of training and benefit payment information which we use to identifiy
participation in one of the three programs are given in the following section.
Coding plan for the treatment information
This section gives the exact coding plans for identification of Practice Firm, SPST
and Retraining. In general we identify program participation as start of a program
in an unemployment spell before another employment begins. This means that we
only identify a start of a program if the employment status in the first month of the
program indicates no employment (BTYP=1).
Practice Firm
Practice Firm is a consolidation of the program types Practice enterprise and Prac-
tice studio from the FuU training data. There is no specific benefit payment type
related to Practice Firms, rather the participants shall receive the general main-
tenance payment for further training. Since the training data are more reliable
than the benefit payment data regarding type of the program we identify Practice
Firm whenever FMASART shows the codes 11 or 12 independently of the payment
information.
Program code Label Label in German
10 Practice enterprise U¨bungsfirma
11 Practice studio U¨bungswerkstatt
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In table B.21 we show how often which combination of benefit payment information
and program type information identifies Practice Firm in the two inflow samples.
Table B.21: Identification of Practice Firm with program type and benefit payment
type: Frequencies
Type of payment
no benefits UB/UA maintenance benefits for
short term further retraining
Program training training Total
Practice enterprise 0 0 0 106 0 106
Practice studio 0 0 0 110 2 112
Total 0 0 0 216 2 218
Women and Men together. BTYP=1 as an additional requirement.
Provision of specific professional skills and techniques
We identify SPST in the following cases.
(a) Identification from training data and benefit payment data
We identify SPST if the training data indicates the general program “Other
adjustment” and the benefit payment information is no benefit payments,
unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance or maintenance payments
while in retraining.
Program
code
Label Label in German
12 Other adjustment of working skills sonst. Anpassung der berufl. Ken-
ntnisse
(b) Reliance on benefit payment data
We identify SPST if the program information from the training data is missing
and the benefit payment information is maintenance payments while in further
training.
Program
code
Label Label in German
-9 missing fehlende Angabe
(c) Additional program from training data
We also identify SPST when another program of little quantitative importance
but SPST–comparable content is recorded in the training data independent of
the benefit payment information.
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Program
code
Label Label in German
31 Further education of trainers and
multidisciplinary qualification
Heran-/Fortbildung v. Aus-
bildungskra¨ften/ berufs-
feldu¨bergreifende Qualifikation
(d) Additional combinatioin
Finally we identify SPST if the training data indicate the unspecific “other
career advancement” and the benefit payment information indicates further
training.
Program
code
Label Label in German
28 Other promotion sonstiger Aufstieg (< 97)
In table B.22 we show how often which combination of benefit payment information
and program type information identifies SPST in the two inflow samples.
Table B.22: Identification of SPST with program type and benefit payment type:
Frequencies
Type of payment
no benefits UB/UA maintenance
benefits for
Program further training Total
missing 0 0 549 549
Other adjustment of working skills 6 10 1158 1174
Other promotion 0 0 6 6
Further education of trainers and
multidisciplinary qualification 0 0 9 9
Total 6 10 1722 1738
Women and Men together. BTYP=1 as an additional requirement.
Retraining
Retraining or longer ”Qualification for the first labor market via the education sys-
tem” is taking part in a new vocational training and obtaining a new vocational
training degree according to the German dual education system. Additionally, but
quantitatively of little importance we see the make up of a missed examination “Cer-
tification” as comparable to retraining because the result is the same. Furthermore
and also only of marginal importance we see participation in the programs “Tech-
nican” or “Master of Business administration (not comparable to an american style
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MBA)” while not receiving maintenance benefits as a loan as Retraining. Conven-
tionally these two programs are considered as career advancement programs which
we do not evaluate. Benefits as a loan would underline their character as career
advancements.
(a) Identification from training data
We identify the following two programs as Retraining independent of the ben-
efit payment information.
Program
code
Label Label in German
29 Certification berufl. Abschlusspru¨fung
32 Retraining Umschulung
(b) Reliance on benefit payment data
If the training data is uninformative and maintenance benefits for Retraining
are paid we identify Retraining.
Program
code
Label Label in German
-9 missing fehlende Angabe
12 Other adjustment of working skills sonst. Anpassung der berufl. Ken-
ntnisse
(c) Other programs from training data
Two other programs are identified from the training data. They typically also
take two years full time and require an existing vocational training degree,
hence are somewhat comparable to retraining in a narrower definition. Not
identified if maintenance benefits are paid as a loan.
Program
code
Label Label in German
26 Technician Techniker (<97)
27 Master of business administration Betriebswirt (<97)
In table B.23 we show how often which combination of benefit payment information
and program type information identifies Retraining in the two inflow samples.
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Table B.23: Identification of Retraining with program type and benefit payment
type: Frequencies
Type of payment
no benefits UB/UA maintenance benefits
Program further training retraining loan Total
missing 0 0 0 55 0 55
Other adjustment of
working skills 0 0 0 13 0 13
Technician 0 0 0 0 0 0
Master of business
administration 0 0 0 0 0 0
Certification 0 0 1 0 0 1
Retraining 2 2 219 137 0 360
Total 2 2 220 205 0 429
Women and Men together. BTYP=1 as an additional requirement.
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Sample construction in comparison to LMW
Table B.24: Overview sample construction
this paper LMW
Inflow sample starts unemployment spell in
93/94
starts unemployment spell in
93/94
Treatment group starts a program within 24
months after beginning of un-
employment spell
starts a program between begin-
ning of unemployment spell and
the end of 94
Control group dynamic control group: does
not start a program in the stra-
tum of unemployment under
consideration
static control group: does not
start a program between begin-
ning of unemployment spell and
the end of 94
Treatment identi-
fication
training spell in the training
participation data or income
maintenance spell in the bene-
fit payment data indicating pro-
gram participation
training spell in the training
participation data
Age restriction 25–55 years (25–50 in case of
RT) in the year of entry into un-
employment
20–53 years in the year of the
(simulated) program start
Benefit payment
restriction
controls have to receive unem-
ployment benefits at least once
during the first 12 months of
their unemployment spell
recipience of benefits in the
month before program start for
participants and in the month
before as well as in the month
of the simulated program start
for controls
Other restrictions without East Berlin last employment before defin-
ing unemployment spell not as
trainee, home worker, appren-
tice, or in part-time with less
than half of the usual ours; no
foreigners
Sample size RT Women: 189 (=61+75+53),
Men: 219 (=107+79+33), num-
bers in parenthesis differenti-
ated by strata
Women: 190, Men: 255
Sample size SPST
(this paper) and
short and long
training (LMW)
Women: 1063
(=254+374+435), Men: 485
(=200+141+144)
Women: 557 (=209 (short)
+ 348 (long)), Men: 302
(=112+190)
Sample size non-
participants
Women: 4585, Men: 5076 (not
directly comparable to the dy-
namic control groups used in
the paper)
Women: 2914, Men: 1690
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B.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Target
Profession
B.3.1 Retraining for Men
In this section we show heterogeneous treatment effects of retraining on men. We
contrast retraining (RT) with target profession in construction with RT with other
target profession (non-construction).
The effects are estimated in the same way as the non-disaggregated effects in the
paper. We used the same propensity score specifications and bandwidth as in the
paper.
Table B.25: Sample sizes: Retraining for men by target profession
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Construction 40 29 19
Non-construction 50 40 13
missing 17 10 1
Total 107 79 33
Remark: The participants are classified according to the field in which they are retrained.
This information is only available from the training participation data and hence is missing
if participation is identified from the benefit payment data.
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